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Context: Online economic crime leverages information technologies (IT) for illegal wealth 
redistribution, such as banking theft. Such crime requires a series of actions, a scheme, 
to be successful. Informal workers, individuals whose economic activities escape 
regulations, can be leveraged to execute various tasks surrounding these schemes. 
However, what these workers represent for online economic crime organizations, and their 
impact on the reach and sophistication of the crime, has yet to be uncovered. This thesis 
focuses on understanding the contexts, motivations, and organizations of those behind 
online economic crime. While doing so, it assesses the role and availability of an informal 
IT workforce surrounding the crime organization and its likelihood to participate in such 
criminal schemes.  
Methods and Data: This thesis builds on three data sources: (1) 21 semi-structured 
interviews with experts, (2) a private chat log containing discussions among individuals 
involved in online economic crime, and (3) two datasets on an informal IT workforce 
operating on a digital labor platform. A blend of qualitative and quantitative analyses is 
developed, including inductive thematic analysis, non-parametric statistical hypothesis 
tests, and group-based trajectory modeling. 
Results: The findings illustrate three key contextual factors influencing those behind 
online economic crime: a lack of legal economic opportunities, a lack of deterrents and the 
availability of drifting means. Organizations behind online economic crime are found to 
take various forms, from organized, to enterprise-like, loose networks or communities. 
They are also characterized by a large sphere of influence given the indispensable 
workers hired to help with the crime orchestration. Among them, informal workers from the 
IT sector are found to be particularly important: they represent a pool of potential workers 
for all legal tasks surrounding online economic crime, and they can be leveraged easily 
due to digital labor platforms. However, further investigations illustrate that the benefits of 
hiring informal IT workers may be hindered by high transaction costs, including high hiring, 
switching, and monitoring costs. Moreover, the likelihood of informal IT workers to 
participate in crime-oriented spaces is found to be limited. 
Conclusion: This study sheds light on the organization of online economic crime and the 
role of informal IT workers at the periphery. It provides both theoretical and empirical 
explanations as to why online economic crime is characterized by long reach, in terms of 
victims, and sophistication. It also offers nuanced concepts (e.g., drifters, informal 
workforce) to better grasp the organization of online economic crime and the degrees of 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Information technologies1 (ITs) have become a central component of everyday 
life and, with them, new crime opportunities have emerged, especially profit-driven crime 
opportunities. ITs connect individuals all around the world in an instant, providing 
diffusion capabilities beyond geographic borders. Such contraction increases the 
number of crime opportunities, as individuals do not need to physically move to commit a 
crime and can target multiple victims at the same time (Llinares and Johnson, 2018; 
Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016; Yar, 2005). These opportunities are appealing up to the point 
that Anderson et al. (2019) estimated that, nowadays, half of profit-driven crimes are 
happening online.  
ITs also influence the organization behind criminal activities. For example, crime-
related products and services can be traded and new business partnerships can be 
established (Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017d). In addition, a large number of 
workers offer their services online (Schmidt, 2017; Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016; 
Drahokoupil and Piasna, 2017), and these services can be used for criminal purposes 
without their necessarily knowing. Indeed, the neutrality (or detachment) of many tasks 
achieved through IT creates a grey area that can be leveraged by those orchestrating 
online criminal schemes (Leukfeldt et al., 2020; Bijlenga and Kleemans, 2018).  
So far, extant research has investigated the organization of criminal groups 
involved in IT-related profit-driven crime, known as profit-driven cybercrime. However, 
profit-driven cybercrime is a wide concept, mixing both online market transactions (e.g., 
sale of an illicit product) and illegal redistribution of wealth (e.g., theft). This thesis 
focuses only on the former, online economic crime, which refers to illegal wealth 
distribution through online means. Examples of online economic crime include 
ransomware attacks or credit card thefts. 
Online economic crime is characterized by its long reach in terms of number of 
victims (Tcherni et al., 2016). Moreover, several online economic crime schemes, such 
as sextortion spam (Paquet-Clouston et al., 2019), banking theft (Kuraku and Kalla 
 
1 Information technologies can be defined as any technologies “used to acquire, store, organize and process data as well as disseminate 
processed data which can be used in specified applications” (Rajaraman, 2018, p.17). 
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2020, Garcia et al., 2019), or ransomware (Paquet-Clouston et al., 2018; Huang et al., 
2018) involve targeting as many people (or companies) as possible to increase the 
chances of successfully stealing money. The crime is also characterized by 
sophistication (as opposed to street wallet theft); it requires several steps to be 
successful, from enticing a user to click on malicious links to compromising a bank 
account, all the way up to money laundering (Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017c).  
Despite the international nature of ITs, organizations involved in online economic 
crime have been found to be locally embedded. Their structure also resembles that of 
traditional criminal groups (Leukfeldt et al., 2020; Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Lusthaus, 2018; 
Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 2017; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a,b,c; 
Leukfeldt, 2014). Still, much has to be uncovered on the contexts, motivations, and 
organizations of those behind such crime. This is especially true considering that many 
aspects surrounding online economic crime, such as building websites, resemble licit 
activities in the IT sector. Already, the involvement of a necessary class of IT workers in 
activities surrounding online economic crime has been mentioned in several studies 
(Collier et al., 2020; Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Bijlenga and Kleemans, 2018; Leukfeldt, 
Kleemans and Stol, 2017a,b,c,d).  
Moreover, to recruit IT workers, there exist online digital labor platforms: 
unregulated spaces that host a large pool of IT workers at a very low cost (Schmidt, 
2017; Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016; Drahokoupil and Piasna, 2017). Due to their 
unregulated status, a lot of work taking place through them can be considered as 
informal: the means by which a product or a service is produced and distributed takes 
place outside the law (Castell and Porter, 1989). Just like in traditional informal markets, 
these informal spaces represent attractive settings for criminal organizations (Sabet, 
2015). Already, a small number of studies have shown that some of the tasks offered on 
digital labor platforms are related to shady activities (Farooqi et al., 2017; Garg, Camp 
and Kanich, 2013; Motoyama et al., 2013). What these workers represent for online 
economic crime organizations, and their impact on the reach and sophistication of the 
crime, has yet to be uncovered. Such an assessment may yield insights on various 
avenues to deter and prevent such crime by motivated offenders, but also by informal IT 
workers involved at the periphery of the crime. 
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This thesis focuses on understanding the contexts, motivations, and 
organizations of those behind online economic crime. While doing so, it assesses the 
role and availability of an informal workforce surrounding the crime organization and its 
likelihood to participate in these criminal schemes. To this end, three sources of data are 
used: (1) 21 semi-structured interviews with experts, (2) a chat log containing private 
discussions among individuals involved in online economic crime, and (3) two 
quantitative datasets of an informal workforce operating on a digital labor platform.  
In the first part of the thesis, the two qualitative sources of data (interviews and 
private chat log) are used to uncover the contexts, motivations, and organizations of 
those behind online economic crime. From these analyses, the importance of informal IT 
workers in the orchestration of the crime is uncovered. Consequently, the second part of 
the thesis uses two quantitative datasets on an informal IT workforce to assess its 
relationship between informal and crime-oriented spaces.  
The thesis starts by presenting, in Chapter 2, a review of relevant empirical 
research on the topic, which includes studies on the organization of criminal groups and 
those behind profit-driven cybercrime as well as studies on informal markets and digital 
labor platforms. The theoretical frameworks used are outlined: Reuter’s (1983) study on 
the consequences of product illegality, Naylor’s (2003) profit-driven cybercrime, and 
Matza’s (1990) drift concept. Then, Chapter 3 outlines the research objectives and 
questions. A figure with the thesis workflow is also provided. Two objectives lead this 
thesis; each of them is answered with two analyses.  
The first objective is to uncover the contexts and motivations that may 
drive individuals to participate in online economic crime. Twenty-one semi-directed 
interviews are conducted with experts knowledgeable on the topic. The methods and 
data are presented in Chapter 4. Then, Chapter 5, entitled Experts’ Perceptions: 
Contexts, Motivations and Organizations, presents the results. The analysis uncovers 
three contextual factors that influence individuals to participate in online economic crime: 
a lack of legal economic opportunities, a lack of deterrents, and drifting means. Their 
confluence in a specific setting is likely to predict the presence of a large population of 
individuals involved in online economic crime. In terms of potential motivators mentioned 
by experts, financial gains and feelings (including pride, fame, excitement and power 
over others) are identified. Financial gain is of no surprise as online economic crime is a 
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profit-driven crime, but investigating this question led to discovering that only a small 
proportion of individuals are perceived as successful in their criminal endeavors. Within 
Chapter 5, experts’ narratives suggest that the organization behind online economic 
crime takes many forms, from organized to loosely structured or enterprise-like. 
Regardless of these structures, individuals involved in online economic crime are 
dependent on a population of individuals evolving at the periphery, called indispensable 
workers: indispensable as a group, yet dispensable as individuals. 
Uncovering contexts and motivations behind online economic crime is also 
achieved by analyzing private conversations among individuals involved in online 
economic crime. Chapter 6 presents the methods and data for this analysis. Then the 
results are presented in Chapter 7, entitled: Private Chats: Dancing on the Crime Line. 
In short, the individuals studied are advertising malicious Android applications on their 
websites on behalf of a criminal group. Their conversations illustrated that they are 
amateur workers working in IT and facing an adverse business environment. They seek 
economic independence yet do not achieve it. These individuals are found, in the end, to 
be the indispensable workers mentioned by experts.  
The results of the two qualitative analyses emphasize the existence of 
indispensable workers surrounding online economic crime organization. They are 
positioned at the periphery of the criminal group, and their mass forms a sphere of 
economic influence that those orchestrating online economic crime can exploit. One 
strand of indispensable workers that are key to online economic crime is informal 
workers from the IT sector.  
Furthermore, the private conversations analyzed in Chapters 6 and 7 led to 
uncovering a digital labor platform for IT-related products and services. Digital 
labor platforms host a pool of potential IT workers for those behind online economic 
crime. Their presence suggests, a priori, that online economic crime groups could hire a 
large workforce. Yet, based on insights from the private chat log in Chapter 7 (coupled 
with previous research), the benefits of hiring workers online may be mitigated by 
transaction costs, including hiring costs (e.g., finding the worker with the right skills), 
switching costs (e.g., costs associated to switching worker afterwards), and monitoring 
costs (e.g., making sure the job is done).  
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The benefits may also be limited by informal workers’ willingness to participate in 
criminal activities. To assess this, the digital labor platform uncovered in Chapters 6 and 
7 is leveraged. This platform is called the “informal platform” throughout the thesis. 
Information on the IT workforce operating on the informal platform is extracted and the 
concept of drifter is developed. Drifters are informal workers who have commented at 
least once in crime-oriented platforms (e.g., carding, hacking platforms).  
The second objective of this study is to assess drifters’ relationship 
between informal and crime-oriented spaces. Drifters are identified in the informal IT 
workforce. Whether they form a distinctive group is evaluated through a series of non-
parametric tests comparing drifters’ behaviors on the informal platform with non-drifters. 
Chapter 8 presents the methods and data for this quantitative analysis. Chapter 9, 
entitled: Indistinguishable Drifters, presents the results, which show that only a small 
proportion of IT workers are drifters, and they are relatively indistinguishable in the 
workforce studied based on the indicators developed.  
The second objective is also answered through an additional analysis of drifters’ 
posting behavior in the informal platform vs crime-oriented platforms through a nine-year 
period. Data and methods are presented in Chapter 10. The results are presented in 
Chapter 11, entitled: Drifter Trajectories Favor Informality. They illustrate that most 
drifters favor the informal space over crime-oriented ones over time. Overall, drifters’ 
engagement in crime-oriented platforms is limited. Such minimal drift recalls Matza’s 
(1990) statement that drift is transient and rather rare for most individuals.  
Chapter 12 provides a discussion of the thesis results. Four discussion points 
emerge: 1) understanding the underlying forces that influence individuals to participate in 
online economic crime, 2) exploring their organizations and the role of informal workers 
involved, 3) illustrating the benefits and difficulties of hiring such a workforce through 
digital labor platforms, and 4) presenting the workforce’s limited involvement in crime-
oriented platforms. They are put in relation with the literature on the topic. Study limits 
and future research are also presented.  
The conclusion is presented in Chapter 13. Additional follow-up ideas are 
introduced. One suggests that specific settings where the contextual factors (identified in 
this thesis) converge may foster large and structured organizations behind online 
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economic crime. Another idea proposes that the informal workforce uncovered may 
partly explain the crime’s reach and sophistication. A third idea suggests that there is a 
need to think beyond motivated offenders when studying online economic crime, taking 
more nuanced approaches. Lastly, further thoughts on how to prevent online economic 
crime participation (from an informal IT worker perspective) are briefly outlined. 
In sum, this study sheds light on the organization of online economic crime and 
the role of informal workers at the periphery. It provides both theoretical and empirical 
explanations as to why online economic crime is characterized by long reach, in terms of 
victims, and sophistication. It also offers nuanced concepts (e.g., drifters, informal 
workforce) to better grasp the organization of online economic crime and the degrees of 
involvement of those surrounding the crime.  
As the reader might have noticed, the thesis structure differs from that of 
traditional theses. For each analysis, the methods and data are presented first, 
followed by the results. This structure is the most efficient one to allow readers to keep 






Chapter 2.  
 
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Review 
As a reminder, this thesis focuses on understanding the contexts, motivations, 
and organizations of those behind online economic crime. While doing so, it assesses 
the role and availability of an informal workforce surrounding the crime organization and 
its likelihood to participate in these criminal schemes.  
The theoretical framework and empirical review section binds together several 
strands of literature that are helpful to position the thesis’ results in extant literature. The 
section starts by reviewing what is known on the organization of criminal groups and 
moves to the organization of those behind profit-driven cybercrime. How online 
economic crime is conceptualized, based on Naylor’s (2003) profit-driven typology, is 
also presented.  
Then, considering the role of informal workers in online economic crime 
organization, what is known on informal economies and digital labor platforms that 
gather IT-related workers is subsequently introduced. To understand how and why 
individuals, such as informal workers, end up participating in crime, Matza’s (1990) drift 
concept and Goldsmith and Brewer’s (2015) digital drift idea are finally outlined.  
2.1. On the Organization of Criminal Groups 
Reviewing the literature on the organization of criminal groups provides insights 
on the dynamics that influence their size, scope, and structure. These insights can be 
used to understand the organization of groups behind online economic crime. What, 
then, is known about the organization of criminal groups?  
Similar to popular journalistic depictions of organized crime, Cressey (1969) 
argued that criminal groups are organized as hierarchical bureaucracies that control the 
supply of illegal products and services. However, although such bureaucracies do exist, 
this conceptualization was found to depict outlier cases (Edwards and Levi, 2008; Paoli 
et al., 2007). Instead, in general, individuals operating in illicit realms are found be 
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loosely organized. They are known to associate for a few economic transactions and 
split afterwards (Morselli, 2009; Morselli et al., 2007; Reuter and Haaga, 1989).  
Reuter (1983) convincingly outlined how those operating in concealed 
environments are forced to stay within a small size and scope due to the consequences 
of product2 illegality. Indeed, the legal status of the product affects the way in which it is 
produced and distributed. Reuter’s (1983) framework was found to be useful in this 
thesis to understand various tradeoffs that those behind online economic crime face 
when developing their schemes. Indeed, although the goal of online economic crime is 
illegal wealth redistribution, there exists a whole enterprise behind the crime 
orchestration. A short summary of Reuter’s ideas is therefore presented below.  
Reuter (1983) argued that since contracts are not enforceable in court law, the 
asset produced and distributed may be seized by law enforcement. Since all participants 
face risks of arrest, information on the production and distribution of the product must be 
controlled. As employees represent a major threat to entrepreneurs, the larger the 
number of employees the higher the risk. In addition, monitoring employees’ 
performance is difficult given that they operate in covert settings (p.117). Thus, having a 
large pool of employees is unlikely as relationships must be structured around providing 
little information on the activities of those involved.  
For these reasons, the supply process is likely to be fragmented, preventing 
entrepreneurs from vertically integrating the production process forward or backward 
which, usually, would allow them to tap into economies of scale and eventually control 
the provision of the input and its costs (p.120). Moreover, with limited access to credit, 
entrepreneurs do not have access to external credits, nor can they separate ownership 
and management (as is the case in large legal companies) nor transfer their ownership. 
Theoretically, the growth of an illegal firm is short and limited to the lifetime of the 
entrepreneur (p.122).  
Reuter (1983) added that entrepreneurs can try to corrupt law enforcement for 
their organizational growth, thus requiring the corrupted police officers to regulate the 
market and decreasing the risks of arrest. However, if a police structure is complex and 
 
2 The analysis could also be applied to firms providing illegal services. However, the term 
“product” is used in the summary for simplicity purposes.   
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many agencies have power over the entrepreneur’s territory, the likeliness of bribing all 
agencies and getting away with it is low (p.126).  
Final customers, such as drug users, of the product represent a significant 
threat to entrepreneurs: they take few precautions, they are not loyal, they are many, 
they face few legal consequences, and they represent the starting point for most law 
enforcement investigations. For these reasons, to prevent contact, the entrepreneur 
must fragment tasks. Developing customers’ goodwill therefore becomes difficult as the 
customer knows only the person with whom they3 deal. Advertising the product and 
creating a brand to develop customer loyalty is thus futile (p.129).  
Illegal enterprises also are likely to stay within a small geographic scope 
because they cannot monitor distant agents for performance nor control the hazard 
associated with transportation and communications. As more borders are crossed, the 
multiplication of law enforcement agencies potentially investigating the illegal activities 
increases as well. This, coupled with the inability of the entrepreneur to develop brand 
loyalty, will prevent an enterprise’s geographical growth (p.130).  
Lastly, diversification of similar products is likely to happen as there is a quick 
profit margin to be gained by reducing consumers’ search costs4. Diversification across 
unrelated product lines is not likely to happen, on the other hand, mainly due to 
increased exposure. Reuter (1983) concluded that illegal markets are much more 
competitive than previously thought due to two driving forces: 1) concern for police 
intervention and 2) lack of enforceable legal contracts. Illegal markets are consequently 
likely to be populated by localized, fragmented, ephemeral, and undiversified enterprises 
(p.132).  
Bouchard and Morselli (2014) reviewed the literature on the size of criminal 
organizations and corroborated that criminal organizations are likely to be small. The 
authors found that they are typically formed of fewer than 10 individuals, a pattern that 
emerges across time, space and markets. More precisely, the size of criminal 
organizations follows a power-law distribution with the majority of groups being small 
(from 2 to 5, fewer than 10) and a few representing large groups, the most visible ones 
 
3 “They” is used to avoid gender-specific phrasing throughout the thesis.  
4 Refers to opportunity costs associated with searching for a product. 
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(p.294). However, the authors highlighted that small groups often loosely collaborate 
with ongoing criminal networks, which does not require the participation of all group 
members. This raises questions on the conceptualization around the size and scope of 
organizations beyond direct membership, as discussed below.  
2.1.1. Boundary Specification Beyond Group Membership  
The concept of “economic influence” brought forth in Tremblay, Bouchard and 
Petit (2009), conceptualizes criminal organization less as a strict group with specific 
membership statuses, but more as a network of individuals interdependent on one 
another yet embedded within a criminal market. Economic influence is not an attribute of 
a criminal organization, but rather a relational outcome; it captures the effect of a 
criminal group outside of its specified boundaries (p.4-5). The authors conclude that a 
small organization of about 100 individuals can have a relatively large sphere of 
economic influence, reaching thousands of individuals working in the market or in its 
periphery.  
Consequently, criminal groups are organized through “a resource pooling 
process that is built around individuals who are socially embedded in various ways 
beyond co-membership in a criminal organization” (Bouchard and Morselli , 2014, p.298-
299). Opportunistic structures constitute a better configuration of criminal organizations, 
opportunisitic because 1) criminal organizations lack history or reputation; 2) they are 
small at the operative level; and 3) they lack sophisticated internal organization 
(Bouchard and Morselli, 2014, p.294).  
Within the sphere of influence of criminal groups, a multitude of legitimate actors 
are involved in various parts of the supply chain, such as transporters, corrupted 
officials, investors, lawyers, and accountants (Morselli and Giguère, 2006; Lyman and 
Potter, 2001). These actors are known as facilitators and defined as participants, from 
the legitimate realm, who provide operational services to individuals involved in criminal 
activities (for a review, see Morselli and Giguère, 2006). For example, Bouchard and 
Dion (2012) reported legitimate shops that provided cannabis cultivators with proper 
equipment. Facilitators provide legitimate status, business experience, financial capital, 
and logistical resources to criminal organizations, while even sometimes filling key roles 
in criminal ventures (Morselli and Giguère, 2006).  
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These individuals may end up involved in criminal organizations due to social 
opportunity structures, where individuals in the direct social environments of those 
involved in the criminal activities are drawn into these activities (Kleemans and De Poot, 
2008; Kleemans and van de Bunt, 2003; Kleemans and Van de Bunt, 1999). Kleemans 
and De Poot (2008) identified five mechanisms that explain why individuals may end up 
involved in criminal groups: 1) existing social ties, 2) work and profession, 3) leisure 
activities and sidelines, 4) life events and 5) being recruited. Whether these individuals 
may end up involved in criminal groups may also depend on various contextual factors.  
This raises the question: what contextual factors influence the growth of an 
organization? The conclusion that criminal organizations are small in size, and scope 
compares the size of such organizations with legal ones (Bouchard and Ouellet, 2011). 
The variation in organization size, once the consequence of product illegality is 
considered, may depend on various characteristics, such as the type of product traded 
or the pool of individuals willing to associate. The optimal size of a criminal organization 
is a product of its environment (Bouchard and Ouellet, 2011; Donaldson, 2001). Looking 
at the literature on shifts and patterns in the mobility of criminal groups can offer 
information on the factors influencing their size and scope..  
2.1.2. Contextual Factors Influencing the Size of Criminal 
Organizations  
Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti (2011) reviewed past studies to examine what 
influences shifts and patterns in the mobility of criminal groups. They identified various 
push (driving individuals out of a setting) and pull (drawing individuals to a setting) 
factors that may influence group patterns across a variety of settings. 
Pull factors create criminogenic environments and offer a high volume of 
interesting illegal opportunities; seven were identified: mass demand, access to supply, 
lax law enforcement, high impunity/corruption, proximity to trafficking routes, porous 
borders, and the presence of brokers and facilitators. In short, mass demand and mass 
supply create market opportunities while lax law enforcement and high 
impunity/corruption allow individuals to believe that they will not face the consequences 
of their actions. Trafficking routes and porous borders matter for specific illegal products 
such as drugs while the presence of brokers and facilitators often helps the criminal 
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organization with market segmentation and dealing with what the authors call “ordinary 
citizens”.  
Only two push factors, driving individuals outside of a criminal setting, were 
subsequently identified: increased law enforcement and increased competition from 
criminal groups. These two factors could lead individuals to stop their criminal activities, 
either due to risks of arrest or due to the meager profit yielded by these activities. Paoli, 
Greenfield and Reuter (2009) also provided an explicit proposition that law enforcement 
effectiveness has a direct impact on the size of criminal organizations.  
 Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti (2011) differentiated between the strategic context, 
where individuals organize around available opportunities, and the emergent context, 
where opportunities influence individuals to organize. However, their main conclusion 
was that opportunities matter more than the group itself in explaining growth and mobility 
in criminal groups, as the problems concerning locations and markets are persistent 
through time while the groups exploiting them are small and transient (p.165).  
Tremblay, Cusson and Morselli (1998) identified three arguments that may 
explain the limits to growth of criminal organizations: 1) the consequences of product 
illegality, 2) unequal availability of corruption opportunities in various settings and 
jurisdictions, and 3) social norms/moral condemnation. As the consequence of product 
illegality was already discussed above, only the two other arguments are briefly outlined 
below. Unequal availability of corruption opportunities refers to the uncertainty and 
difficulty of successfully bribing law enforcement agents across time and space. 
Corrupted agents may yield impunity to individuals, and subsequent organizational 
growth, but maintaining relationships via corruption is relentless and uncertain. Social 
norms and moral censure refer to the degree of moral acceptance, in a society, of the 
organizational criminal activities.  
When the illegal product or service is widely condemned socially (e.g., human 
trafficking or the trading of human organs), those trading it will face additional 
constraints, such as having to hide not only from law enforcement, but also from 
everyone surrounding the criminal activity. Dewey (2016) similarly differentiated 
legitimate/illegitimate markets from illegal/legal ones, highlighting that some markets 
may be illegal according to the law, but considered legitimate by the population, thus 
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increasing the potential number of market participants compared to illegal and 
illegitimate markets.  
When studying the size and influence of criminal organizations, Tremblay, 
Bouchard and Petit (2009) highlighted, as well, that where impunity is prevalent, criminal 
organizations tend to grow to wider territories as “criminal organizations tend to be large 
in settings where states are weak and opportunities abundant” (p.2). However, the 
authors’ argument centered around the idea that, by focusing on the small size of 
criminal organizations -in terms of direct members- researchers, law enforcement 
officials, and policy makers may miss an important aspect of the organizations’ reach, as 
discussed above.  
Organizational reach may expand further given the rise of information 
technologies that are transforming all aspects of society. These technologies modify 
criminal commitment, making them more ephemeral and flexible (Goldsmith and Brewer, 
2015). They also provide capacity (e.g., skills) and accessibility (e.g., potential 
collaborators) to criminal organizations involved in profit-driven activities (Leukfeldt et al., 
2019). To provide insights on information technologies and criminal groups, the following 
section digs into the organization of profit-driven cybercrime.  
2.1.3. On the Organization of Profit-Driven Cybercrime 
Information technologies (ITs) can be considered as any technology “used to 
acquire, store, organize and process data as well as disseminate processed data which 
can be used in specified applications” (Rajaraman, 2018, p.17). Through new criminal 
opportunities, these technologies have influenced various forms of crime (Wall, 2007). 
For example, new types of crime have surfaced, like unauthorized access to computers 
(i.e., cybercrime) or mischief in relation to computer data. Other types of crimes have 
transformed: cheque fraud is (almost) a thing of the past, while online identity fraud is 
booming (Kemp, Llinares and Moneva, 2020; Anderson et al., 2019; Rege, 2009). The 
means have also evolved as, for instance, the possibility of doing online transactions has 
led to the rise of online drug marketplaces (Barratt, Ferris and Winstock, 2016; Christin, 
2012; Décary-Hétu et al., 2012). All in all, as societies are developing and organizing 
around ITs, so are individuals behind criminal activities (Wall, 2007).  
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Usually, criminal activities related to the use of information technologies are 
known as “cybercrime”, and “profit-driven cybercrime” is cybercrime with a financial 
motive (as opposed to an ideological or political motive). Those behind cybercrime with 
profit motives are likely to form organizations or groups to orchestrate their activities (as 
opposed to lone wolves) (Broadhurst et al., 2014). Profit-driven cybercrime 
encompasses online economic crime, but also other types of crime, such as the sale of 
illegal drugs, as explained in the following section.  
This section focuses on reviewing the literature on profit-driven cybercrime given 
that several studies have looked at how those behind profit-driven cybercrime organize 
(Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Lusthaus, 2018; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, b, c, d; 
Odinot et al., 2017; Bulanova-Hristova et al., 2016; Leukfeldt, 2014). The three main 
findings of these studies can be summarized as (1) online offender convergence settings 
play an important role, (2) the organization of those involved in profit-driven cybercrime 
is still locally embedded and (3) their structure is similar to that of traditional criminal 
groups. Each of these findings is discussed below.  
Online Offender Convergence Settings  
When studying profit-driven cybercrime, one can hardly ignore online meeting 
places where such criminal activities are discussed. Extant research has looked at how 
online meeting places are organized, focusing on open and closed forums and chat 
rooms as well as darknet markets (also known as cryptomarkets or anonymous online 
marketplaces). They are known as loose and flexible networks of individuals who 
sometimes associate for criminal purposes (Dupont et al., 2017; Dupont et al., 2016; 
Holt and Smirnova 2014; Yip, Webber and Shadbolt, 2013; Holt 2013; Motoyama et al. 
2013; Décary-Hétu and Dupont 2012; Christin, 2012; Holt and Lampke 2010 and many 
more).  
Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol (2017d) summarized well the function of these 
online places by using Felson’s (2006) offender convergence setting concept5. “Offender 
convergence settings” refers to physical places where individuals involved in criminal 
activities meet, such as bars, to ensure continuity and structures in their groups. These 
 
5 Soudijn and Zegers (2012) also employed the term in their paper Cybercrime and virtual 
offender convergence settings. 
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places also allow the recruiting of individuals outside of the criminal groups’ direct 
network. In the traditional literature, offender convergence settings are important as 
social relationships are clustered  and sometimes criminal groups need to find outsiders 
to complete their schemes (Kleemans, 2007); these settings provide a place for them to 
reach beyond their direct network.  
Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol (2017d) posited that online meeting places, such 
as forums and chat rooms, represent online offender convergence settings that can be 
used for market (trading of products or services), social (discussing), or learning (sharing 
skills) purposes. Through them, criminal expertise can be sought, co-offenders can be 
found, various criminally related products can be bought and sold, and even new skills 
can be learned (Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017d). The sphere of economic 
influence of criminal groups who make use of them can expand significantly. 
Research on the economic aspect of these settings have highlighted the industry 
that has developed, one that specializes in the production, distribution, and sale of illegal 
online products and services. This industry centers around specialization and 
professionalization (Thomas et al., 2015), increasing the productivity and profitability of 
the individuals involved (Lusthaus, 2018; Moore et al., 2009). Thus, one does not need 
to know the whole crime script of credit card fraud as one can just steal credit cards and 
sell them online to other users specialized in cashing out (Hutching and Holt, 2015). 
Through this industry, highly skilled individuals can specialize in one skill and outsource 
the remaining tasks (Van Wegberg et al., 2018).   
Local Embeddedness   
Although information technologies are borderless, most profit-driven cybercrime 
organizations are still locally embedded: individual context and social ties matter. 
Lusthaus and Varese (2021) and Lusthaus (2018) emphasized the offline and local 
dimension that characterize groups behind profit-driven cybercrime. Many studies also 
showed that online offender convergence settings do not necessarily play an important 
role in the growth and origin of criminal networks involved in profit-driven cybercrime 
(Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 2017; Leukfeldt, Kleemans 
and Stol, 2017a, b, c, d; Leukfeldt, 2014).  
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For example, Leukfeldt (2014) presented a case study of phishing in Amsterdam 
and found that the current literature provided an incomplete picture by focusing only on 
online settings. In the given case study, the author highlighted that group members knew 
each other from the physical world rather than through online interactions. Those 
engaged in the phishing scheme were found to be limited by their social opportunity 
structure (Kleemans and De Poot, 2008): the people they knew. They did not take 
advantage of large offender convergence settings where phishing schemes were 
discussed and orchestrated as reported in Soudijn and Zegers (2012). Considering 
these findings, Leukfeldt (2014) stressed the importance of identifying trends in the 
origin and growth of criminal organizations beyond online settings.  
Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol (2017a,b) investigated criminal networks involved 
in online banking theft (phishing and malware) in The Netherlands, Germany, the United 
States and United Kingdom. They evaluated whether the networks studied grew due to 
social contacts (who you know, your connections through your everyday life) or forum 
interactions. By comparing social contacts with forum interactions, the authors 
developed four models of organizational growth: “(1) growth entirely through social 
contacts, (2) social contacts as a base and forums to recruit specialists, (3) forums as a 
base and social contacts to recruit local criminals and (4) growth entirely through forums” 
(Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, p.17). Findings illustrated that most of the 
networks studied fell into the first two models, suggesting that “offline” social contacts 
still play an important role in the formation, functioning and growth of criminal networks 
involved in profit-driven cybercrime.   
Note that criminal groups that formed mainly via forum interactions (models 3 
and 4) were less prevalent, but still existed. Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol (2017a,b,c) 
found evidence of these groups in criminal networks involved in online banking theft. 
These criminal networks formed flexible associations with members established in 
different countries. They were more likely to conduct high tech crimes (such as 
sophisticated malware to steal banking credentials) that do not require a high degree of 




Structure Similar to Traditional Criminal Organizations  
To conceptualize the organization of profit-driven cybercrime, Leukfeldt, 
Lavorgna and Kleemans (2017) investigated whether criminal networks involved in 
online banking theft met the definitions of organized crime. The authors concluded that, 
given loose definitions of organized crime as more or less stable organizations with 
structured links among individuals, the networks studied held the minimum sets of 
characteristics necessary to be considered “organized crime”. However, the authors 
highlighted that the cybercriminal networks studied were far from how organized crime is 
usually depicted, namely, as long-term hierarchical organizations with power in the 
economic and political spheres (see von Lampe (2008) for differences between 
conceptions and realities around “organized crime”).  
Instead, the structure of profit-driven cybercrime organizations resembles that of 
traditional criminal organizations: small and loosely organized (Leukfeldt et al., 2019; 
Lusthaus, 2018; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 2017; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and 
Stol, 2017a, b, c, d; Leukfeldt, 2014). For example, Leukfeldt (2014), Leukfeldt, 
Kleemans and Stol (2017a,b,c) analyzed various networks involved in online banking 
theft and found that none of the networks studied had a strict hierarchical structure, yet 
they all had dependency relationships and functional roles. Through these studies, the 
authors illustrated that the majority of networks studied had three layers: core members 
who initiate and coordinate the attack, enablers6 who provide services necessary for the 
crime script, and money mules who help hide financial trails. 
When analyzing enablers, Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol (2017a, b, c) 
differentiated two types: professionals and recruited. Professional enablers provide 
professional services (usually criminal, such as writing malware) to all kind of criminal 
groups. Recruited enablers, on the other hand, are recruited by a criminal group for a 
specific service, such as a bank employee who can provide information on victims’ 
accounts. Recruited enablers are usually involved with only one criminal network and 
are given a small fee for their service. Both types of enablers are recruited through social 
 
6 In Leukfeldt (2014) and Leukfeldt et al. (2020), individuals providing services to core members 
are called facilitators, rather than enablers, recalling the concept used in previous studies to talk 
about actors from the legal realm involved in criminal organizations (for a review, see Morselli and 
Giguère, 2006).  
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contacts or online offender convergence settings (Leukfeldt et al. 2020; Leukfeldt, 
Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, b, c; Leukfeldt, 2014). 
Overall, most organizations involved in profit-driven cybercrime are locally 
embedded and their structures are similar to traditional criminal organizations (Leukfeldt 
et al., 2020; Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Lusthaus, 2018; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 
2017; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, b, c; Leukfeldt, 2014). However, profit-
driven cybercrime is a broad term that encompasses online economic crime. Why the 
concept of “online economic crime” is preferred in this thesis is explained below. 
2.2. From Cybercrime to Online Economic Crime 
Crime that leverages information technologies usually falls under the cybercrime 
umbrella. This section starts by briefly outlining the impracticalities of the concept that 
led me to avoid talking about cybercrime in general. Then, based on Naylor’s (2003) 
profit-driven crime theory, how online economic crime is viewed and understood in this 
thesis is explained.  
Cybercrime is a wide concept in criminology as most definitions of cybercrime 
refer to the use of “cyberspace” to “facilitate acts of crimes and deviance” (Holt and 
Bossler, 2014, p.21). In such a definition, cybercrime encompasses any kind of crime 
that uses technology, such as malware, cyberbullying, or online sexual exploitation of 
children. To make sense of this broad concept, several typologies have been developed, 
one of the most cited being Wall’s (2007) typology, separating computer-integrity crime 
(e.g., cracking); computer-assisted crime (e.g., fraud, thefts); and computer-content 
crime (e.g., revenge porn). This typology, however, is limited as most crimes overlap in 
the categories. For example, ransomware is a type of malware that aims at 
compromising a device to encrypt its content. For the rightful owner to re-access the 
content, a ransom must be paid to the ransomware attacker. Such an attack can be 
interpreted both as a computer-integrity crime and as a computer-assisted crime. This 
example is one of many, making the typology often impractical. 
Other researchers (such as Furnell (2003) and Smith, Grabosky and Urbas, 
2004) have rather emphasized that “cybercrime” should be divided into two: (1) crimes 
that can happen only via the use of information technologies, such as cracking, and (2) 
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crimes that happen through technological means but could be performed through 
“traditional” ones as well, such as terrorism or bullying. To differentiate crimes involving 
technological means from traditional crimes in the second category, the “cyber” prefix is 
added. Terrorism becomes “cyberterrorism” and bullying becomes “cyberbullying” for 
example. However, as pointed out by Powell, Stratton and Cameron (2018), thinking 
with a dualist approach “terrestrial” vs “cyber” is problematic. It brings together crimes 
that may be totally unrelated in how they unfold and take place (e.g., terrorism and 
bullying). It also creates blind spots by forcing a focus on “cyber” instead of considering 
crime as a process taking place in a technology-embedded society (Powell, Stratton and 
Cameron, 2018).  
 Lusthaus (2018), on the other hand, argued that a better approach to classifying 
types of cybercrime (defined as acts of deviance happening online) is to focus on the 
main motivation behind the crime, such as political or financial. In his book The Industry 
of Anonymity, he focuses on “profit-driven cybercrime”, which represents criminal 
activities that leverage information technologies for economic purposes. Such approach 
was also taken in several studies investigating cybercrime with financial purposes 
(Leukfeldt et al., 2020; Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Lusthaus, 2018; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and 
Kleemans, 2017; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, b, c; Leukfeldt, 2014).  
This conceptualization is narrower than the cybercrime concept but 
encompasses both predatory and market-based transactions, as defined by Naylor 
(2003). Naylor’s (2003) conceptualization of profit-driven crimes was most fruitful in 
thinking about the types of crimes dealt with in this thesis. I develop on it further below. 
2.2.1. Naylor’s (2003) Conceptualization on Profit-Driven Crimes  
Naylor’s (2003) general theory of profit-driven crimes can be used to better 
conceptualize online economic crime and its specifics. Naylor (2003) argued that profit-
driven crime can be better understood in economic rather than sociological terms. His 
typology considers the economic structures and consequences of profit-driven crimes, 
as well as the inherent characteristics of the underlying crime script.  
The typology contains three types of profit-driven crime: predatory, market-
based, and commercial. The first one, predatory crime, includes profit-driven crime that 
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involves illegal redistribution of existing wealth from one party to another and a readily 
identifiable victim, such as wallet theft. Market-based crime, on the other hand, involves 
profit-driven crimes that create new wealth (as opposed to transfers of wealth as with 
predatory crimes) and encompasses the production and/or distribution of goods or 
services that are illegal through voluntary transfers. Market-based crimes include, for 
example, the trade of illegal drugs or contraband products. The third category is defined 
as commercial crime and involves the illegal redistribution of legally earned income, 
such as embezzlement. Naylor (2003) mentions that, stereotypically (and thus not 
certainly), predatory crimes are more likely to be conducted by individuals, market-based 
crimes by groups and commercial crimes by corporations.  
As the crime script behind profit-driven crime involves a complex series of 
interrelated activities and the degree of awareness of the individuals involved varies,  
Naylor (2003) differentiated between primary offences, which include predatory, market-
based, and commercial offences, and secondary offences, which surround (or are a 
byproduct of) these crimes, such as corruption, violence, tax evasion or money 
laundering.  
For example, based on Naylor’s conceptualization, purse-theft is a primary 
offence that can be accompanied with violence – a secondary offence surrounding the 
primary one. Embezzlement, a primary offence, may require money laundering, a 
secondary one. Also, primary offences can be secondary offences in specific cases. For 
example, auto theft may be a primary crime, and the resale of the stolen car is a market-
based offence that is secondary to the primary predatory offence. Such a script 
approach forces one to consider what the driving forces are behind a crime (such as 
theft or resale in the previous example).  
Naylor (2003) added that, in general, predatory offences are characterized by 
violence, but rarely by corruption or tax evasion. On the other hand, market-based 
offences frequently involve money laundering and tax evasion and sometimes violence 
or corruption while commercial offences will rarely involve violence, sometimes money 
laundering or tax evasion, and frequently corruption.  
This proposed general theory of profit-driven crimes was aimed at overcoming 
the vagueness around the conceptualization of profit-driven crimes (e.g., economic 
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crime or white-collar crime) as well as the technological fetishisms surrounding such 
crimes (e.g., telemarketing fraud or internet fraud), which, according to the author, create 
misleading and artificial distinctions. Naylor’s (2003) conceptualization is helpful in 
defining the topic of this study: online economic crime, although Naylor would most likely 
criticize the use of  “online” (technological fetishism) and “economic crime” (vagueness). 
His potential critiques are addressed below.  
2.2.2. Defining and Differentiating Online Economic Crime  
Online economic crimes are online predatory crimes: they encompass crime 
happening through information technologies that impose wealth redistributions with clear 
victims and perpetrators. However, the term “online economic crime” is favored over 
“online predatory crime” for two reasons. First, “predatory” refers to predator (a term 
often linked to animals in popular imaginaries) and implies the exploitation of others 
through violent means when necessary. Further, Naylor (2003) sees violence as the 
most probable secondary offence surrounding predatory profit-driven crimes. Online 
economic crime, on the other hand, focuses on stealing wealth through technological 
means, and rarely (if ever) induces physical violence. For these reasons, using the word 
“predatory” tends to inaccurately associate violence with the crime7.  
Second, the word “online” stresses that the economic crime studied takes place 
through information technologies, although no specific technology or type of crime is 
chosen. The term stresses that the “redistribution of wealth” must happen through 
information technologies, while other aspects surrounding the crime (such as money 
laundering) are not bound to the “online space”.  
By clearly defining economic crime as illegal wealth redistribution where there 
are victims and perpetrators, the vagueness trap of the term “economic crime” is 
avoided. By focusing on the online means of redistribution, fetishism over one 
technology is avoided, while a focus can be put on the new capabilities that information 
technologies enable.  
 
7 This argument does not dismiss the psychological violence that victims may experience due to 
the crime. The idea is to avoid imposing an impression of physical violence surrounding online 
economic crime.  
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In terms of new capabilities, information technologies contract time and space for 
specific human actions (e.g., buying products, surfing online) and interactions (e.g., 
online discussions). Such contraction increases the number of criminal opportunities, as 
offenders do not need to physically move to commit a crime and can target multiple 
victims at the same time (Llinares and Johnson, 2018; Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016; Yar, 
2005). Information technologies also enable pseudo-anonymous interactions, which is 
believed to decrease offenders’ fear of apprehension (Pittaro, 2007) while allowing 
individuals to endorse multiple personalities (Yar, 2005). Pseudo-anonymity is also 
believed to depersonalize victims for offenders (Montoyama et al., 2013).  
However, why not use the mainstream label “cyber” to stress these capabilities? 
“Cyber” refers to the cyberspace metaphor and focuses on dichotomizing the world: 
the “cyberworld” and the physical world (Powell, Stratton and Cameron, 2018). Mumby 
and Spitzack (1983) explained how the use of metaphors can be problematic: it 
oversimplifies a problem and systematically imposes a focus on certain aspects while 
disregarding others. Their use may lead to metaphoric entrapment meaning that “the 
way in which a concept is understood becomes so tied up with a particular metaphoric 
structure that alternative ways of viewing that concept are obscured, or else appear to 
make less sense” (p. 166).  
The cyberspace concept represents such a metaphorical entrapment, drawing 
the world in two distinct categories: an oversimplification that limits our conception of the 
world (Brown, 2006). More and more researchers are cautioning against the use of the 
cyberspace concept, arguing that it obscures the varying degrees in which information 
technologies are embedded in everyday life (Powell, Stratton and Cameron, 2018; 
Graham, 2013; Brown, 2006).  
Moreover, in the past years, scholars in the field of crime and technology have 
moved past this metaphorical entrapment. Some have focused on studying the 
“geographies” behind crime and technology: what makes specific crimes related to 
technology cluster in specific regions of the world (Lusthaus and Varese, 2021; 
Lusthaus, Bruce, Phair, 2020). Others have focused on understanding how the 
embedded nature of technologies shape action and interaction in everyday life related to 
deviance (Powell, Stratton and Cameron, 2018). In the past five years, as opposed to 
studying the “cyber” aspect of the crime, a group of scholars have taken as a starting 
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point the individuals and their surrounding networks to understand the organization of 
profit-driven cybercrime (Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Lusthaus, 2018; 
Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol a,b,c,d; Leukfeldt, 2014).  
This study avoids the use of the term “cyber” to prevent drawing readers into a 
metaphorical entrapment. Instead, this thesis investigates online economic crime, 
conceptualized as online illegal wealth distribution. Naylor (2003) stressed that 
profit-driven crimes are better understood as a series of actions. This is highly relevant 
for online economic crime, as such crime usually requires a series of actions, a 
scheme, to be successful.   
For purposes of clarity, Figure 1 defines cybercrime, profit-driven cybercrime, 
and online economic crime and provides examples for each type. It illustrates that 
cybercrime is a wide concept that encompasses pretty much every criminal activity 
happening through information technologies. Profit-driven cybercrime, on the other hand, 
focuses on “profit-driven” activities happening online, while encompassing both 
predatory and market-based profit-driven crime. Online economic crime focuses on 
illegal wealth distribution happening through online means, considering that such 
redistribution requires a series of actions. The actions surrounding the distribution 
are not necessarily happening online; only the illegal wealth redistribution is. Such 
conceptualization was helpful throughout the thesis. Hopefully, it can enlighten other 
scholars who wish to understand the dynamics behind crime and technology.  
Figure 1  Concepts Linking Crime and Information Technologies 
24 
Online economic crime is generally more complex than traditional economic 
crime, like wallet theft, requiring a certain level of technical knowledge and skills. For 
example, a scheme behind online banking theft could require one to send phishing 
emails meant to induce a person to click on a malicious link. The malicious link, once 
clicked, could then compromise the victim’s device and install a keylogger, a malicious 
software meant to record and exfiltrate everything that the victim types. The malicious 
actors, in this case, would be interested in the specific moment when the victim visits a 
banking website and enters their8 credentials. Once stolen, the credentials would be 
used to connect to the victim’s bank account and transfer money to a bank account 
controlled by the perpetrators. Another example is online extortion using ransomware, 
which is malicious software that compromises a device, encrypts the content, and asks 
for a ransom in exchange. A malicious group could scan the external perimeter of a 
corporate network to try to find vulnerabilities. If one is found and allows the group to 
infiltrate the corporate network, then a ransomware could be launched on the network to 
encrypt the content and a ransom would be asked to re-access the content.  
Both examples involve a series of actions that result in a zero-sum game with a 
monetary goal, although the means to achieve the goal differ. Naylor’s (2003) 
conceptualization is also helpful to identify the various secondary crimes involved in 
online economic crime. They may include, for example, market-based transactions to 
sell the stolen credit cards, money laundering to launder the stolen money, and, most 
importantly, many crimes related to unauthorized access to a computer and mischief in 
relation to computer data.  
Legal Tasks and Online Economic Crime 
Apart from secondary crimes involved in the series of interrelated tasks, the 
orchestration of the online economic crime often requires more coordination and 
mundane tasks that may resemble licit tasks, such as creating websites or maintaining 
an infrastructure of servers.  
These mundane tasks have been reported by Collier et al. (2020), who 
interviewed individuals involved in booter services. Their finding stressed that a great 
number of tasks were outsourced to low-paid contractors, who do the “invisible” work 
 
8 “Their” is used to avoid gender-specific phrasing throughout the thesis.  
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that is or resembles legitimate work. Such work (in the case of this study sysadmin-like 
work) was reported to yield little profit while being boring (Collier et al., 2020).  
Similarly, when studying networks involved in banking theft, Leukfeldt, Kleemans 
and Stol (2017a, b, c, d) mentioned core members recruiting enablers to build 
homemade phishing websites (programmers), write malware, or translate texts. 
Moreover, Leukfeldt et al. (2019) investigated how the availability and use of information 
technologies may change criminal cooperation. Their conclusions highlighted individuals 
with greater technical knowledge positioned at the periphery of the group, dubbed 
enablers. Their role should not be underestimated given that most members in the 
network studied did not have the required technical expertise to successfully achieve the 
crime.  
Bijlenga and Kleemans (2018) found that some individuals and/or organizations 
with IT expertise were actively leveraged by criminal organizations. They studied five 
Dutch criminal investigations where expertise in the information and technology sector 
was sought by individuals involved in criminal activities. In three of the five cases, the 
basis of the collaborations was a legal business relationship. Such a relationship was 
possible because the criminal nature of the tasks was not always obvious; the good or 
service provided was legal, while its usage was not.  
Hence, business collaborations can be established without the contractor or 
seller knowing that the product or service provided will be used for criminal means. As 
stated by Leukfeldt et al. (2020): “the criminal character does not have to be clearly 
visible to the person concerned or it can be denied afterward” (p.6). In this sense, the 
neutrality of IT-related tasks creates a grey area that can be leveraged to successfully 
orchestrate criminal activities (Leukfeldt et al., 2020; Bijlenga and Kleemans, 2018) 
2.3. Informal Economies   
Collier et al. (2020), Leukfeldt et al. (2019), Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol (2017a, 
b, c, d) and Bijlenga and Kleemans (2018) found that individuals with IT skills end up 
conducting activities for criminal groups. This grey area reminds of informal labor 
markets where workers wade between legality, illegality, and criminality. The section 
below reviews what is known on informal markets and their online counterpart. It 
26 
provides useful insights on the reality of informal workers, one that can be used to better 
understand workers with IT expertise who end up involved in online economic crime.   
The “informal economy” is a broad and multifaceted concept tackled by scholars 
from various disciplines, including economics, sociology, and criminology. In general, 
informal economies are associated with the reverse side of the official economy: the 
unregulated or unregistered economic activities (Ponsaers, Shapland and Williams, 
2008). For this thesis, informal economic activities are economic activities that escape 
normal record keeping (Ojo, Nwankwo and Gbadamosi, 2013), thus representing “all 
income-earning activities that are not regulated by the state in social environments 
where similar activities are regulated” (Castel and Portes, 1989, p.23). In such markets, 
the product or the service exchanged is not necessarily illegal; it is rather the means by 
which it is produced and distributed that is illegal. These markets are known to be 
volatile and flexible, but also inherently unstable (Vande Walle, 2008), and their 
existence is not necessarily linked to poverty: their form depends on the context and the 
goal of the participants operating in them (Vande Waller, 2008; Castells and Portes, 
1989).  
Formal and informal economies have a symbiotic relationship (Harding and 
Jenkins, 1989) and decisions in one may change actions in the other. For example, 
strong state control should diminish the size of an informal economy, but it may also 
provide new potential profitable opportunities to individuals who would be willing to 
bypass the controls (Portes and Haller, 2010). Portes and Haller (2010) defined three 
aims of informal economies for market participants: survival, dependent exploitation 
(such as decreased labor costs), and growth (such as capital accumulation through 
greater flexibility) (p.405-6). Thus, considering the latter, informal economies are not 
always destructive: they can provide jobs to otherwise unemployed individuals, lower 
costs for products and services and foster innovation (Ojo, Nwankwo and Gbadamosi, 
2013; Portes and Haller, 2010). Informal economies are also highly dependent on social 
ties to develop trust among market participants (Portes and Haller, 2010; Shaplan, 
2004). Their inception and development are highly reliant on the social structures behind 
them as well as their geographical position, such as access to trade routes or labor 
(Shaplan, 2004). Their economic activities, although informal, are also often considered 
socially acceptable by their enclaves. Informal workers engage in informal markets due 
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to autonomy, social networks, ease of entry, flexibility, and freedom (Ojo, Nwankwo and 
Gbadamosi, 2013). 
However, due to their informal status, these markets may benefit groups involved 
in criminal activities. For example, informal financial markets represent attractive settings 
for money laundering (Vande Walle, 2008). Hagedorn (2007) also found that US gangs 
played protection roles in informal businesses to replace the legal instruments usually 
accessible in the legal realm. However, Sabet (2015) studied how informal and criminal 
sectors overlap in Mexico and argued that the extent to which criminal groups can 
penetrate informal economies to mitigate the opportunity costs (i.e., for protection 
purposes) depends on 1) the degree of illegality and legitimacy of the product traded and 
2) how market participants overcome the transaction risks and the threat of law 
enforcement. Sabet (2015) highlighted, that, in theory, informal settings offer 
opportunities for criminal groups to mitigate transaction failures by providing, for 
example, credit, insurance, or protection, but, in practice, informal workers tend to solve 
these costs through clientelism (exchanging goods and services for political support in 
favor of tolerating their activities) or self-help associations  - associations that provide 
support to individuals who share a common experience (p.2).  
Nevertheless, even if informal workers tend to avoid mingling with criminal 
groups to mitigate uncertain transaction costs, informal markets do create an 
environment that benefits criminal activities in many ways, such as corrupting officials, 
reselling counterfeit or stolen goods or purchasing unlicensed cars. (Sabet, 2015; 
Shaplan, 2004). Moreover, Ojo, Nwankwo and Gbadamosi (2013) studied 30 informal 
entrepreneurs in the UK and found that these informal entrepreneurs seized 
opportunities in criminal spheres. Thus, the line between informal and criminal markets 
is often difficult to draw in practice, as these markets merge and are interrelated in 
various ways (McElwee, Smith, and Somerville, 2011; Vande Walle, 2008; Shapland, 
2004). 
Online Informal Economies 
Nowadays, the internet has become a robust channel for economic transactions 
(Cambini et al., 2011). Given the difficulties legal institutions globally have had in 
regulating online economic transactions (Murray, 2007), online informal economies 
have been thriving (Rangaswamy, 2019; Dobson et al., 2015;). Moreover, online 
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informal economies do not necessarily need social embeddedness to properly function 
(Granovetter, 1985): the potential trust problems and uncertainties that market 
participants face have been partially neutralized with the rise of informal institutions 
(Dobson et al., 2015; Kshetri, 2010). Informal institutions are platforms providing 
mechanisms for neutralizing trust issues among market participants through various 
reputation systems, such as providing feedback.  
Of interest to this thesis are informal institutions known as digital labor platforms, 
which gather a pool of IT workers who could be recruited by online economic crime 
organizations. The next section reviews what is known on the internal dynamics of these 
platforms.  
2.3.2. Digital Labor Platforms  
There exist various informal institutions (e.g., eBay or Amazon), and those of 
interest to this thesis are digital labor platforms (e.g., Freelancer.com, Upwork, Fiverr), 
which offer a matching service linking demand for labor with its supply (Drahokoupil and 
Piasna, 2017). Their rise and expansion, in the past years, have led to a reconfiguration 
of employer-employee relationships, minimizing outside regulations of employment and 
evading company-like structures of employment (Lehdonvirta, 2016). Labor contracts 
happening on these platforms are consequently far away from standard employment 
relationships (SER), which are characterized by full-time, permanent, and direct 
employment by a company (Strauss, 2018a). They rather foster flexible, yet also 
challenging, working conditions, as explained below.  
In short, digital labor platforms are assumed to foster market-like dynamics in the 
supply of and demand for labor, thus reducing hiring transaction costs. They also 
expand the labor supply by lowering barriers to entry to the labor market (Drahokoupil 
and Piasna, 2017). Drahokoupil and Fabo (2016) outlined that these platforms have 
three interesting features: they provide an algorithm to focus on effective matching, they 
reduce hiring transaction costs, and they provide services, through reputation and 
monitoring systems, that reduce the risks involved in market transactions. They are 
assumed to be efficient and flexible at mediating clients (labor demand) and independent 
contractors (labor supply). Through them, a contingent workforce is available on demand 
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and can be dismissed as soon as a task for which the worker is hired is completed 
(Schmidt, 2017). 
However, with direct access to workers from low-income countries, global labor 
arbitrage takes place on these platforms: jobs move to low-cost labor markets, 
consequently leading to competition and reduced wages (Roach, 2004; Drahokoupil and 
Piasna, 2017). These platforms thus reduce workers’ rights and working conditions while 
driving wages to the floor (Schmidt, 2017; Drahokoupil and Piasna, 2017; Drahokoupil 
and Fabo, 2016).  
Also, the easiness in hiring individuals has led to a high prevalence of micro-
tasking: dividing the contracted work to the point that the independent contractors are 
unaware of the final product (Schmidt, 2017; Drahokoupil and Piasna, 2017). Such 
micro-tasking is believed to be negative for workers as it removes their control over the 
work process as well as the reward felt when seeing the final product (Drahokoupil and 
Piasna, 2017).  
Moreover, not only is the price (wage) low, but it also usually covers only the 
marginal costs, ignoring additional long-run costs such as acquiring new skills (Malhotra 
and Van Alstyne, 2014, p. 25). However, Graham, Hjorth and Lehdonvirta (2016) pointed 
out that the positive and negative aspects of these platforms depend on the geographic 
locations in which workers are. For example, some workers may enhance their working 
conditions when established in parts of the world where unemployment is high. Others, 
on the other hand, might be forced to accept low-wage contracts, leading to precarious9 
working relationships.  
Cloud Work on Digital Labor Platforms  
To unravel the type of work offered on digital labor platforms, Schmidt (2017) 
offered an interesting taxonomy: cloud work, crowd work and gig work. Cloud work 
refers to work that can be done remotely via the internet. Crowd work, on the other hand, 
involves tasks that cannot be completed by a single individual but only with an undefined 
group of people (e.g., photo tagging, product categorization). Lastly, gig work refers to 
tasks that need to be done in a specific location and time (e.g., Uber drivers). To 
 
9 For a review on the concept of work precariousness, see Strauss (2018b). 
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differentiate the platforms offering such work, Schmidt (2017) stated that web-based 
digital labor encompasses both cloud work and crowd work while location-based digital 
labor involves accommodation, transportation, delivery services, household services and 
personal services (p.22).   
Freelancer platforms are digital labor platforms that allow hiring an independent 
contractor based on their skills and knowledge, thus hiring cloud work (Schmidt, 2017). 
Payments are usually negotiated individually, and the jobs contracted via freelancer 
platforms are typically complex and specialized (as opposed to automated crowd work), 
including SEO optimization, software and website development, marketing design, 
writing and legal writing (Schmidt, 2017, p.14). These platforms are thriving, as, 
according to the Statista Research, about 59 million individuals were freelancing just in 
the United States in 2020 (Statista Research Department, 2021).  
Labor market transactions taking place specifically on freelancer platforms are 
not as frictionless and flexible as argued by their proponents. There are still global 
frictions as labor demand clients are more likely to select workers who are culturally 
close to them, especially in terms of language (Hong and Pavlou, 2013; Gefen and 
Carmel, 2008). Also, Lustig et al. (2020) interviewed full-time employees who hired 
freelancers as part of their job responsibilities and identified two additional transaction 
costs. The first transaction cost referred to a task definition problem: “the act of carving 
out a piece of one’s work, describing it in a job description, defining the milestones, 
setting the pay rate, and putting it on a freelance platform” (Lustig et al., 2020, p.16). 
Often, the tasks were not well defined, which resulted in misunderstandings with the 
freelancer. The second transaction cost was related to managing freelancers, which was 
time consuming as well as sometimes difficult as some freelancers tend to not abide by 
a company’s worker compliance guideline.  
Informality, Criminality and Digital Labor Platforms 
The difficulties in regulating digital labor platforms have been highlighted by 
several scholars (Schmidt, 2017; Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016; Drahokoupil and Piasna, 
2017; Strauss 2018a). Transacting parties are in different geographic regions, which 
often blurs under which regulation or national standard the work falls (Schmidt, 2017). 
Additionally, the burden is on independent contractors (rather than employers) as “self-
employed” individuals to declare their activities and take care of their social security 
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contributions. Thus, most of the informal work is neither taxed nor covered by social 
insurances (Drahokoupil and Piasna, 2017, p.337). Such a lack of regulations and 
minimum standards increase competition among labor supplies and puts downward 
pressures on pay and working conditions (Drahokoupil and Piasna, 2017, p.336). These 
platforms become tools to circumvent national laws for “consumer protection, workers’ 
rights, minimum wage regulations and social security contributions” (Schmidt, 2017, p.2). 
In the end, these informal platforms represent modern online informal economies.  
 These online informal economies, just like the offline counterparts, may create an 
environment that is auspicious for criminal activities. So far, two freelancer platforms 
have been associated with criminal online activities. Farooqi et al. (2017) tagged the 
platform SEOClerk as a “blackhat marketplace” and Garg, Camp and Kanich (2013) 
considered the platform Freelancer as a hub for criminal activities. The latter assumption 
was based on the results of Motoyama et al. (2013), a study that investigated the on-
demand platform Freelancer and concluded that 66% of the jobs posted were legitimate, 
meaning that about 33% of the remaining tasks were likely related to illegal activities, 
included thwarting security mechanisms, or sending spam.  
 Additionally, these platforms gather informal workers with an IT expertise that 
can be of interest to those involved in online economic crime (Collier et al., 2020; 
Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, b, c, d; Bijlenga and 
Kleemans, 2018). When investigating five case studies where individuals or 
organizations with IT expertise were sought by criminal organizations, Bijlenga and 
Kleemans (2018) concluded that the business relationships were quickly directed at 
criminal collaborations. In “traditional” informal markets, workers were found to avoid 
criminal ties when possible (Sabet, 2015) while also accept economic opportunities in 
the criminal sphere when the potential returns were good (Ojo, Nwankwo and 
Gbadamosi, 2013).  
This raises the question: to what extent the informal IT workforce available on 
digital labor platforms can be considered “available” for those behind online economic 
crime? To unpack this informal/criminal relationship, this thesis needs to conceptualize 
what is meant by being willing to participate in criminal activities. To do so, Matza’s 
(1990) work on “drift” is presented, followed by Goldsmith and Brewer’s (2015) digital 
drift concept.  
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2.4. The Uncertain State: Drifting  
What makes an individual willing to participate in crime? Matza (1990) visited 
such a question in his seminal book Delinquency and Drift, which widely contributed to 
understanding crime and delinquency in the field of criminology (Blomberg et al., 2018). 
He suggested that, rather than conceptualizing delinquency as criminal actors who 
continuously break the law, delinquency should be considered as a transient and 
temporary legal status that individuals intermittently embody. Thus, most delinquents will 
play intermittently delinquent and conventional roles, and, for most of their lives, they will 
stay on the conventional side and not offend (Matza, 1990). When they do, they will first 
drift. The “drifting” concept is what is of interest to this study. The concept has been 
developed for juveniles rather than individuals involved in online economic crime, yet it 
provides nuances and understanding as to why and how an individual may end up in a 
state where criminal activity is possible. I first present a review of Matza’s main thesis to 
understand the background context in which the drifting concept was developed.  
That delinquency should be considered as a transient and temporary legal status 
that individuals intermittently embody is oppositional to sociological theories of deviance 
(Miller, 2017 [1958]; Cohen, 1958 and Cloward and Ohlin, 2013 [1960]), which posit that 
delinquent subculture embraces norms and values that support criminal activity. Matza 
(1990) rejected the idea that delinquents are fully committed to a delinquency 
subculture. The author rather argued that there exists a subculture of delinquency (as 
opposed to a delinquency subculture). This subculture of delinquency is a setting in 
which the commission of criminal activity is acknowledged and is the outcome of 
delinquent values, norms, and sentiments. However, this subculture is not “fully 
committed to crime”, given that delinquents apprehend the potential legal consequences 
of their acts and rationalize them through conventional norms. Indeed, as highlighted by 
Matza (1990), once a criminal act is committed, delinquents rationalize the said act 
through neutralization techniques that approximate conventional norms. These 
techniques are similar to conventional excuses, such as negating an offense (e.g., self 
defense, accident, or insanity), having a sense of injustice (e.g., perceived inconsistency 
of individualized justice), assertion of tort (e.g., negation of victims) and the primacy of 
customs (e.g., consensual crimes). If they were fully committed, such apprehension and 
rationalization would not take place. These neutralization techniques have been revisited 
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in Sykes and Matza (2017) as: 1) denial of responsibility; 2) denial of injury; 3) denial of 
victim; 4) condemnation of the condemners, and 5) appeal of higher loyalties.  
Delinquents are thus committed to neither delinquent nor conventional norms; they 
rather exist in a limbo between these two spaces. The drift (which is of interest to this 
thesis) represents this movement between conventional and criminal actions. Matza 
(1990) defines “drift” as the episodic moments of release from moral restraints: when the 
tie binding self to legal expectations is broken. Drifting does not guarantee a criminal act; 
it only makes the criminal act possible or permissible by temporarily removing moral 
restraints. The idea is to convey an image of individuals who “drift” in and out of these 
restraints yet embody the conventional “restrained” role most of the time. Matza (1990) 
also argued that the moral vacuum is not sufficient to explain the thrust that leads to 
criminal action and suggested that the missing element that pushes an individual into the 
criminal act is conceptualized as will. Two conditions -that can only happen once drift is 
realized- may activate such will: preparation and desperation. Preparation refers to the 
process of learning from experience (personal or from others) that a criminal act is a 
feasible behavior that is relatively easy to do; it implies the will to repeat infractions.  
Desperation refers to a loss of control over one’s environment, leading to the 
commission of crime to re-establish the order; it implies the will to commit new 
infractions.  The will represents the thrust for potential for criminal action implicit in drift 
(p.191). However, it is not automatic: it can be deterred through various processes, such 
as the presence of a guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1979).  
Overall, Matza’s (1990) work has been a source of development and inspiration 
in the field of criminology, shedding light on the processes behind delinquency and 
inspiring various studies on the matter (for a review, see Bloomberg et al., 2018). This 
understanding, along with additional work (see Piquero, 2004; Laub and Sampson, 
2003; Nagin and Land, 1993) has led to the development of the concept of intermittency 
in criminal careers, which involves temporary abstinence from criminal activities followed 
by resumption of criminal activities throughout an individual’s criminal career (Piquero, 
2004). Most delinquents follow zigzag paths, cycles of offending and non-offending 
(Laub and Sampson, 2003), which depends on various individual circumstances, 
including criminal achievements and potential sanctions (Ouellet, 2018).  
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2.4.1. Digital Drift 
Although Matza’s work focused on juveniles, it provides powerful theoretical 
concepts to assess how and why individuals may participate in criminal activities. 
Information technologies have changed the structure and scope of criminal activities and 
Matza’s (1990) drifting concept has been used to grasp online criminal commitment 
processes (Holt, Brewer and Goldsmith, 2018; Goldsmith and Brewer, 2015).  
Goldsmith and Brewer (2015) explored how the internet is changing how crime is 
organized and committed in their paper: Digital Drift and the Criminal Interaction Order. 
They argue that internet-related uses have fundamentally reconfigured the 
arrangements for criminal commitments in three ways: 1) lowering the bonding power of 
groups; 2) expanding the range of interactions possible for an individual; and 3) giving 
the power to individuals to decide when, how, and whether they want to affiliate with 
others (p.113).  
According to the authors, the internet significantly reshapes criminal 
commitments by facilitating the encounter of individuals across time and space; in other 
words, it has increased networking opportunities. Technical affordances of the internet, 
such as the possibility to create (and amend) false identities (avatars) or the possibility to 
anonymously consume information, also encourage the fluidity and play of online 
encounters. Committing to a criminal group in an online environment represents a 
different type of commitment than committing to groups formed through face-to-face 
interactions as online encounters are characterized by movement, unpredictability and 
“absence of involvement”.  
Such a nomadic state allows individuals to engage and dis-engage in criminal 
activities more easily. To grasp such commitment patterns, Goldsmith and Brewer 
(2015) introduced the concept of digital drift, which is derived from Matza (1990). As 
defined by the authors, digital drift captures the ability of individuals to negotiate the 
engagement boundary in criminal commitment and emphasizes the idea that “drift into 
and out of criminal pathways can often be accidental or unpredictable” (p.113). Digital 
drift thus refers to the individual’s episodic involvement in illegal actions, which takes 
place through the dynamic engagement between the features of the internet and the use 
made of them by individuals.  
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The internet also acts as a source of ideas and information, offering conditions 
for individual empowerment, allowing individuals to commit crime “more autonomously 
through facilitating self-instruction” (p.112). These conditions offer more choice and 
control to individuals on when and how to engage with others online. Goldsmith and 
Brewer (2015) concluded that the internet is a source and a facilitator of criminal 
interactions and stressed the need to develop a “criminal interaction order10” that 
incorporates these new means of social encounters (e.g., social networks, forums) and 
these new ways to gain criminal capabilities (i.e., social and criminal capital). They 
argued that such an approach could yield further insights on the processes behind digital 
drifts in and out of criminal commitments. 
The digital drift concept stresses the ephemerality of criminal encounters 
happening in online environments, as well as the possibility for individuals to easily 
engage and disengage in criminal activities at their will. This conceptualization will be 
useful in the thesis when assessing the informal workers’ dance and their potential ease 
at drifting in and out of crime-oriented spaces.  
  
 
10 Refers to Goffman’s (1983) interaction order: the study of strategies and interaction rituals 
among individuals.  
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Chapter 3.  
 
Thesis Objectives and Research Questions 
Online economic crime involves a series of actions that aim at illegal 
redistribution of wealth through online means. The literature review above illustrated 
what is known on the organization of criminal groups (and groups behind profit-driven 
cybercrime) as well as factors influencing their growth. A few studies also highlighted the 
involvement of informal workers from the IT sector in the organization of online economic 
crime, a concerning finding considering that digital labor platforms (specialized in such 
fields) are thriving. However, what these workers represent for online economic crime 
organizations and these workers’ impact on the reach and sophistication of the crime 
has yet to be researched thoroughly. Such an assessment may yield insights on various 
avenues to deter and prevent such crime by motivated offenders, but also by informal IT 
workers involved at the periphery of the crime script.  
Specifically, this thesis uncovers contexts, motivations, and organizations of 
those behind online economic crime. While doing so, it assesses the role and availability 
of an informal workforce surrounding the crime organization and its likelihood to 
participate in such criminal schemes. This mixed-method thesis is divided in two parts, 
representing two objectives and four analyses.  
The first part follows a qualitative approach, driven by the objective (Obj. 1): To 
uncover the contexts and motivations that may drive individuals to participate in 
online economic crime. This objective is achieved through two research questions 
related to two qualitative data sources. The first research question is (RQ1): 
“What are the contextual factors and perceived motivations behind online economic 
crime?” 
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To answer this research question, 21 semi-structured interviews with experts 
knowledgeable about online economic crime are conducted. Experts’ narratives are 
studied through an inductive thematic analysis11.  
The second data source is a chat log containing private conversations among 
individuals involved in online economic crime. To stay as close as possible to their 
conversations, the research question for this analysis focuses on finding their challenges 
and motivations, as opposed to contextual factors. Consequently, the research question 
is (RQ2):  
“What are the main motivations and challenges behind those involved in online 
economic crime?” 
This question is answered through an inductive thematic analysis of the 
conversations. Focusing on the challenges led to uncovering their context. The results of 
these two qualitative analyses emphasize the role of informal workers involved in various 
tasks related to online economic crime. The private chat log conversations led to 
uncovering a digital labor platform for IT-related products and services. The second part 
of this thesis studies the individuals interacting in the digital labor platform.   
Throughout this thesis, individuals discussing on this platform are conceptualized 
as informal IT workers and the platform as an informal platform. Information about 
these informal IT workers was gathered thanks to an academic access to the Flare 
Systems12 database, which is a private company monitoring various online spaces.  
The second part of the thesis focuses on understanding this workforce’s 
relationship between informal and criminal spaces. Since workers could not be 
interviewed, this is done through proxy analysis evaluating informal workers’ 
commenting patterns between the informal platform and crime-oriented ones. Crime-
 
11 Since I defined online economic crime as profit-driven, it may seem tautological to investigate the 
motivations behind such crime. A first iteration of the research question was “…motivation of those exploiting 
information technologies” instead of “online economic crime”.  The concept of online economic crime 
emerged from the interviews thanks to the inductive approach, leading me to reconsider the central topic of 
this thesis. Then, additional perceived motivations were found, along with interesting insights related to the 
financial reality of these individuals.   
12 https://flare.systems/ 
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oriented platforms are platforms that take a clear criminal ethos in their branding, such 
as carding or money laundering.  
To differentiate workers who talked on crime-oriented platforms, the concept of 
drifter is developed. It builds on Matza’s drift (1990), which refers to episodic moments 
of release of moral restraints. Drifters are individuals from the informal workforce that 
end up discussing, at least once, in a crime-oriented space. When drifters discuss on 
crime-oriented platforms, they take action in the space, which is different from lurking or 
simply reading on these spaces. Commenting, however, is not criminal; it is only a step 
that illustrates that those individuals have drifted. In the drifting state, criminal activities 
are possible, yet not inevitable.  
In this second part, a quantitative approach is taken, driven by the objective (Obj. 
2): To assess drifters’ relationship between informal and crime-oriented spaces. 
Two quantitative analyses are computed, each of them led by a specific research 
question. The first quantitative analysis aims at assessing whether drifters formed a 
distinct group that could be identified on the informal platform. If yes, then the drifters’ 
distinctive group (and how it uses the informal platform) would require further 
investigation. The research question is (RQ3): 
 
 “Does drifters’ behavior on the platform differ from that of non-drifters?” 
A series of non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests are conducted on drifters and 
non-drifters, based on behavioral indicators. Behavioral indicators reflect individual 
behavior on the informal platform, such as types of topics discussed and activity rate. To 
assess drifters’ relationship between the informal space and crime-oriented ones further, 
the second quantitative analysis is longitudinal. It focuses on understanding drifters’ 
commenting behavior on these spaces through time. The research question is (RQ4): 
“How do drifters use the informal space compared to crime-oriented spaces over 
time?” 
A group-based trajectory model is built, comparing drifters’ commenting behavior 
between the informal space and crime-oriented ones over a nine-year period. Overall, 
the results of these four analyses shed light on contexts, perceived motivations, and 
organization of individuals involved in online economic crime. They also provide an 
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assessment of the role of informal workers at the periphery, and their likelihood to 
participate in criminal activities.  
For clarity purposes, Figure 2 provides an overview of the thesis workflow, 
including the two research objectives, four research questions, four data sources, and 
four data analyses. Hopefully, through this summary, readers can grasp the topics of the 
upcoming chapters easily. Also, note that, given the mixed-method approach and the 
plurality of datasets, the simplest and most efficient way to present the thesis core is by 
presenting the methods and data followed by the results respectively for each analysis. 
This approach allows the reader to follow the methodological decisions and their impacts 
on the results. Figure 2 also shows which chapters cover which analysis. For one 
analysis, the first chapter contains the methods and data, and the second chapter 
contains the results.  
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Figure 2 Thesis Workflow 
(OEC stands for online economic crime.) 
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Chapter 4. Methods for Interviews with Experts 
The first objective of this thesis is to uncover various contexts and motivations 
that may drive individuals to participate in online economic crime. To do so, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with experts, driven by the question: “What are the 
contextual factors and perceived motivations behind online economic crime?”  The 
following chapter presents the methodological steps followed to recruit and interview 
experts. Then the analytical strategy is outlined followed by ethical considerations.  
4.1. Collaboration with the Stratosphere Laboratory  
The interviews were conducted in close collaboration with the Stratosphere 
Laboratory. The Laboratory is part of the “Artificial Intelligence Centre at the Czech 
Technical University in Prague and works at the intersection of cybersecurity, machine 
learning, and helping others” (Stratosphere, 2021). Three members of the Stratosphere 
Laboratory actively collaborated in the research: Sebastian Garcia (assistant professor 
at CTU and director of Stratosphere Laboratory), Maria José Erquiaga (team leader of 
the aposemat project, part of the Stratosphere Laboratory) and Veronica Valeros 
(technical leader at Stratosphere Laboratory). They helped with participants’ recruitment, 
interviews, and analyses. Their motives to participate in the research were the same as 
mine: to better understand the context and motivations of those behind online economic 
crime.  
4.2. Recruiting Experts  
The Stratosphere Laboratory is formed of well-established researchers from 
academia and the industry with an expertise in cybersecurity and cybercrime. The 
members have presented at international conferences where they have developed a 
network of professionals from all over the world. For recruitment, the Laboratory’s 
international social network was leveraged. Members of the Laboratory were told about 
the study’s aim: that I sought experts knowledgeable on the contexts and motivations 
that influence those behind online economic crime. However, no definition of who 
qualifies as an expert and who does not was provided. I relied on members’ subjective 
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understanding of their network and who would be suitable for the study. The following 
section explains the rationale behind this approach. 
4.2.1. Participants as Experts 
The issue of what constitutes experts and expertise, as well as the extent to 
which “expert” knowledge is more valuable than the knowledge of other people, is a 
highly debated issue in social science (Bogner, Littig and Menz, 2009). There have been 
many attempts at defining who can be considered an expert (Baker, Lovell, and Harris, 
2006), with criteria ranging from an individual’s position and knowledge, to how someone 
is publicly acknowledged or recommended by others (Moseley and Mead, 2001). Yet,  
there are no agreed-upon definitions (Baker, Lovell, and Harris, 2006) as the concept of 
“expertise” is a construct; there are no deterministic ways to specify who is an expert 
and who is not. The dangers of relying on experts’ knowledge for social science studies 
lie in assuming that experts’ knowledge provides the objective truth about a social 
phenomenon. Such a preconception can lead to research findings and subsequent 
policies based on deterministic assumptions (Bogner, Littig and Menz, 2009,). On the 
other hand, individuals with substantial knowledge on a topic can provide valuable 
insights on complex social processes and interviews with them can lead to interesting 
research orientations (Bogner and Menz, 2009). In the end, it is the responsibility of the 
researcher to choose who is an expert and defend that choice (Baker, Lovell, and Harris, 
2006) as well as nuance the findings based on the limits of the established criteria.   
Considering the field of cybersecurity and cybercrime, fixing a strict criterion to 
determine who is an expert and who is not can be problematic, given that skills and 
expertise range from low-level reverse engineering expertise to finding malicious activity 
in network traffic to investigating criminal groups in underground forums. Some could 
argue that the number of years active in the field would be an adequate “objective” 
criterion. Yet the field is evolving so quickly that those with several years of experience 
are often not up to date anymore on new emerging threats, as they move to 
management positions. My experience in the field has taught me that, in cybersecurity, 
expertise is not so much about status or position but more about interest and curiosity. 
Another way of identifying experts is whether they are vetted by others in the field 
as such (Moseley and Mead, 2001). Such a criterion means that individuals 
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knowledgeable in a field can refer someone they consider a suitable expert for the study. 
Such a criterion considers referrers’ assessments of who is an expert on the topic 
resulting from their experiences and interactions in the field. 
The following criterion was the primary one used to accept a study participant: 
someone vetted by Stratosphere Laboratory members or other research participants as 
experts on the study topic. The referrers and research participants were aware of the 
study’s first objective and referred individuals based on their own experiences and 
interactions in the field of cybersecurity and cybercrime.  
However, to avoid presenting the narratives found as objective truth, which is the 
biggest identified danger of using the expert concept in qualitative research (Bogner, 
Littig and Menz, 2009), I stress throughout the results that the findings are associated 
with experts’ understanding of the phenomenon, not necessarily an objective truth.   
4.2.2. Recruiting Process 
Throughout the recruiting process, Stratosphere Laboratory members actively 
helped finding research participants, contacting individuals in their network they thought 
would be knowledgeable on the study topic. When a contact accepted, an introductory 
email was sent and, through a series of online exchanges, a time and date was set for 
the interview and the consent form was shared. Additional participants were also 
recruited via a snowballing method: at the end of each interview, interviewees were 
asked if they knew other experts who would be knowledgeable on the matter. If so, 
participants contacted them first; if the response was positive, the new potential 
participant was contacted, and the same process mentioned above ensued.  
This resulted in 21 interviews and 22 research participants, as one interview was 
conducted with two participants at the same time. The interviews happened between 
July and December 2020 and spanned from 40 to 180 minutes each, with an average of 
90 minutes. In 19 interviews out of 21, Stratosphere collaborators came to the interview 
and sometimes asked questions to research participants. Their presence often made the 
atmosphere more friendly and comfortable.  
 All interviews happened online through Zoom or Jitsi, depending on the 
participant’s preference. If research participants accepted, the audio was recorded using 
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the Otter AI software13. Each interview was transcribed and anonymized with an internal 
ID number. The recordings are kept in an encrypted external drive at the Stratosphere 
Laboratory office and protected by a password.  
4.3. Interview Process and Consent Form 
 The interviews were semi-directed, and the interview process encompassed 
three topics. The first topic asked about experts’ experiences at fighting cybersecurity 
threats and finding those behind the threats, the “attackers”. This topic aimed at 
gathering hands-on experiences, but also led to discussing what experts thought 
motivated those behind the activity. It also brought interesting stories on individuals 
participating in online economic crime and how they organized. The second topic asked 
about contexts wherein those behind such activity cluster, and the third topic inquired 
about specific contextual factors that experts thought could influence individuals to 
participate in such activities. These three topics uncovered various contexts and 
perceived motivations that may drive individuals to participate in online economic crime 
(objective 1). 
However, after the first five interviews, we (the research collaborators and I) 
quickly noticed that moving away from the formal interviewer-interviewee positions 
yielded a more relaxed atmosphere. Rather than asking predefined questions from the 
interview protocol, I semi-directed a discussion. Given the online setting in which the 
interviews took place and the sensitivity of the topics discussed, this change of footing14 
was important and subsequently, more meaningful information was shared. The 
remainder of the interviews started with a first question: “Have you ever worked on 
specific cases of online economic crime, and you ended up finding the people behind 
them?” Then, once participants started to share their experience and knowledge on the 
topic, I semi-directed them by making further inquiries based on the protocol’s topics and 
their narratives. Such an approach made sense because participants had read the 
 
13 https://otter.ai/ 
14 Footing is a concept developed in Goffman (1981, 1974) that refers to the projected self. When 
I moved away from the interviewer position my projected self changed from a strict interviewer to 
an interested party. This transformed the participation framework in which the interview took 
place.  
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consent form and were aware of our research objectives, so they could share their 
knowledge within the frame and structure that they preferred.  
 The consent form sent to research participants is available in Appendix A. It 
includes a thesis summary that was submitted 12 months prior to the final writing of the 
thesis. The prior summary focused on understanding the contextual factors and 
motivation of individuals exploiting information technology opportunities. As an example, 
individuals involved in distributing banking trojan applications related to a botnet (known 
as Geost (Garcia et al., 2019) was mentioned. Since then, the thesis summary has 
changed because of the additional qualitative analysis and the subsequent two 
quantitative sections that were added post-interviews, all focusing on online economic 
crime. However, regardless of these changes, the specific objective to which research 
participants agreed to contribute is the same: to understand the contexts and perceived 
motivations behind those exploiting information technology opportunities. Their narrative 
is thus analyzed and interpreted within the realm they consented for.  
4.4. About Research Participants  
A total of 22 individuals participated in the study. These research participants 
spanned various disciplines and backgrounds: seven worked in anti-virus companies in 
various positions such as threat intelligence or malware reversing, four in banks as 
cybersecurity specialists, two in threat intelligence companies specifically targeting 
groups behind online economic crime, two for government agencies looking at online 
threats targeting public facilities, two as journalists specialized in technology and crime, 
three as independent contractors (one penetration tester, one forensic specialist and one 
malware analyst), one as the head of communication for a cybersecurity company and 
one as a malware researcher who didn’t specify the company nor the sector he worked 
for.  
The geographic diversity of research participants is also diverse: four were 
Mexicans, three Russians, three Romanians, three French, two Taiwanese, one 
Ukrainian, one Czech, one Greek, one English, one Indian, one Chinese, and one 
Argentinian. Since research participants are quoted below and linking their nationality 
with their position could deanonymize them, I do not provide further information on who 
is from where.  
46 
The large geographic representation of research participants was done on 
purpose: to uncover factors and perceived motivations that crossed borders and cultures 
and avoid bending the results for a single geographic region. However, the diversity in 
experts’ professional positions and respective subfields was rather an artefact of the 
Laboratory’s network. In the end, the diversities in background, positions, and subfields 
provides strength to the overall narrative, as themes that span countries and expertise 
illustrate powerful global trends that can help understand why and how individuals 
participate on online economic crime worldwide.   
4.4.1. Experts’ Knowledge on the Topic 
What gathered research participants together was their knowledge and stories of 
individuals involved in online economic crime. A total of 64% of experts had discussed, 
in the past, with individuals involved in such activity. For example, some of them knew 
these individuals from social ties, such as going to school with them. Others went 
undercover, most of the time in forums. Two experts interviewed individuals involved in 
online economic crime as a function of their job. One expert even ended up hanging out 
with a group involved in credit card theft. In two cases, experts were contacted by those 
involved in the crime to explain why they were conducting their crimes, as opposed to 
experts reaching out to them. A few reported having participated in online criminal 
activities “back in the day”. This should come as no surprise. In the cybersecurity field, 
there are several accounts of individuals “testing the technology” before finding full-time 
legal jobs (Tanczer, 2019; Lusthaus, 2018). Those who did not have experiential 
knowledge (36%) had conducted in-depth investigations of individuals involved in IT-
related crime.   
All in all, all experts had extensive knowledge on the topic, either through their 
professional position or their extra-curricular activities. They told real-life stories of 
individuals involved in online economic crime and shared their impressions on what 
contextual factors and perceived motivations could influence individuals to participate in 
such activities. The term “perceived motivation” is used since many accounts are based 
on experts’ interpretations of what motivated those behind the crime.  
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4.5. Analytic Strategy 
The narratives that emerged during the interviews were constructed from the 
questions asked, the experts’ knowledge, and the online interactions. Each interview 
was transcribed and anonymized. Then, the transcript was imported into the NVivo 12 
software for analysis. An inductive thematic analysis was conducted to find patterns 
and meaning in the text. No preliminary codes nor preliminary themes were established. 
I also did not look at the literature on the topic, something that was done later in the 
research process. This strategy was taken to let the themes emerge from experts’ 
understanding of the contexts and perceived motivations that influence individuals to 
participate in online economic crime, rather than from predefined knowledge and 
theories.  
Thematic analysis is a method to identify, analyze and report themes 
representing meaning from text data (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.79). Themes can be 
identified at the semantic or latent level. More precisely, at the semantic level, 
researchers look for specific patterns in the data, based on what is said, and do not look 
beyond. The themes are then summarized and the interpretation and relation to the 
theory is conducted afterwards (Boyatzis, 1998). At the latent level, researchers go 
beyond the semantic context, reporting underlying ideas and assumptions experienced 
by the individuals based on their conversations and the researchers’ interpretations of 
such conversations (Boyatzis, 1998).  
The themes were extracted at these two levels: semantic and latent. Semantic-
level themes included those summarizing perceived motivations and contextual factors 
behind online economic crime. When I ended up interpreting further how experts 
perceived the organization behind those involved in online economic crime, the themes 
were extracted at the latent level.  
In terms of process, the text for each interview was broken down into narrative 
units: groups of words that make sense together. Then these groups of words were 
associated to subthemes. Once all interviews had been analyzed, subthemes were 
grouped into overarching themes.  
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4.5.1. Experts’ Quotes  
In the results, the themes and subthemes are supported with quotations from 
experts. For anonymity and confidentiality, each expert quotation is accompanied with 
the interview’s internal ID, such as Expert 0000. The context in which experts expressed 
their thoughts is, to the best of my knowledge, respected. The language barrier also 
sometimes led me to paraphrase their statements to facilitate the reading experience. 
One difficulty was to give everyone fair representation in the results, as some interviews 
had more content than others. In the end, I used at least one quotation from each 
participant. 
4.5.2. Researcher’s Position  
As the qualitative approaches are diverse and complex (Holloway and Todres, 
2003), the quality of such studies depends on “methodological skills, sensitivity, and 
integrity of the researcher” (Patton, 2005, p.1). To provide transparency on the research 
process, this subsection outlines my epistemological and personal positions.  
To avoid falling in the “theory-as-ideology” trap (Roulston, 2001) researchers 
must reflect, acknowledge, and outline the epistemological position of the qualitative 
research they conduct, depending on the approach used. Such acknowledgment is 
scarce in quantitative research, while qualitative research cannot escape the active role 
of a researcher in the data collection, analysis, and result reporting process. The 
epistemological position of this research is a post-positivist one: science can develop 
warranted truth claims about the world, despite these claims being fallible (Hicks, 2018). 
Such fallible claims are not objective knowledge on the strong sense. They rather 
embody objective knowledge on a weak sense: they are developed through 
intersubjective agreements. This position recognizes that scientists embody a subjective 
outlook on their research and only through strong inter-agreements with other scientists, 
warranted truth claims can be made about the social world studied (Hicks, 2018).  
When conducting qualitative research, researchers are also encouraged to take 
on a reflexive process and acknowledge how their views of the world may influence 
qualitative results (Watt, 2007). My subjective outlook is formed by three experience 
milestones: 1) experience in the private sector as a cybersecurity researcher; 2) 
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graduate studies in criminology; and 3) undergraduate studies in economics. Through 
these past experiences, I developed a critical approach towards the way crime and 
information technologies are depicted by the industry, the media and academia. Such 
depictions are often filled with metaphors (e.g., the cyberspace metaphor), fear 
narratives (e.g., cyberwarfare) and overgeneralization (e.g., everyone can hack from 
anywhere). The data analysis and resulting themes found are thus influenced by this 
critical perspective. 
4.6. Ethical Considerations  
This research has been approved by the Simon Fraser Ethics Department under 
minimal risks (study number 2020s0121). Research participants received a consent form 
prior to the interview. Before the interview, I also inquired whether they had received and 
read the form and, if not, we went through it together. To preserve participants’ 
anonymity and confidentiality, the participant’s signature was not requested. Participants 
were also told that their participation in the study is voluntary and that they may withdraw 
from the study should they choose to do so. The collaborators’ institution, the Czech 




Chapter 5.  
 
Experts’ Perceptions: Contexts, Motivations and 
Organizations  
This chapter presents the common narratives that emerged from the interviews. 
The research question driving the interviews was: “What are the contextual factors and 
perceived motivations behind online economic crime?”  The chapter starts with a 
collection of five stories reported by five experts. Then, the results of the thematic 
analysis are presented. These results are divided into three sections: 1) a confluence of 
contextual factors, 2) perceived motivations, and 3) perceived structure of groups behind 
online economic crime. The third section, “perceived structure”, is the result of the 
inductive thematic analysis which led me to depict how experts perceived the 
organization of those behind online economic crime.  
5.1. Five Real-Life Stories of Online Economic Crime  
To begin, a collection of five stories reported by five experts is presented. These 
stories are not ground-breaking cases that made international news. Instead, they are 
typical stories that illustrate the experiences of different individuals who ended up  
involved in online economic crime. They are presented first to illustrate what experts had 
in mind when they expressed their thoughts throughout the interviews.  
Exiled Soldiers 
An expert talked about a group of ex-soldiers that were exiled from their own 
country because of a political crisis and ended up with no nationality. Yet, “with their 
discipline and strong will”, they started to participate in underground forums, learning 
how to steal cryptocurrency wallets and credit cards. The scheme grew big enough so 
they could buy a few houses and send money back home. To manage more complex 
operations, they hired individuals with high technical skills from schools. They also 
recruited young individuals from the street to cash out and launder their stolen money. 
They ended up forming an organized criminal group conducting various online economic 
crimes.   
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Trapped IT professional  
A security engineer started working for a small criminal group due to better 
financial potential. He ended up the technical administrator of a large-scale banking 
operation, stealing millions of dollars. The pay was 1,200 euros per week, a high salary 
considering his home country. He changed his way of living, borrowed money from a 
criminal source, moved with his family to the country where the group operated, and built 
a house based on that base salary. After a while, the boss of the criminal group behind 
the operation became aggressive and threatening to him, but by then the security 
engineer was trapped: he could not make such a salary in the legitimate realm and he 
was facing recuring payments for the house and the criminal loan he had taken. 
Depression and household conflict ensued, according to the expert telling this story.  
Gaming and Youth  
A young individual loved gaming. While playing, he met a girl and started chatting 
with her. She sent him a link with a pack of emojis which, once clicked on, started 
interfering with his computer: opening the CD player, exposing his IP address, and 
locking him off his device. He promised to himself that this would never happen again 
and started learning computer security. While gaming, someone “DDoSed” (sent a large 
number of requests to a website server until it shuts down) the game server, preventing 
anyone from playing. The young individual became angry and started talking with the 
DDoSer to understand the attack technique; the conversation led him to join an Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) on hacking. This was a small community of like-minded young 
individuals who tested the limits of various technologies together. He eventually became 
the leader of that community, building and managing botnets, stealing credit cards, and 
developing sophisticated schemes to buy technological products he could not afford at 
his young age. This lasted for a few years, and he eventually was hired in cybersecurity. 
He is now a strong advocate for online capture-the-flag competitions.  
Subsidies Zoning Fraud  
A database manager used to work for an institution keeping track of zoning 
information for government subsidies. Depending on the zoning level (e.g., zoning A), 
more subsidies are granted for economic development. Through a personal relationship 
with another employee, he managed to re-access the institution’s database from that 
employee’s laptop, pivoted in the company’s network, escalated his privileges, and 
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established a persistence mechanism, allowing him to access the database whenever 
he wanted. With this access, he developed a consulting business with a high success 
rate winning subsidies on geographic profiling for entrepreneurs. After a while, he made 
so many changes in the database (illustrating that he was highly confident that he would 
not get caught) that a security system triggered, leading to a forensics investigation and, 
eventually, his arrest.  
From Traditional Robberies to Carding 
For many years, a criminal group successfully conducted several robberies. 
Once the scheme did not work anymore, the group pivoted to online economic crime. 
Group members participated in credit card skimming (using a device that steals credit 
card numbers), and banking credential theft through social engineering. They recruited 
many individuals in the credential theft scheme, training them to call potential victims 
and impersonate bank representatives. However, group members were not aware of all 
the traces they left behind while conducting their online illicit activities, due to their lack 
of technical skills. It still took about two years and many complaints for the whole 
scheme to be taken down by law enforcement.  
5.2.   A Confluence of Contextual Factors   
These stories depicted various schemes and experiences behind online 
economic crime. This section presents the contextual factors that emerged through the 
thematic analysis. For clarity purposes, “factor” refers to circumstances that contribute to 
a result and “contextual” is the environment in which individuals evolve. Contextual 
factors are circumstances, identified at the environment level, that can explain why 
individuals end up participating in online economic crime. The assumption behind this 
analysis is that there exist common contextual factors that can explain why many 
individuals participate in online economic crime. 
From the thematic analysis, three contextual factors emerged: (1) lack of legal 
economic opportunities, (2) lack of deterrents, and (3) means of drifting. These factors 
represent a cocktail that, all together, creates favorable contexts that could influence 
individuals to exploit online economic crime opportunities. They are presented below.  
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5.2.1. Lack of Legal Economic Opportunities  
Throughout the interviews, the lack of legal economic opportunities was often 
mentioned in experts’ narratives as a contextual factor influencing individuals to 
participate in online economic crime. For example, Expert 1200 mentioned that in a 
specific context where such crime is prevalent: “You can count on your fingers the 
security companies that we have on the defender side. And the thing is that there are 
other local companies, which are not paying enough.” Expert 1300, in the same vein, 
mentioned that it is “very hard to be employed in this field I guess”. More bluntly, Expert 
402, when talking about an individual involved in economic crime, said: “He lived in the 
country where you don't have much money, even if you are a security engineer, your 
paycheck is like shit.”  
Expert 901 did notice that those living in the countryside were more likely to end 
up in such activities: “If you live in a small city, then, even if you're smart enough, you 
might not be able to have a good job in that city”. Expert 401 talked about the rate of 
unemployment in specific districts that may explain why some individuals end up 
accepting quick online economic crime contracts, such as being a money mule: “the fact 
that the rate of unemployment in those districts is very specific, very high. So, it's way 
easier to recruit mules in those districts”. Experts 1001 and 100 also mentioned the fall 
of the Soviet Union that led to high unemployment rates, which, mixed with high 
technological development, have led individuals to seek online crime opportunities. 
Expert 200 mentioned inequality, recalling that the individuals he investigated came from 
unequal societies. He stated that those in poorer conditions (where there were few legal 
opportunities to make decent salaries) were more likely to seize online economic crime 
opportunities.   
However, experts also stressed that such a factor does not excuse these 
behaviors and that participating in such activities is more a choice than a necessity. For 
example, Expert 900 mentioned: “if you want to have a legal job, there is always a way 
of you getting in […] Yeah, there is a way of doing some remote work. Actually, 
nowadays it's easier.” Similarly, Experts 901 and 1200 mentioned the possibility of using 
bug bounty programs to earn money by legally finding bugs in software. Expert 901 goes 
as far as staying: “There is always a way out. People just don't see it. Or don't want to 
see it.” Individuals do not necessarily participate in online economic crime to survive, 
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although the lack of legal economic opportunities may be the factor that influences them 
to choose this opportunity over another legal one.   
5.2.2. Lack of Deterrents 
The second contextual factor, lack of deterrence, refers to the lack of measures 
or practices aimed at discouraging individuals from conducting online economic crime for 
fear of retribution or consequences (be it formal or informal). The lack of deterrents 
usually expected from law enforcement agencies, justice systems or peer judgements 
was mentioned by several experts. The absence of these deterrents provides a feeling 
of impunity to individuals involved in online economic crime.  
For example, Expert 1300 stated: “you can realize that they [individuals involved 
in online economic crime] do not care, because no one in this country has ever been 
jailed for doing something bad in cyber”, while Expert 300 mentioned: “the local 
institution which investigates economic crime is still really, really badly organized”. 
Expert 500 also mentioned how law enforcement needed to “level-up their game”: “Yes, I 
think we need to improve our investigation capability to figure out what, and who, are the 
bad guys.”  Expert 401 revealed how one individual involved in online economic crime 
texted him: “Okay you know, law enforcement in [country] they really suck at their job”. 
That same expert added: 
“When we decided to fight back against this guy, I spent hours and 
hours and hours with the law enforcement trying to explain how the 
business works, how the guy works, etc. It was for one guy, only for 
one guy. Honestly, I spend days with law enforcement. And I will be 
called again in the future to do that, to explain, in front of a judge, how 
the business works, all the money laundering works, etc. I accepted to 
do that but it's a lot of time burned for almost nothing, you know.” 
Expert 1103 mentioned: “We know that the police enforcement doesn't have the 
skills nor the people to catch anyone doing anything”. This feeling of impunity due to law 
enforcement inefficiency is mentioned quite bluntly by Expert 700 when talking about the 
organization behind online economic crime: “So I think they're quite aware of that. I don't 
get a sense that, in terms the more organized crime, the cash motivated cybercrime. I 
don't get the sense they have any fear about law enforcement whatsoever.” 
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Law enforcement misaligned incentives were also mentioned as an explanation 
of law enforcement inefficiency. For example, Expert 1001 said: “One, law enforcement 
individuals need to know. Second, they need to care. And third, they need to do 
something, and they probably have other more pressing issues.”  Expert 901 discussed 
how investigators are less likely to open an investigation in their country if there are no 
victims, allowing individuals to target victims abroad without the threat of law 
enforcement. This is reiterated by Expert 700: 
“Most of your job as law enforcement is about your local area so whether 
it's your local region or your country. If there is a hacker in a foreign 
country who is targeting people in your country […], even if you get that 
person arrested, it's not going to count towards your arrest figures, 
because they were arrested by Indian police or by Sri Lankan police for 
example.” 
Expert 502 also mentioned that some individuals involved in online economic 
crime ended up moving from their origin country to other countries where law 
enforcement would not bother them. These individuals thus exploited loopholes across 
jurisdictions. Corruption was also raised by experts. For example, Expert 1300 
mentioned that there is no deterrence: “because they know they can like pay money not 
to be jailed and to get this question solved.”  Expert 1001 also stated that, if ever you 
feel threatened by the police, “You could also bribe them [law enforcement officials]. 
That's normal.” As stated by Expert 1100: “If a policeman arrests you for something, you 
can give him some money to let you go and he will accept it”.  
In terms of peer judgements, Expert 1300 mentioned that the absence of 
negative peer judgement may also be a factor influencing individuals: “It's an unsaid rule, 
not to judge a person at all […] It's just none of your business”. Expert 600 mentioned 
that individuals committing online crimes considered that their actions were legal based 
on their own moral values: “it was legal to us”. 
5.2.3. Drifting Means 
 To get involved in online economic crime, one must start somewhere. Experts 
discussed various encounters (both in person and online) wherein individuals discovered 
that participating in online economic crime is possible. These encounters included, for 
example, knowing friends of friends, school recruitment, online advertising, and gaming.  
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The drifting means factor represent the third contextual factor that influence individuals 
to participate in online economic crime, the factor that leads to crime participation.  
Drifting by knowing a “friend of a friend” was a common element mentioned by 
experts. For example, Expert 402 said: “You always have a friend of a friend of a friend 
who's doing something weird, and you can have money, if you need something just 
ask… Social friend or a friend of a friend.” Expert 300 even referred to Granovetter’s 
(1985) theory of strength of weak ties and stated: “it's not necessarily your closest 
friends but someone who knows someone who knows someone...”  who leads one to be 
involved in such activities. Also, being recruited at school was often mentioned by 
experts. For example, Expert 402 stated that some individuals “are just students and 
they are recruited [by groups involved in online economic crime] every year on different 
campuses”. In an extreme example, Expert 800 said: “There is some department at 
Technical University which is full of hackers groups, great ones, and they recruited some 
of these guys to help them build these online operations.” On a more personal level, 
Expert 100 mentioned that someone tried to recruit her engineering friend to write 
malware at school: “He was studying with a guy who tried to recruit him to write 
malware”. Expert 300 also mentioned that, at her high school, individuals were actively 
recruiting students to participate in illicit online activities, as the school was well-known 
as a good computer science school at the national level. Alternatively, Expert 800 
mentioned that criminal groups involved in online economic crime recruited individuals 
straight from the street. He gave an example of a person he knew who: 
“[…] was just jogging in the street and they [individuals from the 
organized group] noticed that his clothes were kind of old, so they 
understood that he can be one of the guys. And they turned him into 
the money mule, actually.” 
Drifting through online means was also mentioned. In fact, many statements 
referred to online recruitment through online advertising using legitimate, well-known 
channels and platforms. Expert 402 supported this idea quite clearly: “They look for 
people who are looking for jobs in famous job websites”. Expert 401 also mentioned: 
“They are recreating news on Instagram, mostly. Saying, okay you want to make some 
money okay create an account in that bank”. Even the large French job website Poll 
Emploi was leveraged, according to that same expert: “They successfully created an 
account on the Poll Emploi website and posted the job offer and I guess they 
successfully recruited mules from the National Job Offer web portal”. 
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Expert 402 talked about how online advertising is used to recruit freelancers and 
employees with ads like: “You want to work for a remote company with commission? 
You will receive the money and you will have to send the money back somewhere and 
you will have a commission with the money transferred”. Expert 900 stated bluntly: 
“There are a lot of online jobs and they're posted by cyber criminals,” as well as “I mean, 
if you see the online jobs, it’s easy to see some things that are fishy because usually 
they pay more than others and they don't have proper contacts”, meaning that they will 
ask to be contacted via informal networks like jabber, ICQ or Proton mail. Expert 901 
also said: “Actually we saw a lot of postings on job sites searching for a good developer 
with knowledge of low-level Windows architecture, and yeah, it looked shady.” Expert 
1101 similarly mentioned seeing postings online for job offers to recruit individuals in 
criminal activities. Expert 401 told a story where a woman told him: 
“Okay, I got a job offer, you know, and someone is asking me to 
translate that message, but I am not sure it is legal and can you give 
me some advice. And it was a message about that ransomware targeting 
la Gendarmerie Nationale, you know!?” 
The woman was thus interested in a translation job offer that asked her to 
translate a ransomware note targeting the French police! On the other hand, Expert 
1102 talked about constantly receiving social network messages asking him if he would 
be willing to do some “extra work”, which was clearly illegal according to him, such as: 
“Hey, I like your skills, I like your history. I know who you are. And I would like to propose 
you with a deal”. This expert illustrated that online recruitment may not be only passive, 
via online ads, but also active, with individuals messaging others with interesting shady 
offers.   
Finally, online gaming also seemed to represent a means of drifting towards 
online economic crime. Expert 700 mentioned: Look, I know computer gamer sounds 
weird and sounds niche, but you've got to realize this is the training ground”. That expert 
discussed how there is a crossover between gaming, hacking and online economic 
crime. Gamers want to hack the game they play, and their curiosity leads them to 
underground forums and down-the-rabbit-hole of participating in the community and 
conducting illicit rent-seeking activities. Expert 402 corroborated this hypothesis, 
mentioning: “So in Germany, so it’s mostly kids and as you said they played Minecraft 
and they have to DDoS the server to each other and quickly you understand that buying 
a stolen credit card is super easy”. Similarly, Expert 900 mentioned:  
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“All right, like a lot of young people, they develop malware for games. 
And then they never get caught. And then a few years pass, and they 
start to do malware stuff, stealing credit cards and things like that.” 
Based on expert narratives, these three factors, lack of legal economic 
opportunities, lack of deterrence and having a means of drifting explained why some 
individuals may end up in online economic crime. These three factors are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive nor required, but the three all together may increase the 
proportion of individuals involved in these activities for most contexts. The following 
sections looks at perceived motivations.  
5.3. Perceived Motivations 
Throughout the data analysis, experts also mentioned potential motivations 
driving those behind online economic crime. These included financial gains, and, to a 
certain degree, the feelings associated with committing such crime, such as pride, 
excitement, or power. Both perceived motivations are presented below.  
5.3.1. Financial Gains 
 According to experts, there are no doubts that actors behind such crime are 
motivated by money. For example, Expert 100 mentioned: “It's all about money, of 
course”, while Expert 1000 said: “Why do people go into this illegal stuff? Why do they 
try to do it? 90% of the time it's about money”.  Similarly, Expert 1103 stated: “Most of 
them, their motivation is financial. They want to profit from this,” and Expert 1200 said: 
“The main factor is the money”. Expert 1102 mentioned: “For money, because you need 
to make some easy money” while Expert 1100 stated: “The money I think is the motive”. 
It is this finding that led me to consider experts’ narratives through the lenses of 
online economic crime rather than “of exploiting information technologies 
opportunities”.  
 What may be more interesting is: how much money? Expert 500 said: “Yes, I 
think they are rich” and Expert 900 mentioned: “They're very rich”. Person 1101 talked 
about a group behind ATM skimmers that made millions and reinvested the money in the 
legal realm, emphasizing: “I mean, we’re talking about a lot of money.” However, an 
alternative narrative also emerged across experts’ discourses, one that considered those 
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behind online economic crime as not necessarily extremely wealthy, but rather wealthy 
enough. These experts stressed that, objectively, the amounts were not, in their view, 
enormous, but, from the perspective of the individual doing the crime, the amount looked 
substantial enough. For example, Expert 1200 mentioned: “I would not say rich. I would 
say successful enough,” while Expert 401 stated: “They make shit tons of money […] but 
they are not rolling in Porsches nor flying in first class. They can brag with an iPhone, 
because an iPhone is 1000 euros not 50,000 euros, you know”. That same Expert also 
added: “They still make more than normal people but it’s still very little. Let’s say, you 
cannot buy a big house, but still a nice one”. Similarly, Expert 100 mentioned that, given 
specific contexts, the money earned through online economic crime is not necessarily 
that impressive, but usually more than what individuals would make as a cybersecurity 
expert in a legitimate industry. Similarly, Expert 1102 stated that, for a specific task 
related to online economic crime, an individual can be offered more than what he or she 
would expect in the legal realm: “like 1200 dollars. Yeah. I mean, it is really cheap. It is 
really for the American side. For [country], it's another salary range”.  
Expert 1300 had a more pessimistic narrative because, according to him, many 
people involved in such activities were rather poorly paid: “People who develop 
malicious code are very often being underpaid”, and adding: “So, it happens that coders 
are underpaid. Yeah. I do know like at least two examples of those. But how much? It 
depends, I guess, it's like a market level.” When talking about the proportion of 
individuals making large amounts of money, Expert 901 replied: “Super small. […] 
Because then think about it as you would see like everybody with yachts and stuff.” 
 Thus, the motivation is money, but whether such activity pays depends on one’s 
perspective and context. Potentially, the idea that online economic crime yields 
substantial amounts of money is what drives such criminals, as Expert 900 mentioned: 
“they want to be rich cybercriminals”. 
5.3.2. Feelings 
Money is the perceived overarching motivation for such crime. Yet experts also 
mentioned motivations that were beyond financial purposes. The motivations that 
emerged from the narratives were often related to feelings or emotions experienced 
when conducting such crime.  For example, an individual involved in economic crime 
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told Expert 402 that: “At first, it’s not about the money, it’s about the adrenaline that I can 
have when I’m able to like steal money from somebody”. The most common feelings 
mentioned by experts included pride and fame (attention seeking), excitement (such as 
adrenaline kicks) and having power over others. These emotions were related to the act 
of defrauding individuals for economic purposes, such as individuals hacking into 
companies to launch a ransomware. Each of these emotions are briefly presented 
below.  
Experts mentioned that taking pride in the illicit activity can be considered a 
motivation. For example, Expert 401, when talking about an individual developing a 
banking trojan, stated: “He was very proud of himself. He really wanted to show the 
people to show everyone, Okay, I did that, I'm pretty good at what I'm doing, and you 
know you guys suck and I’m the best etc.”. Similarly, Expert 700 also stressed such 
feeling, mentioning: “It's a creation, and it takes skills, and it takes patience, and it's 
something that they're struggling, I think, with the pride that they feel in what they 
created”. Such a feeling was also expressed by Expert 200: “The biggest motivator is 
money, and after this is the feeling of doing something like create a name in the 
underground scene.” Pride involves peer recognition, and subsequently fame. Expert 
1102 stressed that fame, a close relative to pride, is a motivator: “It is fame” and “they 
actually work to be famous” while Expert 700 similarly mentioned: “You can see people 
that are saying [in forums] I'm the guy who did this or you know, I recognize you from 
such and such. There's a need for fame in there.” Similarly, Expert 800 talked about a 
group he interacted with that  “were really proud. Yeah, they are considered the heroes 
in their villages they were born, because they made it to the big world, and they are 
making a lot of money”.  
Apart from seeking pride and fame, the feeling of excitement was also 
expressed by experts, excitement for specific actions such as writing malware and 
infecting devices for economic crime purposes. Excitement encompasses pleasure, fun, 
joy and adrenaline rushes. For example, Expert 402 mentioned that an individual 
developing banking trojans he interacted with kept experiencing adrenaline rushes. 
Expert 600 also mentioned how doing such things may be motivated by “the drive, or like 
the kick, you get in doing such things,” while Expert 700 said: “It's just, you are throwing 
yourself again and again and again at a closed door for the joy of the one moment when 
the door swings open.” Experts perceived these emotions -which was gathered into the 
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excitement subtheme- as motivators behind online economic crime. Finally, within 
experts’ discourses, having power over others seemed to be a dominant motivator that 
influenced individuals behind such crime. For example, Expert 800 mentioned: 
“I think the feeling or idea of being important or to have power over 
some other people. And this fascinates them because all they can do is 
just sit behind the computer. And while doing this, they have actual 
power controlling other people's systems.” 
while Expert 600 said: “It’s the capacity that you have to keep learning over others and 
having knowledge is addictive. When you can show that you have knowledge.” Similarly, 
Expert 300 mentioned: “I think they just enjoyed the power and the control, and I guess it 
in an increasingly connected world, being able to play with this kind of stuff is sort of a 
high power”. The idea of having power or control over others while participating in online 
economic crime was a recurrent theme in the data.  
5.4. The Perceived Structure of Groups behind Online 
Economic Crime 
The semi-directed nature of the interviews and the data analysis following an 
inductive approach yielded unexpected results as I ended up sorting different 
perceptions on the organization of online economic crime. Throughout the interviews, 
how experts perceived or conceptualized the organization of online economic crime 
varied greatly, both across experts and within an expert’s discourse. Four organization 
types emerged from their discourse. Two that referred to somewhat structured 
organizations: (1) criminal groups with a certain degree of organization and (2) 
enterprises. Two others that referred to more organic associations: (3) networks and (4) 
communities. Each of these organizations is presented and discussed below, providing 
an interesting depiction of how criminal associations behind online economic crime are 
understood by experts.  
Moreover, this perspective sheds light on the importance of “indispensable 
workers” within experts’ discourses: individuals who are key to the organization of online 
economic crime regardless of the perceived structure behind these groups. Such 
indispensable workers conduct all daily mundane activities surrounding these kinds of 
crimes, such as calling victims to social engineer them, managing infected servers, or 
transferring money (i.e., money mules). Mentions of these workers are presented below. 
62 
5.4.1. Structured Organization  
The structured organization mentioned by experts includes criminal groups 
with a certain degree of organization and enterprises. The first type refers to groups 
of individuals who know each other from the “offline world”. These groups have well-
defined roles related to their involvement in criminal activities. From this type, two 
subtypes emerged: groups that formed due to early online crime opportunities and more 
“traditional” criminal groups who now seek such opportunities.  
The first subtype, groups that formed due to early online crime 
opportunities, refers to groups that started a while ago: at the birth of the 
democratization of information technologies. Consequently, they are nowadays 
knowledgeable on online money-stealing processes and techniques. Expert 901 
depicted them as “more mature criminals, actually criminals who know the drill and who 
know how to organize this pyramid of people and how to actually make money out of it,” 
while Expert 402 stressed their maturity: “From everyone I saw, it’s people aged forty+. 
Nobody under forty I saw”. Similarly, Expert 200 argued that such organizations are 
formed of “Old kind of people; you know that they have not just graduated from 
University but are rather part of an organization that has been known for a while”. The 
relative size of such groups, in terms of the number of people, is also perceived as 
limited. For example, Expert 900 mentioned that: “when one of them [crime groups] gets 
caught, you can count them on one hand”. Similarly, Expert 402 mentioned that, 
considering only Russia, the sum of individuals involved in such groups represents fewer 
than 100 people: “like those people who will take the lead and are the top of the top, 
those people are the very few”. However, these individuals seem to be very successful 
at what they do, explaining why they stay within such a business for many years, 
according to experts. For example, Expert 900 mentioned: “They're very rich, they have 
the resources to do this [sophisticated criminal schemes]”. Similarly, Expert 402 said that 
these groups are the ones we hear the most about; they are the ones “making one or 
two million a month” and they meet “in yachts and big hotels and pictures of their parties 
with cocaine and drugs get leaked to the media”.  
The second subtype refers to traditional crime organizations seeking online 
crime opportunities. The story, presented above, of a group specialized in robberies 
that then pivoted to credit card skimming (using a device that steals credit card numbers) 
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once robberies were no longer successful is a good example. In the same vein, Expert 
901 mentioned that, in many cases, when a criminal group was uncovered, “Several 
members came from traditional crime”. Alternatively, Expert 1103 talked about how 
traditional drug cartels are now recruiting tech savvy individuals, stating: “So basically a 
lot of drug cartels here in [country] are so interested [in technical abilities], they find that 
they need to recruit these kinds of guys”. 
The second type of structured organization perceived by experts was as 
enterprises. Two subtypes emerged as well: groups organized as enterprises or actual 
enterprises involved in online economic crime. The first one referred to criminal 
organizations with paid employees and a structure similar to that of an enterprise. 
For example, Expert 402 talked about an individual working as an employee for the 
criminal organization “to steal from banks from different countries and have a 
commission, a salary”.  Similarly, Expert 901, when talking about an individual 
developing malware for a criminal group, mentioned that the work was like a “day-to-day 
job”. That same expert referred to individuals responsible to cash out money as “low-
level personnel”, using the word “personnel” and so reflecting the idea of their being 
enterprise workers. The story above of the “trapped IT professional” also reflects this 
perceived structure. Expert 1001 went even further in the analogy, mentioning that those 
behind online economic crime “are organized just like normal companies with CEO, CTO 
and marketing departments.”  
The second subtype comprised actual enterprises involved in online 
economic crime. Expert 400 experienced an attack on infrastructure and, once 
investigating the threat, found that the organization behind it was a legal company. The 
criminal scheme involved sending lots of spam that: 
“pretended that you had a parcel to be delivered to your house, written 
in [language] and faking the company’s logo [the company the expert 
worked at]. The spam required that the individual dialed a special 
number that charged 2 euros to get a code. The excess charges were 
sent to a legal company, which, according to a press release describing 
the arrest of the company’s boss and seven employees, summed to 1.5 
million euros per month.” 
An analogy of companies with a double identity, legitimate activities and 
illegitimate activities was also found in the discourse of experts. For example, Expert 
1001 mentioned “[…] there are companies in Russia that have, for instance, two floors. 
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One floor is a legitimate tech business, and the other floor is a non-legitimate tech 
business”. Expert 1200 also talked about double-identity companies subcontracting 
individuals who “are not aware of the company's operation or whatever the company is 
doing.” because “they are not actually aware of this stuff, whether it's legal or illegal 
since they are like a kind of employee for that company. For them like they are just 
getting money to do that job.” Expert 1100 similarly told a story of a legal enterprise that 
installed ATMs across a city with skimmers (credit card theft devices) built into them. By 
the time the enterprise was caught, the money had been stolen and reinvested in the 
legal sphere.  
5.4.2. Organic Structures  
Organic structures included two types:  loose networks of entrepreneurs and 
communities. For the former, experts sometimes perceived the organization behind 
online economic crime as loose networks of entrepreneurs seeking to associate for 
business opportunities. Such discourse was tied to the idea of specialization (referring to 
separation of tasks in the market) and how online platforms may be used to find 
business associates. For example, when Expert 901 discussed the organization behind 
online economic crimes, he mentioned the separation of tasks; for instance, “the 
programmers are completely disconnected from the people who are selling it actually”. 
Expert 402 expanded on an individual who developed a banking trojan that targeted 
French banks. That individual started by selling “his malware, but he was mocked on 
different forums. So, he decided to run his business with his own […] and started making 
a lot of money”. According to the expert, that individual moved to Ukraine and found a 
way to buy fake identities and passports, as well as ways to launder the stolen money 
through mule accounts. He was an independent entrepreneur with a good network.  
Experts’ narratives also encompassed organizations formed of online 
communities. There were several mentions of “attacker community”, “underground 
hacker community” and “there is a big community, you know, people who write malware 
and they are teaching for free” (Expert 900). Some of these underground communities 
are exclusive, as Expert 901 mentioned: “The real business is happening  in the 
underground forums, which is hard to access”. Similarly, Expert 401 stressed that “You 
have to prove yourself to enter this kind of stuff so it's very difficult for any company or 
for any guy like me to enter in those”. These exclusive communities are imagined as a 
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place where entrepreneurs can do “serious business” rather than “sell already hacked 
computers, already stolen cards and stuff like that.” (Expert 901). Expert 901, in the 
previous statement, refers to underground platforms that are open. Other communities 
mentioned by experts were less profit-driven and more knowledge sharing, like the 
statement above referring to individuals teaching each other for free. Expert 600 also 
talked about a community where “a lot of methodologies on how to get money was 
shared”, and the person in that community said: “This was the first time that I felt in a 
community. […] I do not know. It was really nice”.  
Overall, these four types (criminal groups, enterprises, loose networks of 
entrepreneurs, and communities) summarize how the organization of online economic 
crime was depicted by experts. Most likely, the ground-truth lies in a mixture or a blend 
of these organizations, as discussed in Chapter 12.  
5.5. The Indispensable Workers 
Additionally, from experts’ narratives, I noticed that the various structures 
perceived seemed to be dependent on a population of individuals evolving at the 
periphery, the indispensable workers. These workers are individuals who accept jobs 
from these organizations and end-up contributing to online economic crime. They are not 
the motivated offenders behind the crime, those who have thought of the whole scheme, 
but rather a necessary instrument or a needed accessory for the scheme. The concept 
encompasses a wide range of individuals, from information technology professionals 
seeking work contracts to translators (like the woman who responded to a job offer on 
Poll Emploi) to those transferring the money (i.e., money mules). Indeed, several experts 
mentioned how one could end up involved into online economic crime by accepting 
contracts that could be considered legitimate at first. For example, Expert 901 mentioned 
that groups behind online economic crime “hire, like pentesters and those people 
[penetration testers] they do not know that they are actually doing cybercrimes”. 
Similarly, Expert 300 mentioned:  
“Yeah, perhaps you just do a little job for them first and you get paid, 
and you don't really know that you've done something illegal and then 
it's like, hey, it's just a gray zone, or they won't really deny that money, 
and so on. And, yeah, it's a step by step, kind of thing.” 
Slowly, these individuals may drift into crime, as mentioned by Expert 1300:  
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“Some of them have started their activity unconsciously, as a freelancer. 
So, they were just sort of, you know, advertising their services and 
someone has contacted them. And they started to work and after that, 
they realized what was it like, and... But there was no sense to sort of 
give it up.” 
Such depiction was corroborated by Expert 900 who stated: “They give you, like 
some testing tasks. You do things, they pay you. And they, and then they say, okay, we 
are doing something different. Like we're doing malware”. Based on experts’ discourses, 
those actively involved in online economic crime employ workers without being entirely 
honest on the illicitness of the activities. This is not necessarily surprising considering 
that certain activities surrounding online economic crime are legal, such as building 
websites or setting up servers. They are indispensable workers because they are 
needed to ensure the good running of complex schemes surrounding online economic 
crime. As Expert 100 mentioned: “to run a botnet, you need to have servers and all the 
servers they need to be taken care of by administrators. They need programmers and 
programmers need to write good code”. 
Alternatively, middlemen to hide criminal tracks are also needed. For example, 
Expert 402 talked about a scheme that bought goods with stolen online accounts and 
someone was hired as a quality manager to receive the goods: 
“So, you are hired to be a quality manager and you receive packages. 
You have to open the packages and make sure that everything is right, 
and you send the packages somewhere else and that is your job.” 
Money mules also act as middlemen and are necessary for the online economic 
crime to succeed, as stated by Expert 1100. These individuals are the ones who “get 
caught because they leave most traces, and it's easy to find them,” as mentioned by 
Expert 901. Expert 700 mitigated that statement, stating that the risks may not be very 
high: “Finding mules is not really difficult. Mules will take all the risk, but the risks are not 
so burdensome”. Similarly, Expert 401 mentioned that, in his experience, mules are not 
found guilty when caught because of the suspicion that the individuals may not be aware 
that the money cashed out was stolen.  
These workers, be they money mules or IT contractors, illustrate that, for online 
economic crime schemes to succeed, there may be more individuals involved than only 
motivated offenders. The implications of these findings are discussed in Chapter 12. 
67 
Overall, interviews with experts uncovered contextual factors and perceived 
motivations of those behind online economic crime, related to the first objective of this 
study. The inductive thematic analysis also led to exploring how experts perceived the 
organization of those involved in such crime and the indispensable workers surrounding 
them. To complement these findings, another perspective is taken: analyzing 
discussions of individuals involved in online economic crime. This second analysis will 










Chapter 6. Methods for Private Chat Log Analysis 
The following analysis moves beyond experts’ perspectives and focuses on a 
group involved in online economic crime. This was made possible thanks to the 
Stratosphere Laboratory that gave me access to a private chat log containing 
conversations among Russian-speaking individuals involved in spreading malicious 
banking applications related to the Geost botnet.  
In short, the Geost botnet is an Android banking Trojan botnet that infected 
nearly 800,000 Russian phones and had access to millions of Euros. It was discovered 
in 2018 during analysis of the network traffic of the HtBot proxy-malware, a proxy service 
known to be used for anonymity purposes by individuals involved in crime. The 
researchers found unencrypted network traffic directed to the botnet's Command and 
Control (C&C) web server when monitoring the proxy, allowing identification of the 
botnet's domains and IP addresses as well as its infrastructure and general purpose. 
The complex technical analysis of the botnet had already been published by members of 
the Laboratory  (see Garcia et al., 2019). It is during this investigation that the chat log 
containing private conversations among individuals involved in spreading the botnet was 
uncovered, as explained below.  
This unique dataset was used to fulfill the first objective of this study: to uncover 
the contextual factors and perceived motivations of individuals involved in online 
economic crime. The research question leading the analysis was: “What are the 
motivations and challenges behind those involved in online economic crime?” The 
research question focuses on identifying the challenges, as opposed to the contextual 
factors. This allowed me to stay as close as possible to the conversations while 
understanding the context in which these individuals evolve. This chapter focuses on the 
methods and data. It starts by presenting the dataset and the study population. Then, 
the data analysis is outlined along with ethical considerations.  
6.1. Dataset  
The chat log was found on the Virus Total platform by Veronica Valeros from the 
Stratosphere Laboratory. Virus Total is a “free service that analyzes files and URLs for 
viruses, worms, trojans and other kinds of malicious content” (Virus Total, 2020). Anyone 
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can submit a file to Virus Total for inspection through a public web interface. The files 
submitted are available to anyone who has an account with them. Virus Total’s Terms of 
Service mention that a file submitted on their service should be considered public. For 
these reasons, the chat log is treated as a public file, although it is accessible to only 
those who have a paid account with the company. The chat log is an Excel spreadsheet, 
and the conversations are written in Russian. Over 90% of the conversations were 
translated by Anna Shirokova, a Russian-speaking researcher who participated in the 
Garcia et al. (2019) investigation. The remaining 10% was translated using the Google 
Translate application online.  
The chat log was linked to the Geost botnet due to the exchange of specific 
information that could be known only by individuals actively involved in the malicious 
operation. Within the conversation, passwords, IP addresses, and specific domains 
related to the internal operations of the Command and Control (C&C) web servers were 
shared. Specific information about the Geost Android application packages (APKs) was 
also distributed, along with how to obfuscate those APKs before uploading them to 
webpages. The obfuscation method used to avoid antivirus detection of the Geost botnet 
was completely uncovered and published (Sembera et al., 2021). 
In terms of the format, the chat log is formed of 32 conversations and 6,249 
messages between one individual and his business partners. All conversations were 
related to business: there were no intimate/personal conversations. Each conversation 
contained a flow of messages between the main entrepreneur and another business 
partner. For each message, the specific time and date was available along with the 
sender’s and the recipient’s usernames as well as the content of the message in 
Russian and its translated version (if available). The first message was sent June 11th, 
2017, and the last one was sent April 17th, 2018; the dataset thus spans 310 days. 
Figure 3 shows the number of messages exchanged through time in the chat log. Most 
conversations took place at the end of 2017 and early 2018.  
In terms of frequency of discussions, of the 32 one-to-one conversations, 12 had 
one message and 9 had fewer than 20 messages exchanged; 5 included between 20 
and 100 messages; 4 between 100 and 400 messages; and 2 more than 1,000 
messages, forming the core of the dataset. The analysis below centers on the 11 
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conversations that had more than 20 messages, encompassing 6,134 of the 6,249 
messages.  
 
Figure 3 Private Chat Log Frequency of Messages Sent 
6.2. Study Population  
The main individual in the chat log, the one who converses with everyone, is 
called the “Main Entrepreneur” throughout the thesis. Baumol (1996) defines 
entrepreneurs as individuals who are ingenious and creative and find ways to create 
wealth, power, and prestige. When focused on innovation and productive activities, 
entrepreneurs benefit societies by creating wealth. However, entrepreneurship can also 
be destructive, especially when the entrepreneurs focus on rent-seeking at all costs and 
engage in tax evasion or unproductive activities to do so (Baumol, 1996).  
The main individual in the chat log is considered an entrepreneur, as defined by 
Baumol (1996), because of the economic activities he engages in: creating websites for 
rent-seeking purposes. He hires and deals with various contractors to increase the 
efficiency and reach of his websites and participates in various pay-per-install or pay-
per-click programs to make money out of them. These economic activities led him, with 
others in the chat log, to contribute to spreading the Geost botnet.   
The other individuals in the private chat log are considered his business partners. 
Given their conversations, I created seven roles that summarize their function in relation 
with the Main Entrepreneur. They are presented in Table 1.   
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Table 1 Business Partners Roles Created from the Private Chat Log 
Name Role 
Website Master Individual involved in developing websites as well as taking various strategies to 
promote them for monetization 
Web Developer Individual paid to develop websites 
Affiliate Marketer Individual involved in managing affiliate marketing programs (such as developing 
deals with telecommunication companies or running the platform) 
Text Writer Individual paid to write text for better website visibility 
Server Cleaner Individual paid to clean servers when infected with malware 
Money Exchange 
professional 
Individual that specializes in money exchanges 
SEO Professional Individual paid to improve website performance for better website visibility   
These seven roles were distributed among the 11 business partners. Each 
business partner was given one role that summarized best their activities, according to 
the conversations. In short, two business partners in the private chat log were website 
masters (Website Master 1 and Website Master 2). They were creating websites for 
rent-seeking purposes, just like the Main Entrepreneur. They discussed various aspects 
of the business with the Main Entrepreneur. Website Master 1 was also working in close 
collaboration with the Main Entrepreneur, as explained below.  
Two other business partners were developers (Developer 1 and Developer 2): 
individuals hired to develop websites on behalf of the Main Entrepreneur. Two additional 
business partners were identified as affiliate marketers (Affiliate Marketer 1 and Affiliate 
Marketer 2). Affiliate marketing programs are programs that website master can 
subscribe to to try to make money out of their websites, such as pay-per-install. Either 
these affiliate marketers tried to recruit the main entrepreneur to participate in the 
program or the main entrepreneur sought them out for business opportunities. 
One business partner was tagged as a text writer. He was hired to write texts on 
the Main Entrepreneur’s websites. Texts relevant to the website’s topic can lead to 
higher visibility on search engines like Google or Yandex. Two server cleaners were 
also identified in the private chat log (Server Cleaner 1 and Server Cleaner 2). They 
were hired to fix the Main Entrepreneur’s server that was hacked at one point in the 
conversations.  
72 
There was one money exchange professional. He was contacted by the Main 
Entrepreneur to exchange money from one currency to another. Lastly, there was one 
search engine optimization (SEO) professional who was paid to improve the Main 
Entrepreneur’s website visibility through various SEO tactics, such as click redirections.  
The aliases (representing their roles) are presented in Table 2, with the number 
of messages exchanged between each of them and the Main Entrepreneur, the first date 
and last date of interaction, and the length of the conversation.  
Table 2 Business Partners related to the Main Entrepreneur 
In chatlog N. Messages Date start Date end Conversation Length 
Website Master 1 2,043 2017-10-04 2018-04-17 195 days 
Website Master 2  74 2017-09-27 2018-04-14 199 days 
Developer 1 2,871 2017-10-03 2018-04-02 181 days 
Developer 2 33 2017-10-15 2017-10-24 9 days 
Affiliate Marketer 1 156 2017-08-23 2018-03-04 193 days 
Affiliate Marketer 2 207 2017-08-02 2018-04-16 257 days 
Text Writer 30 2017-08-04 2018-01-18 167 days 
Server Cleaner 1 355 2017-11-21 2017-12-07 16 days 
Server Cleaner 2 22 2017-11-12 2017-11-13 1 day 
Money Exchanger 310 2017-09-08 2018-01-19 133 days 
SEO Professional  33 2017-12-14 2017-12-28 14 days 
As shown in Table 2, Website Master 1 (conducting business similar to that of  
the Main Entrepreneur) and Developer 1 (hired to develop the Main Entrepreneur’s 
websites) are the two individuals with the highest number of messages exchanged with 
the Main Entrepreneur. Moreover, information about the Geost botnet was shared within 
these two conversations. The Main Entrepreneur, Website Master 1, and Developer 1 
are thus, with a high degree of certainty, three individuals who are involved in 
online economic crime. The other individuals are subcontractors doing short-term 
contracts for the Main Entrepreneur. Whether they know the websites are related to illicit 
activities, namely, spreading malicious applications, is not obvious through the 
conversation.  
The conversations between the Main Entrepreneur and the two individuals 
involved in such activity formed 79% of the chat log; they are thus the focus of this 
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analysis. However, interactions with the other nine individuals (and the 21 short 
conversations) are also analyzed, allowing the gathering of as much information as 
possible.  
6.3. Data Analysis  
The conversations in the private chat log were analyzed using a thematic 
analysis and an inductive approach: no theme was predetermined prior to starting the 
analysis. The NVivo qualitative data analysis computer software15 was used through the 
process. For each conversation, an intervention was broken down into narrative units 
representing themes, dubbed “nodes” in the computer software. Themes were created 
and modified as the conversations were analyzed. They were extracted at the latent 
level (Boyatzis, 1998), as I interpreted the motivations and challenges of these 
individuals throughout their conversations.  
Due to the complexity in the terms used and the difficulty in understanding some 
of the translated content, each conversation was analyzed and read at least three times. 
Each time, new meaning was extracted as the flow was better understood. After analysis 
of each conversation, a summary of the conversation was recorded in the memo area of 
the software to facilitate remembering the whole flow of the conversation. Once all 
interactions were coded, a transversal analysis of the subthemes that emerged in each 
conversation was conducted. The sub-themes were merged into three large themes that 
best encompassed all sub-themes and topics uncovered. Throughout the results, each 
theme found is supported with paraphrases from the conversations.  
Lastly, throughout the analysis, I faced difficulties in understanding the realities of 
the individuals studied due to the cultural distance between their reality as Russian-
speaking individuals and my reality as a Canadian researcher. Sometimes, the 
translation was not accurate or was hard to comprehend, and contextual meaning was 
missing or difficult to assess. Hundreds of hours were spent reading the conversations 
and trying to find patterns and meaning to them. Although I cannot carve out my 
subjective outlook on the dataset, I can and do try to report the motivations, and 




the methodology mentioned above and re-validating the results by constantly digging 
back into the data and going over each conversation several times.   
6.4. Ethical Considerations  
This research has been approved by the Simon Fraser University ethics 
department under minimal risks (study number 2020s0121), which required asking for a 
waiver of consent in line with Article 5.5A of the TCPS2. To ensure participants’ 
confidentiality and privacy, the pseudonyms of the research participants found in the 
chat log were not used. Their statements were also paraphrased (rather than giving the 
exact quotation) to ensure that a quotation could not be easily linked to an individual in 
the chat log through automatic text search. 
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Chapter 7.  
 
Private Chats: Dancing on the Crime Line  
This chapter start by presenting the themes that emerged through the inductive 
thematic analysis of the private chat log. The research question driving the analysis was: 
“What are the motivations and challenges behind those involved in online economic 
crime?” Four overarching themes were found: 1) a hostile business context, 2) amateur 
work, 3) leniency towards criminality, and 4) seeking economic independence. These 
themes are presented below and depict the motivations and challenges of the individuals 
studied. Then, I explain how these individuals are among the indispensable workers 
mentioned by experts. The chapter concludes by presenting the digital labor platform, 
found in the private chat log, that is investigated in the following quantitative chapters.  
Before presenting the results, some readers may wonder: how is the main 
business of the entrepreneur, which is building websites, related to the malicious Geost 
applications? In short, during the period of study, the Main Entrepreneur developed 
websites advertised as repositories for Android applications (i.e., Android 
portals). He tried to make money out of these websites by participating in various 
affiliate marketing programs: programs in which companies pay others to advertise their 
products or services on their behalf. The main programs the Main Entrepreneur 
participated in were those that paid for downloads of Android applications. Depending on 
the program’s conditions, he could be paid, for example, for an application being 
installed on a phone through his website or once installed, for every user click on 
advertising banners inside the application. To attract users to his Android portals and 
download the advertised applications, the Main Entrepreneur took various strategies, 
from dealing with search engine optimization firms to hiring individuals to produce 
content or paying third parties to display links that point back to the websites (known as 
“buying links”).  
During the period of study and based on the private conversations, the 
applications available on the Main Entrepreneur’s websites (and the websites owned by 
Website Master 1) were Geost applications. This means that the applications available 
on the websites looked benign, like a gaming application, while they were, in fact, 
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banking Trojan applications16. The Main Entrepreneur was paid for each banking Trojan 
successfully installed through his website by an unknown group of people called “they” 
throughout the conversation.  
7.1. Facing an Adverse Business Environment  
The first theme that emerged from the analysis is facing an adverse business 
environment: the economic conditions surrounding the business are inauspicious. It 
includes two subthemes: 1) ephemeral and unreliable business partners, and 2) 
declining business prospects and unstable payments. Each of them is presented below. 
7.1.1. Ephemeral and Unreliable Business Partners 
Of the 32 conversations in the dataset studied, 27 consisted of short-term 
conversations with the Main Entrepreneur trying to engage with individuals, without 
success. Of the longer conversations, the business partners whom the Main 
Entrepreneur dealt with were often unreliable, a pattern that seemed to be shared within 
the business context. For example, the Main Entrepreneur once mentioned: “I can’t 
launch new sites, programmer disappeared” (Main Entrepreneur, October 2017) to 
Website Master 1, who replied: “I need to write to mine, he did not get in touch for a 
week” (Website Master 1, October 2017) and “Same story, and the programmer keeps 
disappearing all the time” (Website Master 1, October 2017). From these interventions, a 
long conversation ensued about how unreliable programmers are in the business, with 
the Main Entrepreneur mentioning: “Well probably he was writing code in his head” 
(Main Entrepreneur, October 2017) when referring to files that had been unchanged for 
a couple of days on the websites’ server. 
As another example, the Main Entrepreneur referred a trusted contact to Affiliate 
Marketer 2, who then mentioned that the referred contact “[…] just wrote to me and then 
disappeared” (Affiliate Marketer 2, November 2017). Similarly, a website developer sub-
contracted by the Main Entrepreneur often stopped working for no apparent reason, 
 
16 This was confirmed through the obfuscation service used by the Main Entrepreneur and 
analyzed in Sembera et al. (accepted). The service disguised the application as legitimate. 
However, once installed, the application’s icon would disappear, and the malicious code would 
run in the background of the victim’s phone.   
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mentioning, for example: “If I could understand what is going on, I would have told you. 
But now I’m saying I am working, but in fact I don’t. I am getting demotivated and do not 
want to do anything” (Developer 1, October 2017) or “Hi! I again stopped working on our 
business” (Developer 1, October 2017). Following such interventions, the developer 
sporadically worked until early January 2018, following the holidays, when he mentioned 
in the conversation: “Yes, I decided to work, I made one edit, went to the second one, 
went to the [name] website, sat on the thought, analyzed it. And I think that I will 
probably refuse the rest of the work.” (Developer 1, January 2018).  
Due to the recurrent problems with the developer, the Main Entrepreneur hired 
someone else who promised to complete the work quickly. Yet, when the Main 
Entrepreneur asked for an update, the person answered: “I have a lot of work on the 
current active orders, urgent corrections, I don’t have time” (Developer 2, October 2017). 
The Main Entrepreneur replied that he would wait, yet the conversation stopped. This 
situation was mentioned by the Main Entrepreneur in another conversation: “[…] I found 
one (programmer). He did something for 2 days and then disappeared” (Main 
Entrepreneur, October 2017). These examples are not unique but rather scattered 
throughout the discussions. They illustrate how ephemeral the business relationships 
are, with individuals frequently changing their minds about the idea of working together. 
7.1.2. Declining Business Prospects and Unstable Payments 
The conversation illustrated that the business was somewhat saturated, not as 
good as “Back in the day” (Main Entrepreneur, April 2018). For example, when looking 
for business opportunities, the Main Entrepreneur mentioned he wished he could 
monetize “SMS as in good old times” (Main Entrepreneur, April 2018,) to which Website 
Master 1 replied: “There is nothing like this now (smiley)” (Website Master 1, April 2018). 
When talking to another business partner, the Main Entrepreneur also mentioned: 
“Conversion rate is not very good” (Main Entrepreneur, November 2017) and 
“Installations are very cheap now” (Main Entrepreneur, February 2018).  
How unstable and unreliable affiliate marketing programs related to Android 
applications are was also mentioned often in the discussions. For example, the Main 
Entrepreneur said: “I have no doubt in you (smiley face), but billing and operators are not 
reliable” (Main Entrepreneur, August 2017) to someone who hoped that the current 
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business would last. Similarly, Website Master 1 said: “Well, nothing you can do. You 
should always be prepared. This business is not stable” (Website Master 1, October 
2017), meaning that one has to be always prepared for months without income. 
Similarly, when the Main Entrepreneur asked an affiliate marketer about a program, the 
latter replied: “Not yet. The monetization is not stable” (Affiliate Marketer 1, November 
2017) adding the precision that “not every operator is working right now” (Affiliate 
Marketer 1). 
Payments from affiliate marketing programs also seem to be volatile. Throughout 
the conversations, they are often postponed, especially payments related to installations 
of malicious Geost applications. In fact, the Main Entrepreneur is the middleman 
between Website Master 1 and those behind the Geost botnet. He is the one transferring 
money for successful installations to Website Master 1 on their behalf. Questions raised 
by Website Master 1 as to when payments will be made are frequent, such as, “Any 
news about the money?” (Website Master 1, November 2017) or “They will not give the 
money yet?” (Website Master 1, December 2017) or “Did they send it [money]?” 
(Website Master 1, March 2018). Most of the time, the Main Entrepreneur mentioned 
that payments were delayed, and eventually the interactions illustrated that the 
payments had been made. Website Master 1 had to be patient: he had to wait for those 
behind the program to pay, but also for the Main Entrepreneur to transfer the money. 
The Main Entrepreneur was also unreliable, often paying Website Master 1 late and 
apologizing for it: “Hi, I'm sorry that I have not yet transferred, I was detained [for work] 
until Sunday, I will immediately transfer 2 payments.” 
The business was so ephemeral that, by the end of the period of study, all 
programs that the Main Entrepreneur was involved in over the past months had 
vanished. He thus again asked Affiliate Marketer 1 for business opportunities, 
mentioning he was just “Jumping around, looking for something stable (Main 
Entrepreneur, March 2018). 
Based on these subthemes, the business environment in which these individuals 
evolved is adverse or, in other words, unpleasant and difficult. No business relationships 
developed, both in terms of business partners or programs, seem to be fulfilling or 
efficient and the prospect of making decent money is low. This, coupled with the 
amateur status presented below, illustrate a rather challenging business context.  
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7.2. Amateur Work  
For the business to be successful, websites have to attract visitors and entice 
them to download Android applications. To do so, a lot of work must be completed, from 
website design to content production and visibility. For these reasons, the Main 
Entrepreneur and his sub-contractors spent a lot of time trying to develop decently 
performing websites. Based on the discussion surrounding website development and the 
various difficulties faced, the second theme amateur work emerged from the data. This 
theme included the subthemes 1) lacking technical skills, and 2) building and working 
with defective tools, illustrating that the difficulties faced were not resolved by 
professionals, but rather amateurs. A server hack incident further corroborated this 
finding, as shown below.  
7.2.1. Lacking Technical Skills 
Often, when facing technical difficulties, the Main Entrepreneur and his business 
partners lacked the skills to resolve them efficiently as professionals. The discussions 
are filled with interventions that illustrate this, such as: “I am saying I don’t know how to 
split the traffic” (Main Entrepreneur, November 2017) or “I cannot understand how to 
give files from the cache folder” (Main Entrepreneur, December 2017) and even “I do not 
know how to make [use?] the API” (Main Entrepreneur, December 2017). Similarly, 
Website Master 1 mentioned: “I'm not a super programmer either” (Website Master 1, 
December 2017) and “I am not a programmer, I know my files” (Website Master 1, 
December 2017). Yet having some programming skills would be useful for individuals 
developing Android portals for internet marketing purposes.  
Moreover, Developer 1 spent a lot of time trying to figure out how to make the 
websites efficient for search engine optimization purposes; there are hundreds of 
interactions between Developer 1 and the Main Entrepreneur, where they try to figure 
out how to set up various techniques to optimize their websites. Yet the end results are 
not as expected, as Developer 1 one mentioned: “Our sites are not high-quality, they will 
not last long” (Developer 1, December 2017).  The Main Entrepreneur tried to convince 
Developer 1 to continue, arguing: “Let's make a couple of sites, modify the rest if it 
doesn’t work in a couple of months we’ll give up or sell” (Main Entrepreneur, January 
2018).  
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7.2.2. Building and Working with Defective Tools  
The tools used and developed for the business were also flawed and required 
constant maintenance. For example, hundreds of conversations were focused on fixing a 
tool called “a parser” that crawls other Android websites to automatically fill the Main 
Entrepreneur’s website with new content. Yet the tool works badly and is often broken, 
with the Main Entrepreneur asking  Developer 1 to look at it: “Can you check parser for 
[website domain name]? It does not parse many categories” (Main Entrepreneur, 
November 2017) or “Parser does not work” (Main Entrepreneur, November 2017) or “Hi, 
fix the parsers as you can, otherwise it’s not good […] (smiley)” (Main Entrepreneur, 
March 2018). It is unclear why the “parser” is always broken, but it is clear that they are 
having problems, with many interventions aimed at fixing it.  
Some applications that the Main Entrepreneur advertised on his website for 
monetization were also flawed, as he mentioned: “Before the application was getting 
flagged and did not bring a good conversion rate” (Main Entrepreneur, October 2017). 
Hacking Incident 
During the period of study, the Main Entrepreneur’s server was hacked, requiring 
him to shut down his entire operation and hire someone to clean the server. He 
mentioned: “I need to clean up the server and websites from malicious code and 
programs.” (Main Entrepreneur, November 2017) when hiring the individual. The hack 
happened, according to the Main Entrepreneur, because he allowed a friend to host a 
website and that friend shared the server’s password publicly, leading the server to be 
hacked and leveraged to send spam and junk links. The Main Entrepreneur thus had to 
hire someone to help him clean the server. The server cleaner worked tirelessly, and the 
job took much more time than expected. As the conversation goes on, it becomes clear 
that the way the server was set up is unprofessional. The server cleaner mentioned: “[…] 
Now you have all sites on one server user, you need to create a separate user for each 
site. Also, each database from the site must be under its own user […]” (Server Cleaner 
1, November 2017) and then stated: “I went to sleep, your sites exhausted me” (Server 
Cleaner 1, November 2017).  
Three days later, one of the Main Entrepreneur’s websites was hacked again so 
he restored the backup files, yet the website was still infected. Not knowing what to do, 
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the Main Entrepreneur asked for help again from the server cleaner. The server cleaner 
looked at the set up and noticed, again, unsecure settings. He mentioned: “In order for 
the protection to be effective, as well as to prevent reinfection, you need to set secure 
PHP settings.[…]” (Server Cleaner 1, December 2017) and “Now what needs to be done 
is to restore the site from a clean backup, re-update and set the settings” (Server 
Cleaner 1, December 2017). This server hacking incident shows that the Main 
Entrepreneur might not have been aware of good security measures and practices for 
the business he was involved in, making him a novice in the field. Overall, the core 
group of individuals in the private chat log (Main Entrepreneur, Website Master 1 and 
Developer 1) seemed to lack the required knowledge to conduct their business 
professionally and efficiently. 
7.3. Leniency Towards Criminality  
That some of these individuals were involved in criminality was not obvious 
throughout the conversations, apart from the technical information shared about the 
Geost botnet. No one talked about spreading banking Trojans or contributing to a botnet. 
Instead, there were hints that showed that at least the Main Entrepreneur and his two 
closest business partners were aware that the applications were malicious. Such 
interactions were grouped in the third theme leniency towards criminality, including 1) 
shady activities and 2) fighting security measure subthemes.  
7.3.1. Shady Activities  
At least the Main Entrepreneur and his two closest business partners were aware 
that they were manipulating malicious applications. For example, when talking about 
them, the Main Entrepreneur said: “I see the dangerous file” (Main Entrepreneur, 
November 2017). The Main Entrepreneur also talked with Website Master 1 and 
Developer 1 about an antivirus company blocking the malicious application and 
developed tactics to “clean” the file (also called “crypting”, which basically means 
obfuscating its code).  
Other interventions indicated lenient attitudes towards malicious or shady 
activities by individuals in the chat log. For example, in a conversation about the 
potential profitability of a program, Affiliate Marketer 2 mentioned: “Conversion rate is 
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different, but there is no guarantee that total sum will be better than from legal” (Affiliate 
Marketer 2, November 2017) to the Main Entrepreneur, thus making a distinction 
between legal and non-legal business opportunities. In another conversation, the Main 
Entrepreneur asked the money exchanger to be -most likely- a money mule: “Hi, are you 
here? I have a proposal for you. Are you interested in these sorts of deals, you give 
cash, and the customer will transfer money to a bank account + 7%?” (Main 
Entrepreneur, January 2018). The offer was refused, yet the conversation between the 
two continued, as the Main Entrepreneur acted as a middleman for a group that needed 
to transfer large amounts of money. Based on the conversation, the money exchanger 
asked a percentage fee (between 10 and 15%) for every exchange while the Main 
Entrepreneur asked, on behalf of another group, for cash transfers to accounts in China 
or Bitcoin transfers. The conversation between the two does not indicate whether the 
deals discussed took place, as there was disagreement about the percentage fees. 
Given the percentage fees and the transfer methods, there was little doubt -from a 
reader’s perspective- that the money exchanged came from shady proceedings.  
7.3.2. Fighting Security Measures 
The entrepreneur’s websites are also often banned by Google or Yandex Search 
Engines, illustrating that the activities he is involved in may be considered suspicious 
from the point of view of legitimate search engine companies. However, whether they 
are banned because of the way the Main Entrepreneur attempts to gain visibility, such 
as via purchasing links or SEO campaigns, or because some of the applications hosted 
on the websites are malicious, was unclear. For example, when talking about his 
websites in Fall 2017, the Main Entrepreneur mentioned: “Damn it my tags were not 
removed yet” (Main Entrepreneur, October 2017) meaning that some websites are still 
blocked by the Google or Yahoo search engines. While talking to Website Master 1, the 
Main Entrepreneur said: “I still have tags on mine” (Main Entrepreneur, October 2017) to 
which Website Master 1 answered: “Well Yandex can keep them for a long time” 
(Website Master 1, October 2017). These bans seemed to be recurrent as even in 
March 2018, when the Main Entrepreneur talked about the number of installations he 
had succeeded with, he mentioned 200 installations, and then said: “With Yandex 
browser [and no ban], would be 40% more, but alas” (Main Entrepreneur, March 2018). 
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Moreover, applications that are “cleaned” by being “crypted”, means that they are 
obfuscated to avoid detection by antivirus engines. The Main Entrepreneur took several 
steps to “clean” the Geost applications that were on his websites, as they were 
constantly flagged by antivirus engines as malicious, thus preventing the installation of 
the application on users’ devices.  Such work seemed to be redundant and relentless, as 
shown in the conversation below between the Main Entrepreneur and Website Master 1:   
“20:49 – Main Entrepreneur: [file name] the file, right? 
 20:50 – Website Master 1: Yes 
 20:51 – Main Entrepreneur: Try to re-crypt. and install. 
 21:17 – Website Master 1: Done 
 21:26 – Main Entrepreneur: And again, change file. Re-deploy. 
 21:49 – Website Master 1: Re-deployed” 
Within an hour, the Main Entrepreneur and Website Master 1 had to change the 
malicious application file on their websites because it had been detected. Such 
conversations between the Main Entrepreneur and Website Master 1 were recurrent 
throughout Fall 2017: they constantly needed to re-crypt and re-deploy new malicious 
applications sent by those behind the Geost botnet. Such relentless and redundant work 
was highlighted again when the Main Entrepreneur was trying to convince Website 
Master 2 to spread Geost applications and Website Master 2 answered: “Too much to 
deal with” (Website Master 2, October 2017). These findings spark the questions: why 
were they involved in such work? What were their motivations?  
7.3.3. Seeking Economic Independence 
The fourth theme encompassesed what seemed to drive the individuals studied: 
seeking economic independence. However, whether such a motivation was fulfilled is 
doubtful: the potential revenue estimated for a website master is much lower than the 
expected revenue, as presented in the following subsection.  
The motivation behind all these activities seemed to be money, as seen in 
interventions such as: “Hi, it's time to work. The year has begun. Need to earn money 
this year” (Main Entrepreneur, January 2018) or “Hi, maybe we can still do what we 
agreed on? A few websites would be enough for the beginning. And it is not that much to 
do. At the end of the month when we finish, I will get a good payment.” (Main 
Entrepreneur, October 2017). Distributing Geost applications seemed to represent an 
opportunity that could satisfy the Main Entrepreneur’s motivations. Indeed, when the 
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developer did not want to work, the Main Entrepreneur was willing to pay double to 
motivate him: “I will pay you double” (Main Entrepreneur, October 2017) illustrating that 
the opportunity may have been interesting enough to increase the developer’s salary. 
When the Main Entrepreneur talked to Website Master 2 about an opportunity to 
distribute Geost applications and Website Master 2 refused, the Main Entrepreneur 
replied: “Why don’t you want to send this traffic? it is more profitable!” (Main 
Entrepreneur, October 2017). Thus, there seems to be a premium profit in spreading 
malicious applications.  
The idea of independence, of not working for someone else (such as a boss), 
also seemed to be a motivation shared by the Main Entrepreneur and Developer 1. In 
their conversation, the main entrepreneur tried to convince Developer 1 to continue the 
work he had started, motivating him with the idea of money and not working for someone 
else (as opposed to short-term contracts that Developer 1 does in partnership with the 
Main Entrepreneur). For example, the Main Entrepreneur mentioned: 
“[…] Look at all pros and cons. The motivation we have is not working 
for another boss (not to work for someone else). At the end of the 
month, I will pay you a good amount of money. Also, a motivation. 
Honestly, let’s do it, create a few websites and that’s it, then you can 
relax, and the rest of the work would be on me. Please understand it is 
important. And it’s not an option to look for another programmer.” (Main 
Entrepreneur, October 2017). 
As Developer 1 stopped working, being discouraged, the Main Entrepreneur 
continued to try to motivate him, mentioning:  
“Ok, it doesn’t go this way. You need to pull yourself together and work. 
Otherwise, we will continue to work for someone else. And make money 
for other people. Seriously, you need to gather your strength and start 
to work, moreover I already started buying links for our domains” (Main 
entrepreneur, October 2017). 
In this statement, the Main Entrepreneur mentioned a wish to stop working for 
someone else. Yet Developer 1 was discouraged by their business, which seemed to 
yield little profit, not providing him with the recurrent income he was expecting: “The fact 
is, I already did several times some stuffs for passive income, and then did nothing. And 
passive income is gone.” (Developer 1, November 2017) and “Yes, I don’t see any 
prospects, I realized that I was led by the fact that others make good money […] 
(Developer 1, January 2018). Passive income refers to developing a business that would 
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pay regularly afterwards with little effort. In the previous statement, Developer 1 
mentioned that he was led by the idea that others were making good money, thinking 
that he could achieve such economic independence as well.  
Success?  
The conversation between the Main Entrepreneur and Website Master 1 yielded 
insights into the potential revenue that can be achieved by a website master when 
distributing malicious applications. This is because Website Master 1 distributed Geost 
applications on his own websites (just like the Main Entrepreneur) and for every 
successful installation, the Main Entrepreneur transferred money to Website Master 1 on 
behalf of those behind the Geost applications. 
Potential revenues were estimated by considering every time the Main 
Entrepreneur sent money to Website Master 1 with mentions such as: “Money was 
transferred” for “[number] of installs”. For example, the Main Entrepreneur said once: 
“Transfer for 200 [installations], check it please” (Main Entrepreneur, November 2017), 
to which Website Master 1 replied: “How much is this one now?” (Website Master, 
November 2017) and the Main Entrepreneur replied: “Four thousand, with commissions 
3700” (Main Entrepreneur, November 2017). The interventions indicated that Website 
Master 1 was paid 18.5 rubles (3,700 rubles / 200 installed applications) per malicious 
applications installed. The commission fees are exchange fees charged by the online 
payment service QIWI, a payment service used by Russian citizens. Another example 
would be: “Hi, 9k transferred check” followed by “For 500” (Main Entrepreneur, January 
2018), which meant, in this case, 18 rubles per malicious application. 
The potential revenue of Website Master 1 was thus calculated by considering all 
payment mentions like those presented above. When only the number of installations 
was mentioned, the latest price per application (in the conversation) was considered, 
which ranged between 17 and 20 rubles. Transferred payments found in the 





Table 3 Business Partners related to the Main Entrepreneur 
 Installation Price per application Rubles 
2017-10-04 250 20 5000 
2017-10-16 437 20 8740 
2017-10-20 350 20 7000 
2017-11-05 700 18.57 13000 
2017-11-13 410 18.57 7600 
2017-11-18 200 18.57 3700 
2017-11-30 325 18.57 6000 
2017-12-06 444 18.01 8000 
2017-12-22 666 18.01 12000 
2017-12-27 555 18.01 10000 
2017-12-29 333 18.01 6000 
2018-01-07 555 18.01 10000 
2018-01-10 500 18 9000 
2018-01-20 666 18.02 12000 
2018-01-29 102 17.65 1800 
2018-02-02 278 17.99 5000 
2018-02-19 56 17.86 1000 
Total 6,827  125,840 
Website Master 1 thus made an estimated potential revenue of 125,840 rubles 
(~USD 2,157.3817) for 139 days (from October 2017 to February 2018) due to 6,827 
devices installing the malicious application Geost. This represents 6,827 potential 
victims during near five months. Whether such an amount is substantial depends on 
one’s perspective. Yet this revenue may not be exactly what these individuals were 
expecting: when the Main Entrepreneur was talking about other opportunities that could 
pay, he mentioned that “Movie sites can collect 20 thousand [rubles] per day” (Main 
Entrepreneur, November 2017). Over the 139 days of operation investigated above, this 
would represent a revenue of 2,780,000 rubles (USD 47,659.86), more than 2,000 times 
what Website Master 1 made with the Geost applications.  
 
 
17 The exchange rate as of December 31st, 2017 was considered, which was 58.33 rubles for one 
US dollar.  
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7.4. Indispensable Workers Dancing on the Crime Line  
The above analysis uncovered the challenges and motivations of individuals 
involved in spreading malicious Android applications related to the Geost botnet. They 
were, in the end, amateurs with leniency towards criminality and motivated by economic 
independence but facing an adverse environment. By taking a step back from the 
analysis, one may notice that, in the end, the Main Entrepreneur and his business 
partners were not the motivated offenders behind the Geost botnet, but rather the 
indispensable workers mentioned by experts in the interviews. 
They were those positioned at the periphery of criminal organizations, doing the 
licit tasks, such as building websites. For this specific scheme, Geost operators (the 
minds behind the botnet scheme) needed these workers to spread the malicious 
applications. Indeed, through the work of these indispensable workers, banking Trojan 
applications were made available on Android portals and downloaded by individuals. 
These individuals, with their leniency towards criminality, ended up participating in the 
scheme, lured by potential profits. However, the profits made were not as high as their 
expectations.  
7.5. Uncovering an IT Informal Workforce 
These findings yield insights on the actors positioned at the periphery of online 
economic crime organizations. However, is there a way to expand the analysis through 
quantitative lenses and assess the extent to which such leniency towards criminality is 
generalized? Do individuals from the IT sector, like the individuals studied above, tend to 
participate in online economic crime easily and quickly for the lure of profits?  
These inquiries are explored in the second part of this thesis, thanks to 
information in the private chat log that pointed towards a digital labor platform 
specialized in IT services. Indeed, three individuals, namely, the Main Entrepreneur, 
Website Master 1 and Developer 1, also discussed their business on such a platform. 
The association was possible because 1) links to specific posts on the public platform 
were shared within the private conversations (e.g., “ordered texts [link to comment on 
the public platform]” (Main Entrepreneur, January 2018) and 2) these three individuals 
used the same usernames in the private chat log as in the public platform.  
88 
The platform is named searchengines[dot]guru and is a Russian- and English-
speaking platform dedicated to Internet marketing. It appeared in early 2000 and, as of 
2021, reported over 400,000 registered members and 14,000,000 comments. The 
platform advertises itself as a “website allowing users to discuss issues related to 
creating and promoting websites on the Internet”. It is divided into categories that cover 
various aspects of internet marketing, allowing the matching of labor supply and labor 
demand on specific aspects surrounding the business.  
However, because the platform advertises itself as a place where individuals can 
discuss issues related to creating and developing websites, and not as a “matchmaker” 
for labor demand and supply, it is less organized or formal than digital labor platforms 
(e.g., freelancer platforms) mentioned in previous research. These digital platforms are 
already known as unregulated spaces where informal work is thriving (Schmidt, 2017; 
Drahokoupil and Piasna, 2017; Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016). 
In this thesis, this platform is conceptualized as a platform gathering informal 
workers specialized in IT services. These are workers because internet marketing 
involves business-related activities, and most users use the platform to offer and 
demand various cloud work. They are informal workers because most (not all) economic 
activities, happening through the platform, are most likely unregulated or unregistered, 
similar to formal digital labor platforms (Schmidt, 2017; Drahokoupil and Piasna, 2017; 
Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016) .  
The remainder of this thesis focuses on assessing this informal IT workforce’s 
potential ties with criminal spaces. For now, searchengine[dot]guru is referred to as 
an (the) informal platform since it gathers both discussions about and sales of IT-
related products and services. 
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Chapter 8.  
 
Methods for Drifters and Non-Drifters Comparison 
The second part of this thesis takes a quantitative approach to assess the 
uncovered informal IT workforce’s potential availability to participate in online economic 
crime tasks. This is done by evaluating informal workers’ commenting patterns between 
the informal platform and crime-oriented ones. Crime-oriented platforms are platforms 
that embody a criminal ethos, such as carding or black hat SEO. To differentiate workers 
who talked on crime-oriented platforms, the concept of drifter is developed. Drifters are 
individuals from the uncovered informal IT workforce that discussed, at least once, in a 
crime-oriented platform.   
The second objective of this study is to assess drifters’ relationship between 
informal and crime-oriented spaces. To fulfill this objective, whether drifters formed a 
distinct group that could be identified on the informal space is first assessed. If so, then 
the drifters’ distinctive group would require further investigation. The research question 
that leads the following analyses is: “Does drifters’ behavior on the platform differ from 
that of non-drifters?” 
The chapter presents the methodological strategy developed to answer this 
question. First, the data creation process and validation are presented. This includes 
creating a dataset of the workforce, finding other platforms on which the workforce 
discussed, identifying whether these platforms are “crime-oriented”, and dividing the 
workforce between drifters and non-drifters. Second, the four indicators developed to 
grasp workers’ behavior on the informal platform are outlined, namely, activity rate, 
diversification level, business purposes, and specialized topics. Third, the comparison 
strategy, which includes a series of Mann-Whitney U tests, is explained.  
8.1. Dataset Extraction 
Gathering a dataset including the informal workforce and its potential ties to other 
crime-oriented platforms was made possible by an academic access to the Flare 
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Systems18 portal and its application programming interface (API). Flare Systems is a 
Montreal-based company that has developed a digital risk protection and cyber threat 
intelligence platform. It has been monitoring the informal platform as well as over 100 
other online platforms over the past years. For the informal platform19, it has collected 
more than 12,000,000 comments, some of these comments dating back to early 2000. 
The academic access to Flare Systems was first used to create the informal workforce 
dataset. To begin, I ensured that Flare Systems had a valid assessment of the informal 
platform. To do so, fifty random actors were selected, and the number of comments 
found on the Flare Systems database was compared to the number of comments found 
on the platform from 2012 to 202020. Based on this random sample of actors, Flare 
Systems had, on average, 93% (std=0.13) of the total number of comments published on 
the platform, illustrating that it had a relatively good visibility.  
The private chat log discussions took place in 2017 and 2018 and the three 
individuals involved in malicious activities, the Main Entrepreneur, Website Master 1 and 
Developer 1, also discussed on the informal platform during these years. To be as close 
as possible to the economic context uncovered in the private chat log, these two years 
served as a ground point for the following analysis on the informal platform.   
Using the Flare Systems API, all comments posted on the informal platform in 
2017 and 2018 were extracted. For each comment, the comment’s identification number, 
text, timestamp, and the name of the actor who wrote it were extracted, along with the 
title of the thread in which it was posted and the thread’s identification number. One 
actor’s name was “Этот пользователь удален,” which means “This user has been 
deleted”. Consequently, all comments related to this specific actor’s name were 
 
18 https://flare.systems/ 
19 Searchengines[dot]guru is called the “informal platform” for the remainder of this thesis. 
20 The time-period 2012-2020 was selected because the platform was revamped in June 2020 (see Valeros 
and Garcia, forthcoming) and the number of comments published on the platform before 2012 was 
incomplete. For example, for the 50 actors investigated, the informal platform listed their comments from 
2012 to 2020, and then a few comments in 2009 and 2010, and almost no comments from 2000 to 2009. On 
the other hand, comments dating back to early 2000 were available in the Flare Systems database, 
illustrating that the “revamping” of the platform may have resulted in a loss of information. This was further 
confirmed when some mismatches were found between the Flare Systems database and the informal 
platform: Flare Systems had more information than did the informal platform on each actor. When assessing 
Flare’s visibility, only situations where the number of comments on Flare was lower than or equal to what 
was published on the informal platform were considered, resulting in a high visibility of 93%. 
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removed. A total of 685,815 comments, 34,706 threads and 23,348 individual users 
were extracted. 
The dataset was augmented with the thread’s category and subcategory as 
displayed on the website. Using the thread identification number, the thread’s category 
and subcategory were extracted from the source code of the page using an automated 
web crawler. Such crawling was achieved over several days to ensure that the platform’s 
server would not experience disruption from the research activity. A total of nine 
categories and 80 subcategories were found. Table 4 shows the nine categories and a 
sample of their subcategories. Topics ranged from questions about search engine 
optimization to hiring webmasters to monetizing websites. Table 4 also illustrates the 
distribution of comments across categories. The category “about monetizing sites” was 
the most popular one, representing 20% of the comments, followed by “not about work” 
with 17% and site building with 16%.  
Table 4 Categories and Subcategories on the Informal Platform 
 Category Subcategory % of 
Comments 
1 Search Engine Yandex, Site Directories, Google 10% 
2 About Monetizing Sites Partnership Programs, General Questions about 
Making Money on Sites, YouTube Monetization 
20% 
3 Practical Optimization 
Issues 
Popular SEO and SEO Newbie Questions, Doorways 
and Cloaking, General optimization issues 
13% 
4 Communication of 
Professionals 
Cryptocurrencies, Ecommerce, Social Media Marketing 14% 
5 Site Building Domain Names, Hosting and Servers for Websites, 
Web Analytics, Copywriting 
16% 
6 Exchange and Sales Buying and Selling Sites, Digital Goods, Programs and 
Scripts 
5% 
7 About Purchased Traffic 
for Websites 
Teaser and Banner Advertising, Contextual Advertising, 
Yandex Direct, Google Ads 
2% 
8 Work and Services for 
Webmasters 
Copywriting Translations, Social Media Marketing 
Services, Optimization Promotion and Audit 
3% 
9 Not About Work Meetings and Gatherings, Smoking Room, About the 




8.2. Sample Description 
Based on the above dataset, Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics on users’ 
participation in terms of the number of comments they posted on the platform as well as 
the number of threads and categories in which they participated. In 2017 and 2018, 
users commented, on average, 29 times (std=151) on the platform, with a minimum of 
one, a median of four, and a maximum of 6,603 comments. This maximum represents,  
posting, on average, nine times per day over a two-year time span. A major contributor 
could credibly have such posting behavior. Thus, all users in the end-tail of the posting 
distribution were kept for the analysis. Also, users participated, on average, in eleven 
threads (std=50), with a minimum of one thread and a maximum of 2,013 threads. Half 
participated in two or fewer threads. In terms of categories, users posted, on average, in 
two categories (std=2), with a minimum of one and a maximum of nine. Half  participated 
in only one category.  
Overall, according to these statistics, user participation was unequal, with most 
users exhibiting a low rate of participation. This skewed distribution reflects the 
participation inequality rule found in online communities and highlighted by scholars 
(Haklay, 2016; Paquet-Clouston, Décary-Hétu and Morselli, 2016; Sun, Rau, and Ma, 
2014; van Mierlo 2014; Mooney and Corcoran 2012; Lund, Coulton, Wilson, 2011; 
Budhathoki, 2010). Among the most well-known distributions is the 90-9-1 law 
formulated by Nielsen (2006): 90% of users in online platforms are lurkers who do not 
contribute; 9% are intermittent contributors; and 1% are heavy contributors. Thus, in 
most online platforms, only a small proportion of users contribute to most of the content, 
while silent and minor contributors form the great majority of users (Haklay, 2016; Sun, 
Rau, and Ma, 2014,).  
In the current dataset, the large number of minor contributors may significantly 
impact the analysis, driving indicators closer to zero (e.g., total number of comments). 
For this reason, a subsample was created to consider only the proportion of the 
population at the end-tail of the distribution. In the distribution of comments per user, 
there is a slight breakdown at 10 comments, with about 70% of users posting fewer than 
ten comments and 30% posting more than ten comments, as shown in Figure 4 (which 
includes users who posted less than 100 comments).  
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Figure 4  Distribution of Comments for Users who Posted Fewer than 
100 Comments on the Informal Platform 
Given this distribution, a subsample was created including only users who posted 
at least 10 times in 2017 and 2018, representing the top 30% (N=6,924). Table 5 also 
presents the descriptive statistics on user participation for this top 30%. In this 
subsample, users are more active: they posted, on average, 92 comments (std=267), 
with a minimum of ten and a maximum of 6,603. Users also posted in, on average, 34 
distinct threads (std=88) and, on average, four categories (std=2).  
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics on the 2017-2018 Dataset 
 Min Max Mean (std) Med 
All Dataset N= 23,348 users    
  N. Comments 1 6,603 30 (151) 4 
  N. threads 1 2,013 11 (50) 2 
  N. Category 1 9 2 (2) 1 
Top 30% N= 6,924 users    
  N. Comments 10 6,603 92 (267) 27 
  N. threads 1 2,013 34 (88) 12 
  N. Category 1 9 4 (2) 3 
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8.3. Identifying Drifters  
Drifters in this study are individuals who comment on the informal platform and at 
least once on a crime-oriented platform, such as a hacking forum. Given that users pick 
usernames to identify themselves in online communities, identifying drifters is possible 
by cross-correlating usernames on different platforms. The assumption behind cross-
correlating usernames is that users may chose the same username -or a similar one- 
across platforms, a behavior identified in previous studies (Wang et al., 2016; Perito et 
al., 2011). Indeed, Wang et al. (2016) and Perito et al., (2011) correlated similar 
usernames across platforms and could identify real-world individuals. Given that the 
most efficient way to identify individuals across platforms is through their usernames, 
such a strategy is taken to identify drifters.  
The Flare Systems portal and application programming interface (API) allowed 
searching for the name of an actor and finding other platforms on which the actor 
engaged. Thus, considering the dataset that included all individuals who spoke on the 
informal forum in 2017 and 2018, a list of usernames was created. Each of these 
usernames could be queried on the Flare Systems database using a perfect math 
approach: if the username were found to have commented on a platform other than the 
informal one, then Flare’s identification number for the comment, its timestamp, and the 
name of the platform on which it was posted could be extracted and added to a separate 
dataset. However, before querying Flare Systems’ database, filtering processes were 
developed, as explained below. 
8.3.1. Filtering Processes 
Two filtering processes were developed: one considering username length and 
sophistication, and a second one considering the timestamp of comments posted 
outside the informal platform. Both processes are explained below.  
Username Filters 
To minimize the chances of cross-correlating usernames that could belong to 
different individuals due to the popularity or lack of sophistication of the usernames, 
three filters were developed. The first filter, the base filter, considered only usernames 
formed of at least five characters, thus removing several common usernames such as 
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“Nick”, “Max,” or “bot,” as well as two, three or four-letter usernames. Although some of 
these usernames could be quite sophisticated, an investigation of the list of such short 
usernames indicated that there were plenty of generic ones that could be removed by 
applying this minimal filter. The base filter reduced the number of users (eligible to be 
drifters) to 21,726.  
The second filter considered only usernames with at least 6 characters, reducing 
the number of potential individuals to 19,291. The third filter considered usernames with 
at least 5 characters AND at least an uppercase OR a number OR one special 
character, leading to 14,863 potential individuals. Note that none of these filters is better 
than the others. Filters 1 and 2 are more liberal, but they are likely to include generic 
usernames. Filter 3 is more conservative but is also likely to dismiss individual 
usernames with only lower-case characters. Finally, they are all likely to dismiss false 
negatives like usernames with fewer than five characters but with four uniquely ordered 
ones. The idea is to minimize the chances of cross-correlating generic usernames and 
maximizing the chances of keeping one-of-a-kind usernames21.  
Thus, based on this filtering process, all usernames with at least five characters 
(N=21,726) were searched for in the Flare Systems database and a separate dataset 
was created including all drifters. This database included (1) Flare’s identification 
number for the comment, (2) its timestamp, (3) the name of the platform on which it was 
posted, and (4) the related username.  
Timeframe Filters  
Flare Systems has strong visibility on other platforms, and some of these 
platforms have been active since early 2000. Thus, once the drifter dataset was created, 
additional time filters were developed to prevent identifying a user who posted on 
another platform in 2005 as the same user who posted on the informal platform 12 years 
later due to the same username. For the filters to be accurate, they had to isolate 
comments posted around 2017 and 2018. To make sure that the results were not an 
artefact of the filtering decisions, three filters with different timeframes were developed.  
 
21 Individuals impersonating other individuals (doing username mimicry) could also yield false positives. 
However, there are no reasons to believe that username mimicry is a concerning phenomenon within the 
informal platform population. 
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The first filter (2015-2020), the most liberal one, considered all comments posted 
on other platforms two years prior to 2017 and two years after 2018, that is, from 2015 to 
2020. The second filter (2017-2019) considered all comments posted on other platforms 
one year prior to 2017 and one year after 2018, thus from 2016 to 2019. The third filter 
(2017-2018), the most conservative one, considered only comments posted on other 
forums during the period of study: in 2017 and 2018. These filters aimed at minimizing 
the chances of cross-correlating usernames that might not belong to the same 
individuals because of the time difference between the comments posted, while also 
generating a sufficient dataset for the analysis.  
8.3.2. Confirming the General Purpose of Crime-Oriented Platforms 
Before presenting the drifter dataset, an additional step was required as I had to 
investigate whether the platforms on which drifters discussed were crime-oriented, 
displaying a clear association with criminality in the platform’s branding22. A total of 42 
external platforms were found and each of them was visited to categorize its general 
purpose. Sometimes, the platforms were down (which is frequent for those hosted on 
the Tor network) or required registration. In such cases, to find their general purpose, 
security reports and blogs about them were searched for on the general web or 
information from the Flare System database was used.  
Four platforms were not identified as “crime-oriented”. They rather focused on 
technological topics such as cybersecurity. They were thus removed. On the other hand, 
the remaining 38 platforms were openly related to criminal activities. Of these, 17 were 
hosted on the “clearnet”, meaning that they could be visited via a modern web browser 
such as Google. The remaining 21 were hosted on The Onion Router (Tor), known as 
part of the “darknet”. 
 Tor is an anonymous communication protocol developed by a network of 
volunteers that allows users to browse the internet anonymously23. The anonymous 
protocol also hosts websites, known as onion services, that offer anonymity to both 
website owners and visitors. These onion services are often associated with the “darknet 
 
22 The term platform is used throughout this thesis. It is a generic term to refer to websites where 
individuals can discuss and/or sell products and services.  
23 https://www.torproject.org/ 
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(Fidalgo et al., 2019; Broadhurst et al., 2020; Owen and Savage, 2015), a loosely 
defined concept that encompasses networks that are not accessible via modern web 
browsers and offer anonymity to their users, such as I2P, Freenet, Tor, and ZeroNet 
(Hu, 2020). Content is more likely to be related to criminal activities when hosted on 
these technologies due to the anonymity provided24. 
8.3.3. Drifter Dataset 
Following this last cleanup, nine (sub)datasets were created by combining the 
username filters with the time filters. These nine (sub)datasets were further subdivided 
into (1) the whole population and (2) the top 30%. Thus, the number of drifters and 
external platforms found varied depending on the filters and the population considered, 
as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6  Drifters Identified Based on the Combined Filters for the Whole 
Dataset and the Top 30% 
 2015-2020 2016-2019 2017-2018 
 Dataset Top 30% Dataset Top 30% Dataset Top 30% 
 Drifters Plat. Drifters Plat. Drifters Plat. Drifters Plat. Drifters Plat. Drifters Plat. 
Min 5 
chars 
1,557 38 510 31 1,160 34 379 30 696 31 231 25 
Min 6 
chars 
1,234 38 395 30 924 34 290 29 557 31 177 24 
Min 5 
chars + 
946 36 330 28 700 32 244 28 421 30 152 23 
Combining the most liberal filters (username length: min 5 chars and timeframe: 
2015-2010) led to finding 1,557 drifters posting on 38 crime-oriented platforms for the 
whole population and 510 drifters posting on 31 external platforms for the top 30%. On 
the other hand, combining the most conservative filters (username length: min 5 chars+ 
and timeframe: 2017-2018) yielded 421 drifters on 30 platforms for the entire population 
and 152 drifters on 23 platforms for the top 30%. Overall, drifter datasets vary from 421 
 
24 However, whether the content available on onion services is solely criminal is subject to debate. For 
example, Faizan and Khan (2019) found that 66% of the content hosted on these websites was licit while 
Owen and Savage (2015) reported that the majority of the content hosted on the network was related to 
crime. 
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to 1,557 for the whole population and from 152 to 510 for the top 30%, depending on the 
combination of filters used.   
8.4. Behavior Indicators  
To assess whether drifters and non-drifters behaved differently on the informal 
platform, four indicators were developed for each actor: (1) activity rate, (2) 
diversification level, (3) potential business interactions, and (4) topics discussed. Each  
contains various sub-indicators as explained below.  
8.4.1. Activity Rate  
Activity rate assessed whether drifters were more active on the informal 
platforms than on the crime-oriented platforms. It was measured through two sub-
indicators: (1) the sum of all comments made by a user in 2017 and 2018 and (2) the 
number of days an individual was active over the two-year period, meaning the number 
of days an individual posted at least once.   
8.4.2. Diversification Level 
The diversification level assessed whether drifters were more diversified in terms 
of topics discussed on the informal platform. This level was measured through three sub-
indicators. First, the Standard Diversity Index (SDI) developed by Agresti and Agresti 
(1978) was calculated, as expressed in eq. (1),   
𝑆𝐷𝐼 =  [
𝑘
1−𝑘
]  1 −  ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑘
𝑖=1  eq. (1) 
where 𝑘 represents the number of categories and 𝑃𝑖 the proportion of observations in the 
𝑖𝑡ℎ category where 𝑖 =  1 … 𝑘. Thus, the index shows if an actor posts, on average, in 
several categories or only one category. More precisely, it calculates what is the 
probability that two comments picked randomly (from the same individual) will be from 
the same category. The SDI ranges from 0 for no diversity to 1 for perfect diversification. 
The two remaining sub-indicators for the diversification level were the number of 
categories and the number of subcategories in which an individual commented.  
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8.4.3. Potential Business Interactions 
This indicator aimed at assessing (roughly) whether drifters talked more about 
cash and money than non-drifters on the informal platform, hence being more business 
inclined. It was measured through two sub-indicators: (1) the number of comments in 
which an individual mentioned the words “dollar(s)” and/or “ruble(s)” or their respective 
signs “$” or “₽” and (2) the proportion of comments with a dollar or ruble sign among an 
individuals’ total number of posts.  
8.4.4. Specialized Topics  
The last indicator measured whether drifters were specialized in one of the 
platform’s topics or, in other words, whether drifters talked more (in terms of the number 
of comments) in any of the nine categories available on the informal platform, than in the 
others. These categories are listed in Table 4. They have specific sets of rules enforced 
by the platform administrators (see Valeros and Garcia, forthcoming).  
In short, the search engines category includes any discussions related to 
popular search engines like Yandex or Google. About monetizing sites includes 
discussions on how to make money with websites, with a special focus on affiliate 
marketing programs. Optimization practices includes discussions on website 
promotions, such as SEO techniques. Communication of professionals encompasses 
topics related to finances and businesses, including money exchanges through 
electronic payments or cryptocurrencies. The site building category is about 
technologies, solutions, and services associated with building websites, such as virtual 
hosting or server administration. The exchange and sales category focuses on tools, 
services, and jobs related to internet marketing at large, like the sale of domains or 
finding skilled workers to develop scripts. About purchased traffic for websites 
includes discussions on advertising campaigns and how to purchase internet traffic. 
Work and services for webmasters encompasses topics on how to efficiently maintain 
a website, including copywriting, design, and audit services. The last category, not 
about work, contains various unrelated topics such as sports and travels.  
For a deep dive into the categories, one can refer to Valeros and Garcia’s 
forthcoming study on the services exchanged on the informal platform. Overall, each of 
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these categories has similar purposes such as internet marketing, yet their subtopics are 
specific, from purchasing internet traffic to building websites to hiring skilled 
professionals. Measuring whether there are significant differences between drifters and 
non-drifters in terms of the number of comments in each of these categories will illustrate 
whether drifters cluster in specific spaces of the platform.  
8.5. Descriptive Statistics on Indicators  
The descriptive statistics for each sub-indicator are presented in Table 7 for both 
the entire platform population (N=23,348) and the top 30% (N=6,924).  
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics on Sub-Indicators 




 Min Max Mean (std) Med Min Max Mean (std) Med 
Activity Rate         
   Number of posts 1 6,603 29 (151) 4 10 6,603 92 (267) 27 
   Number of days active 1 708 14 (41) 3 1 708 41 (67) 17 
Diversification         
   SDI 0 1 0.3 (0.4) 0 0 1 0.5 (0.4) 0.6 
   Number of categories 1 9 2 (2) 1 1 9 4 (2) 3 
   Number of sub-categories 1 71 3 (5) 1 1 71 7 (9) 4 
Business         
  Number of $ in comments 0 1,225 1 (11) 0 0 1,225 3 (20) 0 
  Proportion of $ comments 0 1 0.04 (0.1) 0 0 1 0.04 (0.1) 0 
Topics Discussed         
  Search Engines 0 1,109 3 (21) 0 0 1,109 9 (38) 0 
  About Monetizing Sites 0 3,010 6 (42) 0 0 3,010 18 (75) 1 
  Practical Optimization Issues 0 2,965 4 (31) 0 0 2,965 12 (56) 1 
  Communication of Professionals 0 2,363 4 (41) 0 0 2,363 13 (75) 0 
  Site Building 0 2,873 5 (45) 0 0 2,873 14 (81) 1 
  Exchange and Sales 0 689 2 (10) 0 0 689 4 (17) 0 
  About Purchased Traffic for Websites 0 880 1 (10) 0 0 880 2 (18) 0 
  Work and Services for Webmasters 0 296 1 (6) 0 0 296 3 (11) 0 
  Not About Work 0 3,532 5 (71) 0 0 3,532 16 (129) 0 
As shown in Table 7 when considering the entire population, individuals have 
posted on average and over two years 29 comments (std=151) on the informal platform, 
101 
with a minimum of one and a maximum of 6,603, and they have been active, on 
average, 14 days (std=41). In terms of diversification within their own posting patterns, 
individuals are not diversified (mean=0.3, std=0.4). On average, they post in two 
categories (std=2) and in three subcategories (std=5). Moreover, individuals post, on 
average, one comment with a dollar or ruble sign (std=11), and the average proportion 
of dollar or ruble signs in the pool of comments per individual is low (0.04, std=0.1). In 
terms of topics discussed based on the platform’s categorization, the average posting 
spans from one to six posts with standard deviations going from six to 71. For all 
categories, at least 50% of individuals do not post at all. 
When considering the top 30%, the average participation for each sub-indicator 
increases. Individuals in the top 30% subsample have posted on average and over two 
years, 92 comments on the informal platform (std=267), with a minimum of 10 and a 
maximum of 6,603, and they have been active, on average, 41 days (std=67). In terms 
of diversification, within their own posting patterns, individuals are relatively diversified 
(mean=0.5, std=0.4). On average, they post in four categories (std=2) and in seven 
subcategories (std=9). Moreover, individuals post, on average, three comments with a 
dollar or ruble sign (std=20) and the average proportion of dollar or ruble signs in the 
pool of comments per individual is, again, low (0.04, std=0.1). In terms of topics 
discussed based on the platform’s categorization, the average posting spans from two to 
18 posts with standard deviations from 11 to 129. For all categories, at least 50% of 
individuals in the sample do not post at all or have posted only one comment.  
8.6. Comparing Drifters and Non-Drifters: Mann-Whitney U 
Tests  
To compare drifters and non-drifters, a series of Mann-Whitney U tests were 
computed using the behavior sub-indicators developed above. A Mann-Whitney U test 
was favored over more common parametric tests because all sub-indicators did not 
follow a normal distribution25. 
Also known as Wilcoxon Rank Sum or Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon, the Mann-
Whitney U test assesses whether the distributions between two groups differ while 
 
25 This was confirmed by using the normal test function from the scipy.stats package. 
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making no prior assumptions on the form of the distributions tested (Hart, 2001). The 
assumptions behind the tests are rather that the data from the two groups are 
independent, that they follow a similar shape and that they are ordinal or continuous. 
The datasets used respect such assumptions. The sub-indicators for both drifters and 
non-drifters are independent (e.g., the posting behavior of drifters is independent of the 
posting behavior of non-drifters); the distribution shapes of each sub-indicator for both 
groups are similar (as shown below); and the sub-indicators are ordinal or continuous.  
The test compares the two groups by ranking their respective values from low to 
high and then comparing the ranks between the two groups (Shier, 2004). The number 
of times a value in group A is greater than a value in group B is counted and the total is 
known as 𝑈𝑎 . The inverse is computed to find 𝑈𝑏. For two identical ranks, half the tie is 
given to one value and the other half is given to the other tied value during the counting 
procedure. The resulting statistic 𝑈 (thus Mann-Whitney U) is the minimum of the two 
values found: 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑈𝑎 , 𝑈𝑏). The lower the 𝑈 is, the higher the difference between the two 
distributions is. Also, when 𝑈𝑎  is approximately equal to 𝑈𝑏, then the null hypothesis is 
not rejected and the distributions of the two groups are considered equal. To assess the 
significance of the test, the Mann-Whitney U uses a 𝑧 distribution (a standard normal 
table) when the sample size is greater than 20. The 𝑧 −score is calculated according to 
the function presented in eq. (2) 





𝑁𝑎∗𝑁𝑏 (𝑁𝑎 + 𝑁𝑏 +1)
12
  eq. (2) 
where 𝑁𝑎 is the sample size of group A, 𝑁𝑏 is the sample size of group B, and 𝑈 is the 
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑈𝑎 , 𝑈𝑏). If the 𝑧-score found is less than -1.96 or greater than 1.96, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Given the test’s procedure, unbalanced sampling among the two 
groups is not an issue.  
To compute the series of Mann-Whitney U tests, the mannwhitneyu function from 
the ScipyStats package was used26. For each sub-indicator, the null hypothesis (H0) 
was: there is no difference between drifters and non-drifters, and the alternative 
 
26 The test handles for ties, as explained above, and uses a continuity correction. 
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hypothesis (Ha) was: there is a difference between drifters and non-drifters. The 
significance level of the tests (𝛼) was set to 0.05, meaning there was a 5% risk of 
concluding that a difference exists when there is no difference. For each group (drifters 
and non-drifters) and each test, the group’s mean, standard deviation, and median are 
reported, along with the mannwhitneyu statistics (𝑈) and the p-value of the test. To 
report the effect size, the common language effect size, introduced by McGraw and 
Wong (1992), is used, denoted as 𝑓 and illustrated in eq. (3) 
𝑓 =  
𝑈
𝑁𝑎∗𝑁𝑏
 eq. (3) 
where 𝑈 is the Mann-Whitney U statistics, 𝑁𝑎 is the sample size of group A, and 𝑁𝑏 is 
the sample size of group B. The function 𝑓 represents the proportion of favorable pairs 
that support one direction, let’s say group A over group B (McGraw and Wong, 1992). 
The reported 𝑈 in the scipy.stats package is the 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑈𝑎 , 𝑈𝑏), and the 𝑓 calculated with 
this 𝑈 represents the proportion of favorable pairs for the group that has the lower 
number of favorable pairs. Thus, 1 −  𝑓 is computed below to find the proportion of 
favorable pairs for the group that has the higher number of favorable pairs. The statistic 
1 –  𝑓 is reported, as well, for each test. Thus, for each indicator, 1 –  𝑓 represents the 




Chapter 9. Indistinguishable Drifters 
This chapter presents the results on whether drifters form a distinctive group 
within the informal workforce. The research question leading the analysis was: “Does 
drifters’ behavior on the platform differ from that of non-drifters?”  Based on the behavior 
indicator developed, they do not.  
The chapter starts by briefly presenting the crime-oriented platforms found as 
well as drifters’ posting patterns on them. Then, the Mann-Whitney U tests results are 
shown for the whole population and the top 30%. A short summary of the main findings 
concludes the chapter.  
9.1. Exploring Crime-Oriented Platforms  
A total of 21,726 users on the informal platform had a username with at least five 
characters. Of these individuals, 7.2% (1,557 individuals) were identified as drifters 
based on the 2015-2020-time filter, 5.3% (1,160 individuals) considering the 2016-2019- 
time filter, and 3.2% based on the 2017-2018-time filter (696 individuals). Also, based on 
the most liberal filtering approach (username of five characters and 2015-2020), a total 
of 38 crime-oriented platforms were found.  
In terms of their general purpose, seven focused on hacking; seven were related 
to cracking (cracked software) or leaked information (e.g., lists of usernames and 
passwords); six focused on carding (credit card fraud); three were cryptomarkets 
(marketplaces hosted on Tor); one involved money laundering discussions; and one 
was specialized in sharing blackhat SEO techniques. Thirteen platforms were hosted 
on the darknet and gathered various discussions and/or sales and/or questions on 
various content, most often crime-oriented topics.  
Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of platforms in terms of (1) the platform’s 
accessibility via the clearnet or the darknet, (2) the platform’s main identified purpose, 
(3) the number of drifters who interacted on it, and (4) the total number of comments. 
The figure is a tree map where the size of the boxes represents the number of drifters in 
the sample who interacted on the platform (also specified under the platform’s name) 
and the color scale represents the number of posts on each platform. Appendix B also 
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presents a table with the information, as some platforms have too few actors to be 
visible in Figure 5.   
 
Figure 5 Tree Map of Crime-Oriented Platforms Found 
Platforms are grouped by type; the size of the box represents the number of actors (also 
specified under the platform’s name) and the color scale represents the number of posts. 
In terms of number of users, the most popular platforms included Nulled.to 
(cracking and leaks), Dark Money (money laundering), Best Hack Forum (hacking), 
Exploit In (hacking), Black Hat World (Black Hat SEO), and Club2crd (carding). These 
crime-oriented platforms are also the ones with the greatest number of posts, although in 
a different order. Overall, drifters commented on a variety of crime-oriented platforms, 
from cracking (and leaks) to hacking or money laundering.  
Investigating further the data showed that drifters favored crime-oriented 
platforms hosted on the clearnet over those hosted on the darknet. A total of 67% of 
drifters’ comments were posted on crime-oriented platforms hosted on the clearnet. 
Moreover, 61% of drifters commented only on clearnet platforms, 25% only on darknet 
platforms and 14% on both.  
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  To assess drifters’ involvement in crime-oriented platforms, their comment 
frequency was examined. Each drifter posted, on average, 21 comments on crime-
oriented platforms (std=75), with a minimum of one and a maximum of 1,383. Also, 50% 
of drifters posted three comments and 75% posted only ten comments. ne may wonder 
whether those who commented heavily on the informal platform are the same individuals 
who commented heavily on crime-oriented ones. However, this is not the case as a 
Pearsonr bivariate correlation yields a non-significant coefficient of 0.04 (p-value= 
0.0952) between the two logged variables.  
9.2. Comparing Drifters and Non-Drifters 
To compare drifters and non-drifters, Mann-Whitney U tests are computed on the 
whole dataset and the top 30% for each of the indicators presented above and for the 
nine sub-datasets generated by combining username filters and time filters. None of the 
filter combinations change the substantive conclusions of this study.  
Thus, for purposes of concision, the results of only one combination of username 
and time filters are presented: the username filter 5 chars+ and the time filter 2016-
201927. The former represents a conservative approach for the username filter and the 
latter a middle-ground for the time filter. The exact combination used, however, does not 
change the substance of the results. Results for all filter combinations are provided in 
Appendix C.  
9.2.1. Considering the Platform Population 
The Mann-Whitney U tests were first computed on the whole dataset to assess if 
drifters’ behaviors differed from those of non-drifters on the informal platform. Table 8 
presents the results of the series of non-parametric tests and significant relationships are 
highlighted in grey. 
 
27 This combination is chosen because: (1) the 5 chars+ filter is the most conservative, and (2) 
the 2016–2019-time filter is the most rigorous: comments posted one year prior and after the 
period of study. The first time filter is liberal (2015-2020) and the third (2017-2018) is strict, 
leaving out potential comments posted prior or before.  
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Table 8  Mann-Whitney U Test Results for the Whole Dataset with Username 
Filter 5 Chars+ and Time Filter 2016-2019 
 
As displayed in Table 8, 12 out of 16 sub-indicators display significant differences 
(i.e., the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis) between 
drifters and non-drifters. However, when comparing the descriptive statistics (𝑥 ̅ score is 
in bold) for each group, the absolute differences reported are minimal, as illustrated in 
the following text, which goes over each indicator. 
In terms of rate of activity, Mann-Whitney U tests illustrate that there are 
significant differences in the number of comments (𝑈= 7241098, 𝑝=0.000) for drifters 
(𝑥 ̅  =  𝟑𝟒. 𝟐𝟕,  𝜎 = 136.51, ?̃?  =  5) compared to non-drifters (𝑥 ̅  =  𝟐𝟗. 𝟏𝟏, 𝜎 = 151.26,  
?̃?  =  4) as well as in the number of active days (𝑈= 7143484, 𝑝=0.000) for drifters (𝑥 ̅  =
 𝟏𝟔. 𝟔𝟎, 𝜎 = 38.11,  ?̃?  =  3) compared to non-drifters (𝑥 ̅  =  𝟏𝟑. 𝟓𝟑, 𝜎 = 40.74,  ?̃?  =  2). 
Thus, drifters tend to post a few more comments and are active for a few more days on 






 𝑥 ̅(𝜎) ?̃? 𝑥 ̅(𝜎) ?̃? 𝑼 𝒑 𝟏 −  𝒇 
Activity Rate        
N. comments 34.27 (136.51) 5 29.11 (151.26) 4 7241098 0.000 0.54 
N. days active 16.60 (38.11) 3 13.53 (40.74) 2 7143484 0.000 0.55 
Diversification        
SDI 0.33 (0.40) 0 0.29 (0.39) 0 7438357 0.001 0.53 
N. cat. 2.19 (1.88) 1 1.97 (1.68) 1 7373268 0.000 0.54 
N. sub-cat 3.69 (6.18) 1 3.15 (5.37) 1 7441092 0.001 0.53 
Business        
N. $/ ₽ sign 1.24 (5.15) 0 1.05 (10.84) 0 7373506 0.000 0.54 
Prop. $/ ₽ sign 0.05 (0.15) 0 0.04 (0.13) 0 7407759 0.000 0.53 
Specific Topics         
Search Engines 2.22 (13.03) 0 2.96 (21.34) 0 7886942 0.379 0.50 
Monetizing sites 7.16 (33.93) 0 5.73 (41.79) 0 7756367 0.121 0.51 
Practical opt.       3.06 (11.71) 0 3.84 (31.48) 0 7758960 0.121 0.51 
Comm. of prof. 8.35 (62.68) 0 3.93 (40.53) 0 7229753 0.000 0.51 
Site building 4.21 (19.02) 0 4.64 (45.37) 0 7557235 0.005 0.52 
Exch. and sales 1.54 (6.23) 0 1.46 (9.61) 0 7454369 0.000 0.53 
Purch. traffic 0.78 (6.96) 0 0.67 (9.90) 0 7733458 0.018 0.51 
Work webmasters 1.04 (5.50) 0 0.96 (5.99) 0 7888565 0.367 0.50 
Not about work 5.91 (54.54) 0 4.91 (71.01) 0 7658896 0.003 0.52 
Mean: 𝑥 ̅, std: 𝜎, median: ?̃? , Mann-Whitney U: 𝑈, p-value: 𝑝, effect size: 1 –  𝑓, significance level 𝛼 is 0.05 
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sizes also reveal a small difference, with only 54% of possible pairs being in favor of 
drifters for the number of comments and 55% for the number of days. 
In terms of diversification level, there are also significant differences in the SDI 
(𝑈= 7438357, 𝑝=0.000) between drifters (𝑥 ̅  =  𝟎. 𝟑𝟑, 𝜎 = 0.40, ?̃?  =  0) and non-drifters 
(𝑥 ̅  =  𝟎. 𝟐𝟗, 𝜎 = 0.39,  ?̃?  =  0), as well as the number of categories (𝑈= 7373268, 
𝑝=0.000) for drifters (𝑥 ̅  =  𝟐. 𝟏𝟗, 𝜎 = 1.88, ?̃?  =  1) and non-drifters (𝑥 ̅  =  𝟏. 𝟗𝟕, 𝜎 =
1.68,  ?̃?  =  1), and the number of subcategories (𝑈= 7441092, 𝑝=0.000, drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =
 𝟑. 𝟔𝟗, 𝜎 =  6.18,   ?̃?  =  1, non-drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟑. 𝟏𝟓, 𝜎 = 5.37 ,  ?̃?  =  1). Yet the minimal 
differences in the descriptive statistics of the two groups and the effect sizes of 53% and 
54% illustrate that, overall, these two groups are relatively similar.  
In terms of business purposes, Mann-Whitney U tests also show that there are 
significant differences between the number of comments posted for business purposes 
(𝑈= 7373506, 𝑝=0.000) for drifters (𝑥 ̅  =  𝟏. 𝟐𝟒, 𝜎 = 5.15 ,  ?̃?  =  0) and non-drifters (𝑥 ̅  =
 𝟏. 𝟎𝟓, 𝜎 = 10.84,  ?̃?  =  0) as well as their proportion (𝑈= 7407759, 𝑝=0.000, drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =
 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓, 𝜎 =  0.15, ?̃?  =  0, non-drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟎. 𝟎𝟒, 𝜎 =  0.13,  ?̃?  =  0). However, these 
differences are, again, limited considering the effect sizes of 53% and 54% and the 
reported descriptive statistics.  
Lastly, in terms of topics discussed, five categories out of nine display a 
significant difference between the number of comments for drifters and non-drifters: the 
communication of professionals category (𝑈= 7229753, 𝑝=0.000, drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟖. 𝟑𝟓, 
𝜎 =  62.68, ?̃?  =  0, non-drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟑. 𝟗𝟑, 𝜎 =  41.79,  ?̃?  =  0), the site building 
category (𝑈= 7557235, 𝑝=0.000, drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟒. 𝟐𝟏, 𝜎 =  19.02, ?̃?  =  0, non-drifters: 
𝑥 ̅  =  𝟒. 𝟔𝟒, 𝜎 =  45.47,  ?̃?  =  0), the exchange and sales category (𝑈= 7454369, 
𝑝=0.000, drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟏. 𝟓𝟒, 𝜎 =  6.23, ?̃?  =  0, non-drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟏. 𝟒𝟔, 𝜎 =  9.61,  ?̃?  =
 0), the purchased traffic category (𝑈= 7733458, 𝑝=0.000, drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟎. 𝟕𝟖, 𝜎 =  6.96, 
?̃?  =  0, non-drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟎. 𝟔𝟕, 𝜎 =  9.90,  ?̃?  =  0) and the not about work category (𝑈= 
7658896, 𝑝=0.000, drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟓. 𝟗𝟏, 𝜎 =  54.54, ?̃?  =  0, non-drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟒. 𝟗𝟏, 𝜎 =
 71.01,  ?̃?  =  0).  Yet the minimal differences in the descriptive statistics of the two 
groups and the effect sizes ranging between 51% and 53% illustrate that, although 
significant differences are found, these differences are minimal.   
Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of each sub-indicator for each group. Through 
such visualization, one can see that the distributions of both groups are highly similar in 
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terms of shape and scale throughout all sub-indicators. Drifters tend to score higher in 
most indicators, but the effect sizes for all indicators are remarkably small. Considering 
these results, concluding that drifters and non-drifters are from a different population 
would stretch the reality. The analysis is recomputed with the top 30% dataset below. 
 
 
Figure 6 Distribution of Behavior Indicators for Drifters and Non-Drifters 
For visibility purposes, all drifters are included in each representation while random samples of 3,000 non-drifters are 
selected for each indicator. The lines represent group means. If only one line is visible, the group means overlap. Some 
indicators are logged, as specified in the x-axis label.  
9.2.2. Considering the Top 30% in 2017 and 2018  
The previous analysis thus found that drifters and non-drifters have minor to no 
differences in their behaviors on the informal platform. One could wonder if these results 
are an artefact of selecting the entire population for the analysis, including all minimal 
contributors. When selecting only top platform contributors, the behaviors of drifters and 
non-drifter may differ. To evaluate this hypothesis, the analysis above was repeated with 
only the top 30% of individuals discussing on the informal platform. Results are 
presented in Table 9 and significant relationships are highlighted in grey.  
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Table 9 Mann-Whitney U Test Results for the Top 30% Dataset with Name 
Filter 5 Chars+ and Time Filter 2016-2019 
 
In comparison to the previous analysis, fewer significant relationships are found: 
six out of the 16 sub-indicators display significant differences between the two groups  
(i.e., the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis). Yet, although 
significant, the reported differences between the two groups are, once again, minimal, as 
highlighted in the text below (𝑥 ̅ score is in bold).  
In terms of rate of activity, Mann-Whitney U tests illustrate that there are 
significant differences in the number of comments (𝑈= 736120, 𝑝=0.0051) for drifters 
(𝑥 ̅  =  𝟗𝟐. 𝟔𝟖,  𝜎 = 220, ?̃?  =  36) compared to non-drifters (𝑥 ̅  =  𝟗𝟏. 𝟕𝟏, 𝜎 = 268,  ?̃?  =
 27) as well as in the number of active days (𝑈= 714399, 𝑝=0.0005) for drifters (𝑥 ̅  =
 𝟒𝟑. 𝟐𝟕, 𝜎 = 55.5,  ?̃?  =  22) compared to non-drifters (𝑥 ̅  =  𝟓𝟎. 𝟓𝟗, 𝜎 = 66.7,  ?̃?  =  17). 
Yet, even in the top 30%, although drifters tend to post a few more comments and are 






 𝑥 ̅(𝜎) ?̃? 𝑥 ̅(𝜎) ?̃? 𝑼 𝒑 𝟏 −  𝒇 
Activity Rate        
N. comments 92.68 (220) 36 91.71 (268) 27 736120 0.0051 0.53 
N. days active 43.27 (55.5) 22 40.59 (67.7) 17 714399 0.0005 0.52 
Diversification        
SDI 0.52 (0.35) 0.61 0.51 (0.36) 0.6 794990 0.2563 0.51 
N. cat. 3.77 (2.35) 3 3.53 (2.25) 3 767956 0.0603 0.53 
N. sub-cat 7.78 (9.09) 5 7.20 (8.51) 4 787480 0.1839 0.52 
Business        
N. $/ ₽ sign 3.27 (8.33) 1 3.30 (19.77) 0 736008 0.0024 0.55 
Prop. $/ ₽ sign 0.04 (0.10) 0.01 0.04 (0.08) 0 748942 0.0094 0.54 
Specific Topics         
Search Engines 6.01 (21.58) 0 9.36 (38.52) 0 801801 0.3182 0.51 
Monetizing sites 19.55 (53.7) 1 18.04 (75.5) 1 781203 0.1222 0.52 
Practical opt.       8.14 (18.78) 0 11.79 (57.2) 1 807473 0.3975 0.51 
Comm. of prof. 23.08 (105) 1 12.58 (73.9) 0 719287 0.0003 0.56 
Site building 10.98 (31.1) 1 14.55 (82.7) 1 799605 0.2969 0.51 
Exch. and sales 3.59 (10.13) 0 4.23 (17.33) 0 796505 0.2396 0.51 
Purch. traffic 1.95 (11.67) 0 1.99 (17.87) 0 790470 0.1241 0.52 
Work webmasters 2.54 (9.06) 0 2.71 (10.75) 0 806772 0.3674 0.51 
Not about work 16.84 (91.5) 0 16.47 (130) 0 757053 0.0099 0.54 
Mean: 𝑥 ̅, std: 𝜎, median: ?̃? , Mann-Whitney U: 𝑈, p-value: 𝑝, effect size: 1 –  𝑓, significance level 𝛼 is 0.05 
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sizes also illustrate this minimal difference with only 53% of possible pairs being in favor 
of drifters for the number of comments and 52% for the number of days.  
In terms of diversification, no sub-indicators, the SDI, the number of categories, 
and the number of sub-categories, illustrate a significant difference between the 
distribution of the two groups.  
In terms of business purposes, Mann-Whitney U tests illustrate that there are 
significant differences between the number of comments posted for business purposes 
(𝑈= 736008, 𝑝=0.0024) for drifters (𝑥 ̅  =  𝟑. 𝟐𝟕, 𝜎 = 8.33,  ?̃?  =  1) and non-drifters (𝑥 ̅  =
 𝟑. 𝟑𝟎, 𝜎 = 19.77,  ?̃?  =  0) and their proportions (𝑈= 748942, 𝑝=0.0094, drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =
 𝟎. 𝟎𝟒, 𝜎 =  0.10, ?̃?  =  0.01, non-drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟎. 𝟎𝟒, 𝜎 =  0.08,  ?̃?  =  0). However, the 
differences in the descriptive statistics of the two groups are minimal. The 55% effect 
sizes for the number of comments and 54% for the proportion illustrate, again, that these 
differences are, once more, limited.  
Lastly, in terms of topics discussed, two out of nine categories display a 
significant difference between the number of comments for drifters and non-drifters: the 
communication of professionals category (𝑈= 719287, 𝑝=0.0003, drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟐𝟑. 𝟎𝟖, 
𝜎 =  105, ?̃?  =  1, non-drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟏𝟐. 𝟓𝟖, 𝜎 =  73.9,  ?̃?  =  0), and the not about work 
category (𝑈= 757053, 𝑝=0.0099, drifters: 𝑥 ̅  =  𝟏𝟔. 𝟖𝟒, 𝜎 =  91.5 ?̃?  =  0, non-drifters: 
𝑥 ̅  =  𝟏𝟔. 𝟒𝟕, 𝜎 =  130,  ?̃?  =  0).  One could argue that the communication as a 
professional category, where drifters speak twice as much as non-drifters, indicates a 
difference. Yet the effect size of 56% is small and this effect size does not hold when the 
tests are computed on other filtered datasets (see Appendix C). The effect size for the 
not about work category is also limited.  
Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of each sub-indicator for each group, and, 
once again, the distributions of both groups are highly similar in terms of shape and 
scale throughout all sub-indicators. Again, drifters tend to score higher in most 
indicators, but the effect sizes are all small. Considering that pooling the top 30% of the 
population reduces the number of significant relationships from 12 to six, and given the 
effect size, I conclude that the differences between the two populations are minimal.   
Drifters rather seem to be similar to non-drifters, based on the indicators developed.  
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Figure 7 Distribution Drifters and Non-Drifters based on Behavior Indicators 
for the Top 30% 
For visibility purposes, all drifters are included in each representation while random samples of 750 non-drifters are 
selected for each indicator. The lines represent group means. If only one line is visible, the group means overlap. Some 
indicators are logged, as specified in the x-axis label.  
9.3. No Absolute Differences and Limited Drifting  
All in all, drifters form a small proportion of the population: 7.2%28 when 
considering the most liberal filters29. Thus, the proportion of individuals who drift onto 
crime-oriented platforms, using the same username, is small. However, further 
considerations need to be accounted for. For example, the analysis focused on a perfect 
match approach, and it is likely that individuals changed their usernames (slightly or 
entirely) when registering on crime-oriented platforms. Also, given that the base dataset 
includes individuals in an informal space, it is also possible that some individuals have 
entirely changed their username to avoid cross-correlating their informal online identity 
 
28 The proportion considers only users with a username of at least five characters.  
29 Name filter: minimum of 5 characters and time filter: 2015-2010 
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with their identity on crime-oriented spaces. Some individuals may furthermore be 
involved in criminality without being registered in crime-oriented platforms, like the three 
individuals investigated in the private chat log. The main conclusion from this analysis is 
that there exists an overlap between informal and crime-oriented spaces online; through 
a perfect match approach and liberal filters, 7.2% of individuals seem to wade in both 
worlds.  
The analysis also illustrated that the types of platforms on which drifters discuss 
are quite diversified, ranging from hacking to carding, money laundering and black hat 
SEO. The drifter population is diversified and distributed across a large variety of crime-
oriented platforms. Although drifters may not favor one type of crime-oriented platform, 
the analysis showed that 61% of drifters spoke only on clearnet platforms (25% only on 
darknet platforms and 14% on both), illustrating that clearnet platforms may be preferred 
over darknet ones. 
The analysis also suggested that drifters’ participation in crime-oriented spaces is 
limited: 50% of the drifters population commented three times on these platforms and 
75% made fewer than ten comments. Such participation is low considering that these 
statistics are pulled from the most liberal filter, which accounts for the years 2015 to 
2020. In sum, the majority of drifters seem to be limited contributors in crime-oriented 
spaces. Potentially, these individuals limit their involvement in crime-oriented spaces 
because of the platforms’ more obvious criminal status.  
The significant relationships found with the Mann-Whitney U tests displayed 
minimal to no differences between drifters and non-drifters in terms of activity rate, 
diversification, business purposes and specialized topics on the informal platform. This 
finding is consistent regardless of whether the whole population or the top 30% is 
considered. However, there are important limits to the analyses above: other indicators, 
not used in this study, could differentiate both groups. Other techniques could also be 
used to identify drifters. Finally, although drifters are relatively indistinguishable, based 
on the indicators developed, their presence in crime-oriented platforms, compared to the 
informal one, still warrants further investigation. More precisely, that drifters’ involvement 
in crime-oriented spaces is limited, based on a static dataset, sparks inquiries on 
whether such a finding is consistent over time. This inquiry led the final analysis of this 
thesis.  
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Chapter 10. Methods to assess Drifting Trajectories 
The last analysis of this thesis aims at fulfilling the second objective of this study, 
which is to assess drifters’ relationship between informal and crime-oriented spaces. The 
previous chapters illustrated that drifters are relatively indistinguishable from the mass, 
and their involvement in crime-oriented platforms is limited. The following analysis 
complements these results by looking at drifters’ relationship between informal and 
crime-oriented spaces through time. The research question leading this analysis is: 
“How do drifters use the informal space compared to crime-oriented spaces over time?”  
The strategy to answer this question was to develop a group-based trajectory 
model that could detect similar trajectories of drifters’ posting behavior between the 
informal platform and crime-oriented ones through time. This chapter presents the 
various methodological steps taken to develop such a model. It starts by explaining the 
longitudinal dataset created and the Krackhardt External/Internal ratio (E/I ratio) used to 
capture commenting patterns. Then, the logic behind group-based trajectory modeling 
and the model created are outlined.   
10.1. Dataset 
To conduct such a longitudinal analysis, a dataset of the informal workforce 
spanning several years was needed. To create this dataset, the Flare API was 
leveraged, and all comments posted on the informal platform from 2012 to 2020 were 
first extracted30. Each comment’s identification number, text, and timestamp, as well as 
the name of the actor who wrote it, was gathered31. With this, a list of usernames 
containing all individuals who posted on the informal platform over the nine-year period 
of study was created.  
Before searching these usernames on the Flare Systems database to find other 
platforms on which they discussed, a username filter was applied: the most conservative 
 
30 Nine years may seem like a long timeframe for online participation. However, the three individuals in the 
private chat log had been active on this platform since even longer than that (as early as 2009) and two of 
them were still active at the time of writing this thesis. Also, 2012 was selected as the starting point since 
data on the informal platform prior to this year was unreliable. The year 2020 was selected as the last full 
year because the data was extracted in mid-2021.  
31The actor named: “Этот пользователь удален” (meaning: this user has been deleted) was removed. 
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one (presented in the previous chapter). This filter removes all usernames that do not 
have a minimum of 5 characters AND at least an uppercase OR a number OR one 
special character. This allowed minimizing the potential false positive of linking unrelated 
usernames during the cross-correlation procedure between platforms. Overall, the list of 
usernames from 2012 to 2020 included 35,450 individuals. Each of them was searched 
in the Flare Systems database and, when a comment on another platform was found 
under the same username, the comment’s identification number, timestamp, the platform 
name, and the username were extracted.  
Of these 35,450 individuals, 2,471 perfect matches were found: they represent 
2,471 individuals who have discussed at least once on another platform with the same 
username during the nine-year period. These 2,471 individuals discussed on 34 different 
platforms, the same crime-oriented platforms presented in the previous chapter, except 
for one. The new one was investigated and was not found to be crime-oriented; it was 
thus removed from the dataset.  
Overall, these 2,471 individuals posted 285,372 comments on the informal 
platform and 79,448 on crime-oriented platforms over nine years. Drifters’ posting trends 
through time, on both informal and criminal spaces, are presented in the results section 
below.    
10.2. Krackhardt External/Internal Ratio 
To assess posting patterns of drifters in and out of the informal platform to and 
from crime-oriented spaces, the Krackhardt External/Internal Ratio (E/I ratio) was used. 
This ratio was developed in network science (Krackhardt and Stern, 1988) to measure 
the extent to which an individual’s relationships are centered around their internal 
community or around other, external communities. A score of -1 indicates that an 
individual only has ties to their assigned community while a score of 1 indicates that an 
individual only has ties external to their assigned community. A score of 0, on the other 
hand, means that the individual has equal ties in and out of their community.  
In this study, the E/I ratio refers to drifters’ commenting pattern on the informal 
platform vs crime-oriented ones. Internal ties are comments posted on the informal 
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platform while external ties are comments posted on crime-oriented platforms. The ratio 
is defined in eq. (4): 
𝐸/𝐼 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑡 =
𝑥𝑒,𝑡−𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑥𝑒,𝑡+𝑥𝑖,𝑡
   eq. (4) 
where 𝑥𝑒,𝑡 represents the number of external comments (outside the informal platform) 
at period 𝑡, and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 represents the number of internal comments (inside the informal 
platform) at period 𝑡. This E/I ratio is calculated for every user and every period between 
2012 and 2020. The results range from -1 to 1, where -1 represents all comments on the 
informal platform and 1 represents all comments external to the informal platform. If a 
user posted equally on both spaces, then the E/I ratio is zero, as neither space is 
favored. Descriptive statistics on the E/I ratio for each period of study are presented  in 
Table 10.  
Table 10 Distribution of E/I Ratio across the Different Periods of Study 
Period  N Mean (std) Med 
  2012 1,124 -0.89 (0.42) -1 
  2013 1,179 -0.73 (0.63) -1 
  2014 1,146 -0.54 (0.81) -1 
  2015 1,243 -0.23 (0.92) -1 
  2016 1,133 -0.30 (0.91) -1 
  2017 1,076 -0.22 (0.92) -1 
  2018 1,034 -0.07 (0.96) -0.63 
  2019 975 0.11 (0.95) 0.93 
  2020 922 0.34 (0.90) 1 
As shown in Table 10, the average E/I ratio and the median are closer to -1 
(favoring informal platform) at the beginning of the period of study and move closer to 1 
(favoring crime-oriented platforms) at the end of the period of study. Notice also that the 
standard deviations for every year are large (considering that the ratio has a range 
between minus one and one), which means that there is great variance in the E/I ratio 
score in the drifter population through time.  
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10.3. Identifying Drifters’ Trajectories 
To assess drifters’ posting behavior through time, a group-based trajectory model 
(GBTM) was developed. GBTM are finite mixture models designed to extract subgroups 
within a population that follow similar trajectories over a variable of interest (Jones and 
Nagin, 2007). Finite mixture refers to models that analyze outcomes from a population 
with a finite number of homogenous subpopulations (Nagin and Odgers, 2010a,b). Such 
models are widely used in criminology to assess developmental trajectories of 
delinquency (Nagin and Piquero, 2014; Haviland and Nagin, 2005; Nagin and Odgers, 
2010a,b; Nagin and Tremblay, 2005). The base model is presented below.  
10.3.1. The Base Model  
GBTM aims at finding clusters of individuals with similar trajectories, yet the 
model’s parameters are not the result of a cluster analysis. Rather, the model is the 
product of a maximum likelihood estimation: the objective is to identify a set of 
parameters that will maximize the probability of an outcome (Nagin, 2005, p.24). As well 
summarized in Jones and Nagin (2007, p.543) and paraphrased below, GBTM assumes 
that, given a longitudinal measured sequence 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖1, 𝑦𝑖2, 𝑦𝑖3, … , 𝑦1𝑇  of an individual 𝑖 
over 𝑇 periods, and 𝑃(𝑌𝑖) representing the probability of observing the sequence 𝑌𝑖, the 
population is formed of a mixture of 𝐽 distinct trajectory groups as defined in eq. (5). 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝑃
𝑗(𝑌𝑖)𝑗   eq. (5) 
where 𝑃𝑗(𝑌𝑖) represents the probability of observing 𝑌𝑖 given group membership 𝑗, and 𝜋𝑗 
represents the probability of group 𝑗 in the population (i.e., the probability of an individual 
picked randomly of being from group 𝑗). The base model assumes that, conditional on 
membership 𝑗, the variables 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡 =  1,2, … 𝑇  at each period are independent and thus 
the probability of observing 𝑌𝑖, given group membership 𝑗 (𝑃
𝑗(𝑌𝑖)), can be defined in eq. 
(6). 
𝑃𝑗(𝑌𝑖)  =  ∏ 𝑝
𝑗(𝑦𝑖𝑡)𝑇  eq. (6) 
where 𝑃𝑗(𝑌𝑖𝑡) is the probability distribution function of 𝑌𝑖𝑡, given membership in group 𝑗 
(Nagin, 2005, p.26). On the other hand, the group membership probabilities 𝜋𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, … 𝐽 
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are estimated via the multinomial logit function (p.543) to ensure that the probability 







 eq. (7) 
where 𝜃1 is normalized to zero. The form of 𝑝
𝑗𝑡(𝑦𝑖𝑡) (data points) depends on the type of 
data investigated. Common distributions for these models include zero-inflated Poisson, 
logit or censored normal (Jones and Nagin, 2007, p.543). The shapes of the trajectories 
for each group are defined via a polynomial function over time and can vary across 
groups. Finding the form and parameters of these polynomials, along with the number of 
groups, is the bulk of the modelling process. 
10.3.2. Censored Normal Model  
The model’s variable of interest is the E/I ratio, computed for each drifter at each 
period. As mentioned above, the specific form of likelihood function depends on the 
distribution of the outcome variable (e.g., censored normal, Poisson or logit). Given that, 
in this study, the outcome variable is bound between -1 and 1 and clusters at these 
extremes, the censored normal likelihood function is selected. Such a function allows for 
censoring when the outcome variable clusters at a minimum and/or a maximum scale 
(Jones et al., 2001) as the linkage between the time and the outcome variable is 
determined with a latent variable (𝑦∗𝑗𝑖𝑡).  
The relationship between time and the latent variable can go up to a fourth-order 
polynomial (𝑒𝑥: 𝑦∗𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0
𝑗 + 𝛽1
𝑗𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2
𝑗𝑇2𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3
𝑗𝑇3𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4
𝑗𝑇4𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ) and the error 
term is normally distributed with a mean of zero and a constant standard of deviation 
(Nagin, 2005; Jones and Nagin, 2007). The latent variable estimates the potential for an 
individual to engage in behavior beyond the bound outcome when estimating the 
model’s parameters (Nagin, 2005). Such a function is ideal when an outcome variable is 
bound, such as a psychometric scale, and a large number of observations cluster at a 
minimum, while another smaller contingent clusters at the maximum (Nagin, 1999). In 
the model, those clustering at one extreme of the E/I ratio (e.g., -1) have differences that 
cannot be grasped by the bound variable. For example, there might be differences 
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among those who scored -1, such as individuals who had a higher level of engagement 
in crime-oriented platforms. The latent variable captures these potential differences.  
10.3.3. Drifters Sample for the Model  
The outcome variable is the E/I ratio for each drifter during the nine years 
studied, from 2012 to 2020. However, of the 2,471 drifters found, not all were active 
throughout the nine years of study. Table 11 illustrates how many individuals were active 
from one year to nine years.  
Table 11 Distribution of the Number of Years Available per Drifter in the 
Dataset 
Number of Year Drifters % Sample Cumulative 
1 year 84 4% 3% 
2 years 667 27% 31% 
3 years 520 21% 52% 
4 years 381 15% 67% 
5 years 266 11% 78% 
6 years 193 8% 86% 
7 years 147 6% 92% 
8 years 104 4% 96% 
9 years 109 4% 100% 
N 2,471 100%  
As shown in Table 11, only 4% of the sample were active for the nine years 
studied (109 individuals) and 67% of the sample includes individuals active for fewer 
than four years. This means that only 33% were active at least five years. That most 
drifters are not active for the nine years is unsurprising, given that online commitments, 
especially in crime-oriented spaces, are known to be ephemeral (Goldsmith and Brewer, 
2015).  
Thus, the greater the sample of drifters the more likely the individuals included 
will have missing information. To keep the entire sample, the missing data could be 
treated in two ways. First, for every year a drifter was not active, the model could 
consider that the drifter has an E/I ratio of zero. In such a case, a score of zero would  
mean that either the drifter has posted equally in both the informal platform and other 
crime-oriented platforms OR the drifter has not posted in any platform. In both cases, the 
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drifter would not be favoring the informal platform over other crime-oriented ones. This 
approach also considers that what Flare Systems has gathered is the ground-truth: if 
there are no comments from these drifters in the monitored platforms during these years, 
it means these individuals have not posted and their E/I ratio score should be zero.  
The second approach is inferential: it considers that, for every year a drifter did 
not post, the E/I ratio is missing. Missing data will be treated at random by the software. 
This approach considers that Flare Systems does not have the ground-truth, the dataset 
has missing at random (MAR) information, and users’ behaviors were not captured for 
many potential explanations, such as technical difficulties or because drifters have 
changed their usernames through time. The extent to which the missing data is related 
to a random process is, however, unclear.  
 After thorough evaluation, both approaches are somewhat problematic 
considering the significant amount of missing information in the dataset. The first 
approach imposes a high number of zeros, which leads to the trajectories being dragged 
near the zero line for the outcome variable when running the model. The second 
approach (treating the data as MAR) inputs a substantial amount of “random” 
information to the model, which can potentially lead to misleading results.  
 In the end, the fewer missing periods the better. The idea was to find 
relationships, such as what proportion of drifters stay mainly in the informal platform, 
move permanently into crime-oriented platforms or discuss in both alternatively. The 
model was thus computed on a subset of drifters: those for whom there were 
observations for the nine periods of study (N=109). Using these active drifters allowed 
me to explore trends, without imposing artificial data. Once the best model parameters 
and number of groups were determined with this subset, the model was applied to 
additional subsets of drifters using the conservative model explained above (adding 
zeros to missing information). The STATA software (Version 16) and the TRAJPLOT 
plugin (Jone and Nagin, 2013) were used for model computations.  
10.3.4. Best Model Decision 
Given that the model aims at dividing a population into groups with similar 
trajectories, there are vast possibilities as each individual can represent a group and the 
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trajectories can go from a constant or linear form to a quadratic or a cubic one. To 
determine the best model, Nagin (2005) developed a formal procedure based on the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). BIC is one of the most used model fit criteria that 
balances model complexity (number of parameters) and goodness of fit (Nagin and 
Odgers, 2007). It is defined eq. (8), 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿) − 0.5𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁) eq. (8) 
where 𝐿 is the value of the model’s maximized likelihood, 𝑁 is the sample size, and 𝑘 is 
the number of parameters (Nagin, 2005). The left hand side of the formula (𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐿)) 
accounts for an improvement in the model fit while the right side (0.5𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁)) subtracts 
a penalty for the addition of a group or a parameter to the model fit. Models with a higher 
BIC are thus preferred. Moreover, the model includes two BICs: one that considers the 
number of participants as the sample size and another that considers the number of 
observations as the sample size. The correct theoretical BIC is between these two BICs 
(Nagin, 2005).  
Nagin’s (2005) procedure to find the best model is based on two processes: (1) 
determining the number of groups that best divide the population and (2) determining the 
best polynomial function to use for each trajectory. For the first process, a predetermined 
polynomial function is chosen, based on prior knowledge of the data, and groups are 
added iteratively to the model.  
However, sometimes, adding groups results in a slight increase in BIC. To 
determine if such a slight increase is significant, the Bayes factor 𝐵𝑖𝑗 can be used. This 
factor computes the ratio of probability of 𝑖 being the right model to the probability of 𝑗 
being the correct model (Nagin, 2005, p.6). However, given that calculating the Bayes 
factor can be computationally intensive, Nagin (2005) argues that the Kass and 
Wasserman (1995) approximation of the Bayes factor is sufficient. The approximation is 
expressed as: 𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 𝑒
𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑖−𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑗. 
When comparing two models, if 𝐵𝑖𝑗   is larger than 10 (𝐵𝑖𝑗   > 10), then there is 
strong evidence in favor of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ model, the model with an additional group. A 
𝐵𝑖𝑗  between three and 10 (3 <  𝐵𝑖𝑗  < 10) means that there is moderate evidence, and a 
smaller 𝐵𝑖𝑗 between one and three  (1 𝐵𝑖𝑗 < 3 ) means that there is weak evidence in 
122 
favor of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ model. On the other hand, a 𝐵𝑖𝑗   between one and one third (1/3 < 𝐵𝑖𝑗  1) 
illustrates weak evidence for the 𝑗𝑡ℎ model, between one third and one tenth 
(1/10 < 𝐵𝑖𝑗 <  1/3) shows moderate evidence, and lower than one tenth (𝐵𝑖𝑗 < 1/10) 
means that there is strong evidence for the 𝑗𝑡ℎ model. When 𝐵𝑖𝑗  = 1, both models are 
equally good.  
In specific situations, the BIC constantly increases when adding a group or a 
parameter, preventing one from determining the best model. In such a case, Nagin 
(2005) argues that the model selection must balance parsimony and the distinctive 
features of the data. Models with a  fewer number of groups are favored: it is better to 
select no more groups than are necessary to illustrate the unique features of the data 
(Nagin, 2005).  
Hence, the number of groups that best fit the data can be found with the BIC 
following the procedure mentioned above. Once the best number of groups is 
determined, the model’s parameters are determined for each trajectory group using the 
BIC as an indicator. Entropy can also be an indicator of a model’s fit. The measure 
indexes “classification accuracy by averaging the posterior probabilities after individuals 
have been assigned to their most likely class, with values closer to 1 indexing greater 
precision (range 0 to 1)”. (Nagin and Odgers, 2010, p.117).  
10.3.5. Model Diagnostics 
Based on Nagin (2005), three indicators can be used to assess the model’s fit to 
the data. The first indicator is the group average of individual posterior group 
membership probabilities (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑃𝑃). Posterior group membership probabilities are 
calculated for each individual and the 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑗 is the average of these probabilities for 
each group 𝑗  in which an individual was assigned to the model. An 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑃𝑃 of 70% is 
assumed to be adequate (Nagin, 2005). The second indicator is the odds of correct 






  eq. (9) 
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where 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑗 is the average posterior probability of group 𝑗 and 𝜋𝑗 is the random 
assignment of probabilities for the said group 𝑗. An 𝑂𝐶𝐶 of one means that the model 
has no predictive probability beyond random chance while an 𝑂𝐶𝐶>5 means that the 
model is a good fit. The third indicator 𝑃𝑗 calculates the number of individuals assigned 
to a group. It is defined in eq. (10) 
𝑃𝑗 = 𝑁𝑗/𝑁 eq. (10) 
where 𝑁𝑗 is the number of individuals assigned to group 𝑗 and 𝑁 is the total number of 
individuals. 𝑃𝑗 is then compared with 𝜋𝑗 which represents the model’s estimated random 
assignments to group 𝑗. When 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑖 = 1, all individuals are assigned to one group with 
perfect certainty and  𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖. As the assignment error increases, the difference between 
the two measures increases. A correspondence between the two measures is thus an 
indicator of model accuracy (Nagin, 2005). The three model diagnostics are calculated 
and reported below.  
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Chapter 11. Drifter Trajectories Favor Informality   
This final analysis chapter presents the result on the group-based trajectory 
modeling developed to answer the question: “How do drifters use the informal space 
compared to crime-oriented spaces over time?” Results show that about 75% of drifters 
favor the informal space over crime-oriented ones over time! The chapter starts by 
presenting longitudinal information about the dataset. The model’s results are then 
introduced and discussed.   
11.1. Drifters’ Commenting Behavior Through Time  
To begin, longitudinal commenting trends are presented for the informal platform 
population (N=35,450) and the drifter population (N=2,471). As illustrated in Figure 8 
(left), there is a clear decreasing trend in the number of comments posted on the 
informal platform annually, suggesting that engagement on this platform may be falling. 
Such a decreasing trend is also observed among the drifter population, as shown in 
Figure 8 (right). On the other hand, drifters’ total number of comments in crime-oriented 
platforms does not follow a steep decrease, but rather oscillates around 10,000 
comments total over time. Consequently, based on the total number of comments 
posted on crime-oriented platforms, drifters’ engagement seems to be quite steady. 
 
Figure 8 Total Number of Comments Annually 
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Figure 9 Mean Number of Comments for the Drifter Population through time  
(N=2,471) 
However, a different picture is painted when considering the mean number of 
comments for the drifter population through time, as shown in Figure 9. The figure 
illustrates that drifters’ engagement in terms of mean number of comments per drifter per 
year also decreases in the informal platform over time. In terms of commenting on crime-
oriented platforms, the trend increases from 2012 and 2013 and then decreases 
constantly through time, until the end of 2018, when participation has slightly increased. 
Overall, drifters’ average participation is declining in both spaces.  
Drifters’ mean number of comments decreases over time, but the number of 
comments on crime-oriented platforms is relatively constant, as shown in Figure 8. This 
means that the number of drifters who speak on crime-oriented platforms increases by 
the end of the period of study.  
11.2. Group-Based Trajectory Modeling Results  
To assess drifters’ intertwined relationship between informality and criminality, a 
trajectory analysis on drifters’ yearly E/I ratio score was computed using the censored 
normal distribution, as explained above. The sample considered is that including drifters 
active on either space throughout the whole period of study (N=109). Finding the best 
model required two steps: (1) determine the number of groups (i.e., number of groups in 
the population with similar trajectories) and (2) determine the shape of the parameters. 
For the first step, linear trajectories were used to evaluate the model with the best 
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number of groups. Such trajectories assume that drifters’ E/I ratios are linear through 
time, either decreasing or increasing.  
Table 12 illustrates the results for the first step, finding the number of groups, and 
includes the models’ BICs. When a group is added, the 𝐵𝑖𝑗 is computed between the two 
models to assess whether adding a group significantly increases (decreases in this case 
since the values are negative) the BICs.  





N = 109 
𝑩𝟐𝒊𝒋 
2 groups -778.27 - -771.67 - 
3 groups -763.24 3,368,573 -753.35 9,042,216 
4 groups  -765.65 0.08981 -752.47 2.4108997 
5 groups -774.41 0.000 -757.93 0.00425 
6 groups  -778.48 0.017 -758.71 0.458406 
Table 12 illustrates that there is strong evidence for a model with three groups 
(𝐵𝑖𝑗  >  10) over the two-groups model. There is also strong evidence for the three-
groups over the four-groups model (𝐵𝑖𝑗  <  1/10). Adding more groups then does not 
yield higher BICs. The best model is thus the three-group model. The second step is to 
determine the shape of the trajectories. Table 13 presents the results for combinations 
for linear and quadratic trajectories. Both cubic and constant trajectories were 
considered, but they are not reported because they only yielded lower BICs than the 
BICs presented in Table 13. 
Table 13 Determining the Shapes of the Trajectories 









N = 109 
1 Linear Linear Linear -763.24 -752.35 
2 Quadratic Linear Linear -766.68 -755.69 
3 Linear Quadratic Linear -759.20 -748.22 
4 Linear Linear Quadratic -759.20 -748.22 
5 Linear Quadratic Quadratic -761.76 -749.68 
6 Quadratic Quadratic Linear -762.64 -750.56 
7 Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic -765.19 -752.01 
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As illustrated in Table 13, the models with the highest BICs were models 3 and 4, 
which both included two linear and one quadratic trajectory shape. Both models were 
compared, and the results were exactly the same (which is not always the case); results 
for (the simpler) Model 3 are thus presented below.  
11.2.1. Three-Group Model Results 
Table 14 presents the results of the three-group model with two linear and one 
quadratic trajectory. The trajectories through time are also presented in Figure 14.  
Table 14 Trajectory Results with E/I ratio as the Outcome Variable 
 Estimate SE P-value  
Group 1     
 Intercept -3.05046 0.22267 0.0000 
 Linear 0.16457 0.03248 0.0000 
Group 2    
 Intercept -2.47120 0.26930 0.0000 
 Linear 1.40106       0.26930 0.0000 
 Quadratic -0.10258 0.02658 0.0001 
Group 3    
 Intercept -4.44736 0.50486 0.0000 
 Linear 0.64794 0.08299 0.0000 
Sigma 1.31638 0.07860 0.0000 
Random Assignment Prob  SE p-value  
 Group 1  73% 4.91262 0.0000 
 Group 2  12% 3.12749 0.0002 
 Group 3 15% 4.20429 0.0004 
BIC    
 N=981 -759.20   
 N=109 -748.22   
Entropy 0.924   
The results show that all trajectories found by the model are statistically 
significant32. All group intercepts are below -1 (captured by the latent variable), 
 
32 Sigma represents the estimated standard deviation of the residual (Zhang and Max, 2019) 
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suggesting a strong preference for the informal forum for all drifters at the beginning of 
the study. Based on the model’s estimates and the trajectories presented in Figure 10, 
Group 1 includes 73% of the sampled drifter population and shows a positive linear -yet 
quite flat- trend through time. Group 2, on the other hand, represents 12% of the 
sampled population and illustrates a positive trend that eventually flattens and tends to 
decrease at the end of the period studied. Group 3 also represents a small portion of the 
sampled population, 15%, and illustrates a positive trend through time.  
  
Figure 10 Group Trajectories Through Time (N=109) 
The visual representation of these trajectories in Figure 11 illustrates that Group 
1’s trajectory, which encompasses the great majority of sampled drifters, stays close to 
- 1 and favors the informal platform over crime-oriented ones. Group 2, on the other 
hand, drifts, at the beginning of the period of study, out of the informal space to crime-
oriented spaces, where the group’s participants discuss through the rest of the period of 
study. The third group drifts out as well, but at a slower pace and a little bit later in the 
period of study. The members of this group start favoring crime-oriented spaces around 
2017 when the zero boundary of favoring neither is crossed towards crime-oriented 
ones.  
However, note that this model was computed on a small number of drifters: those 
who were active for the nine periods of study (N=109). To assess if the findings were an 
artifact of this sample, the current model (three groups with two linear trajectories and 
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one quadratic) was computed with additional subsamples: drifters with eight years of 
observations, seven, six, etc. The results were similar (in terms of trajectory trends and 
population distribution across the three groups), but as more and more data was 
missing, the trajectories were dragged closer to zero. Thus, the model presented above 
is the soundest one, the one with no missing data. It represents trends that can be seen 
using other datasets with missing years, until the missing year information drags the 
analysis to zero.  Before discussion of the results, the model’s diagnostics are presented 
below.  
11.2.2. Three-Group Model Diagnostics 
As presented in the methodology, Nagin (2005) has developed diagnostics to 
assess the extent to which a model fits the data. The diagnostics for the model 
presented above are available in Table 15. 
Table 15 Model’s Diagnostics 
 𝑵 𝑨𝒗𝒆𝑷𝑷𝒋 
𝑺𝑻𝑫 
𝑨𝒗𝒆𝑷𝑷𝒋 
𝝅𝒋 𝑷𝒋 𝑶𝑪𝑪𝒋 
Group 1 81 0.97 0.08 0.73 0.74 11.96 
Group 2 13 0.99 0.03 0.12 0.12 726 
Group 3  15 0.92 0.12 0.15 0.14 65.16 
 The results illustrate that the three-group model fits the data well. The 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑗, 
the average of individual posterior group membership probabilities, is 97% for Group 1, 
99% for Group 2, and 92% for Group 3. The respective standard deviations are also low, 
illustrating little deviation from the average score. The odds of correct classification 
(OCC) are all above Nagin’s baseline of five and the three 𝑃𝑗 (the number of individuals 
assigned to each group divided by the whole population) are nearly equal with the 𝜋𝑗, the 
random assignment of probabilities. Overall, the model fits the data properly.  
11.3. Favoring Informality  
There are key takeaways from the results of this chapter. To begin with, 
engagement, in terms of total number of comments, in the informal space decreases 
through time. This shows that the informal forum may not be as popular as it was at the 
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beginning of the study. Such a decreased activity rate may be due to the adverse 
business environment in which these individuals seem to operate (as seen in the private 
chat log), but this is a discussion for the following chapter. 
Considering the drifter sample, the total number of comments posted on the 
informal platform decreases while the total number of comments posted on crime-
oriented spaces is relatively steady. On the other hand, drifters’ individual engagement 
decreases, on average, in crime-oriented platforms. This means that the number of 
drifters in the dataset who speak on crime-oriented platforms increases by the end of the 
period of study. Why the number of drifters speaking on crime-oriented platforms 
increases over time is a question that warrants further research. Potentially, crime-
oriented platforms attract more users nowadays. Although interesting, this is beyond the 
scope of this study.  
The main finding of this chapter relates to the GBTM model. When the most 
active drifters are selected, those who participated in the nine periods of study, the 
results of the trajectory analysis illustrate that drifters strongly favor informal spaces over 
criminal ones through time. Indeed, for 73% of the population, participation in criminal 
spaces is minimal compared to participation in informal spaces. On the other hand, 27% 
of the drifter population do end up speaking more in crime-oriented spaces over time: 
12% at a quick pace and 15% at a slower pace.  
The two previous analyses aimed at fulfilling the second objective: to assess 
drifters’ relationship between informal and crime-oriented spaces. The first one 
illustrated that drifters are relatively indistinguishable from the mass and their 
involvement in crime-oriented platforms is limited. The second one illustrated that, 
through time, based on their commenting behavior, drifters’ favor the informal platform 




Chapter 12. Discussion 
Through two objectives and four analyses, this study uncovers contexts, 
perceived motivations, and organizations of individuals involved in online economic 
crime while putting a magnifying glass on an informal workforce and its likelihood to drift. 
From the results, four discussion points emerged: 1) understanding the underlying forces 
that influence individuals to participate in online economic crime, 2) exploring their 
organizations and the role of informal workers involved, 3) illustrating the benefits and 
difficulties of hiring such a workforce through digital labor platforms, and 4) presenting 
the workforce’s limited involvement in crime-oriented platforms. Each is discussed 
below, followed by study limits and further research.  
12.1. Understanding the Forces Underlying Online Economic 
Crime  
The first discussion point focuses on understanding the underlying forces that 
influence individuals to participate in online economic crime. It relates to the first analysis 
that investigated the contextual factors and perceived motivations of those behind online 
economic crime from the perspectives of individuals with knowledge and experience on 
the matter, that is, of experts. The results spanned expertise and geographical regions, 
illustrating that there are global trends behind online economic crime. Each finding is 
discussed below and interpreted through previous criminological studies. When possible, 
they are also paired with the themes that emerged from the private chat log analysis. 
12.1.1. The Triad Influencing Those Behind Online Economic 
Crime 
The first factor, lack of legal economic opportunities, refers to situations 
where individuals do not have interesting legal opportunities to exploit their skills, leading 
them to participate in such profit-driven crime. Linking the lack of legal economic 
opportunities to crime participation implies that a relationship exists between being 
unable to fulfill economic goals and turning to crime to do so. In other words, individuals 
who seek financial wealth, and cannot achieve such gains legally, may resort to illegal 
means. Such an idea recalls Merton’s seminal work (1968; 1938) on Social Structure 
and Anomie, which presents anomie and strain theories.   
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Anomie theory refers to an imbalance between cultural goals that are acclaimed, 
such as making money, over proper institutional means available to achieve them. When 
summarizing Merton’s contributions, Featherstone and Deflem (2003) explain that a 
society is in a state of anomie when greater stress is put on achieving the goals and less 
on the approved norms regulating the means to achieve them. Strain theory, on the 
other hand, states that individuals are more likely to pursue illegitimate means to attain 
acclaimed cultural goals when they cannot do so through legitimate means. To explain 
how individuals adapt to patterns of goals and means, Merton (1938)  sketched five 
modes of adaptation: conformity, ritualism, rebellion, retreatism33 and innovation. The 
last one, innovation adaptation, relates to the factor found in this thesis. Innovation 
adaptation represents individuals who embrace cultural goals but are blocked from 
legitimate avenues to attain such goals. As stated by Merton, this blockage leads them 
to reject the legitimate means (as opposed to the goal) and find new avenues, innovate, 
to achieve their goals.  
The factor “a lack of legal opportunity” links to Merton’s idea that a differential 
access to legal opportunities may lead individuals to “innovate” and find other means to 
achieve their goals. For online economic crime, the goal appears to be profit-driven. 
Remember Expert 900 mentioned: “they want to be rich cybercriminals” (Expert, 900) 
and an individual in the private chat log said: “I realized that I was led by the fact that 
others make good money […]” (Developer 1, January 2018).  This should not come as a 
surprise: gaining economic wealth is a widespread cultural goal across cultures (Passas, 
2000). The factor that emerged from the data analysis implies that, in a context where 
there is a lack of legal opportunities to achieve economic goals, individuals may turn to 
crime opportunities and, in such a situation, crime becomes a means to pursue an end –
make money.  
Focusing on the “void” in legal opportunities implies that, given better economic 
conditions, at least some individuals might not participate in online economic crime. As 
implied in Merton’s (1968; 1938) work, crime participation is a product of society’s 
 
33 In short, conformity adaptation represents the great majority of individuals in society: those who 
accept the cultural goals and the institutional means to achieve them. Ritualism adaptation 
represents those who reject cultural goals but will accept the institutional means. Retreatism are 
those who reject both, living as marginalists in the society. Rebellion  includes individuals who 
emancipate from the cultural goals and institutional means and attempt to introduce a new social 
order (Merton, 1938).  
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forcing individuals to do things they would not do otherwise (Bernard, 1984). This line of 
thinking opens research avenues toward understanding what concentration of legal 
economic opportunities (or say growth in the technological sector) can deter most 
individuals from participating in online economic crime. 
Merton’s anomie and strain theories are intertwined, yet separate (Featherstone 
and Deflem, 2003) and they have been extended (Agnew, 2017; Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 2012; Messner, 1988, among many others), acclaimed (Adler, 2020; 
Rosenfeld, 1989) and criticized (Besnard 1990; Kornhauser 1978) in the criminological 
scholarship. Reviewing these works is beyond the scope of this thesis. Future studies 
could look at how anomie and strain theory can explain the high prevalence of 
individuals involved in online economic crime in specific contexts.  
When investigating actors involved in online economic crime, the theme of 
adverse business environment emerged with unreliable business partners, unstable 
payment programs and declining business prospects as subthemes. The individuals 
studied in the private chat log were involved in internet marketing, participating in affiliate 
marketing programs to monetize Android portals they had developed. They talked at 
length about how bad the business had become, with few interesting prospects to 
monetize their websites. Such discussions are closely linked to the lack of legal 
economic opportunities raised by experts, which could partly explain why these 
individuals ended up seizing the Geost opportunity. This opportunity may have looked 
enticing in terms of its potential profitability, with few alternative options. Yet, whether the 
individuals studied would have preferred an equivalent legal alternative is unclear, 
given their leniency towards criminality as illustrated across their discussions. Moreover, 
considering that the individuals in the private chat log had invested a lot of time and 
energy in building their Android portals, switching to alternative opportunities, such as 
the movie websites they mentioned, seemed to involve high switching costs (costs 
related to converting to alternative business opportunities).  
This case study nuances the factor that emerged from the interviews: considering 
these individuals may have invested time and energy in developing Android portals, the 
lack of legal opportunities related to their business may have enticed them to consider 
opportunities from the criminal realm although other legal opportunities were available, 
such as monetizing other types of websites. In short, legal alternatives may exist but 
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may not be considered due to high switching costs. Further research could investigate 
the different dynamics at play across subsectors, such as to what extent legal 
alternatives are considered by IT workers who have the potential to participate in online 
economic crime.  
The second factor, lack of deterrents, encompasses elements that lead to a 
feeling of impunity for individuals committing criminal activities. Impunity means being 
exempted from punishment for actions that usually are considered to deserve 
punishment. The lack of deterrents that induce a feeling of impunity recalls Stafford and 
Warr’s (1993) argument that avoiding punishment increases the chances of 
committing more crime in the future. The authors revisited deterrence theory (Becarria, 
1963 [1764]) by proposing that an individual may be deterred or encouraged not to 
offend or to offend through a combination of personal and vicarious experiences of being 
punished AND avoiding punishment. They posited that the latter may do more to 
encourage criminal behavior due to the actor’s feeling “immune” to consequences 
(p.125). This proposition was supported in various empirical studies that found that 
avoiding punishment increases the chances of future offending (Sitren and Applegate 
2012, 2007; Piquero and Pogarsky, 2002; Piquero and Paternoster, 1998; Paternoster 
and Piquero, 1995). A feeling of impunity is also the main factor explaining why, in 
certain settings, criminal organizations tend to be large (Tremblay, Bouchard and Petit, 
2009). Studying how this feeling unfolds specifically for those involved in online 
economic crime, given that wealth distribution happens through online means, could be 
of interest to future studies.  
Similarly to findings from the interviews, the individuals involved in online 
economic crime, studied in Chapters 6 and 7, did not seem to fear any consequences 
from their actions. The theme of leniency towards criminality illustrated that they were 
aware that what they were doing was illegal, yet they never mentioned facing potential 
consequences related to their economic activities. However, note that none of these 
individuals developed the malicious Geost applications nor connected to victims’ bank 
accounts with compromised credentials. All they did was publish malicious Android 
applications on their website. They were paid when someone visited the website and 
downloaded the said application. This action resembles any other economic activities 
that these individuals might have pursued for a legitimate affiliate marketing program. 
That the actions they did were the exact same ones as the ones they did for legal 
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affiliate marketing programs could have created such a sense of impunity. However, 
one difference was that their websites were continually blocked by search engines, 
requiring them to develop various strategies to circumvent the search engines. This 
extra work seemed to be acceptable given the potential profitability of Geost and the few 
other legal alternatives in their business niche. 
Mechanisms that led to this feeling of impunity mentioned by experts included 
law enforcement efficiency, lack of peer judgements and the possibility of corrupting law 
enforcement. These elements have also been identified as major factors influencing the 
size and scope of criminal organizations in the literature (Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti, 
2011; Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter, 2009; Tremblay, Bouchard and Petit, 2009; 
Tremblay, Cusson and Morselli, 1998).  
Notice also that experts’ examples included both formal (e.g., law enforcement) 
and informal (e.g., peer judgements) sanctions [punishments]. These types of sanctions 
are part of social control theory, which emphasizes formal and informal mechanisms that 
influence individuals to conform to the rules of society, thus preventing them from 
committing crime (Hirschi, 1969; Sampson, 1986). Within the theory, formal mechanisms 
include state regulations that prevent individuals from committing criminal activities due 
to the fear of facing legal retributions. Informal mechanisms, on the other hand, include 
internalized norms and values acquired through a socialization process with peers and 
families that prevent an individual from committing a crime. For example, there were no 
peer judgments (at least clearly expressed) among the three individuals involved in the 
Geost scheme, the Main Entrepreneur, Developer 1 and Website Master 1, nor by any 
other business partners who may have been suspicious of the illicit activities happening.  
The absence of these two types of sanctions is believed to influence individuals 
to commit online economic crime. Preventing online economic crime is often associated 
with increasing law enforcement capacities and skills (Bulanova-Hristova et al. 2016). 
Given these results, informal sanctions, such as peer judgement, could also have a 
prevention effect. Investigating this avenue to develop new strategies to deter individuals 
from participating in online economic crime could be the topic of future studies. Also, 
understanding why, in specific settings, peers may not judge individuals involved in such 
activities could be an interesting research avenue. This non-judgmentality may be 
related to the lack of legal opportunities mentioned above.  
136 
The third factor, drifting means, refers to an encounter wherein individuals 
discover that participating in online economic crime is possible. Encounters mentioned 
by experts were multiple, including schools, online advertising platforms, or gaming 
activities. The drifting means factor can be interpreted as involving three steps: 1) 
encountering a situation or a space where individuals participated in online economic 
crime, 2) realizing that participating in such crime was possible, and 3) participating. 
Thus, the term “drifting” ties to Matza’s (1990) work, which considers drifting as a state in 
which the tie binding self to legal expectations is broken. When one is relieved of moral 
restraints, crime becomes a possibility. The factor drifting means implies this drift state, 
but also a condition that triggers the will to participate in crime. I call this condition 
“realization” to refer to situations where individuals understand that participating in online 
economic crime is possible, either through their own experiences or by seeing others so 
doing. This recalls Matza’s (1990) preparation condition, which states that an individual 
can be triggered to crime by knowing that something is possible and repeating it. 
In some situations, however, experts mentioned that individuals were tricked into 
contributing to such crime, learning later that the work they had done was for a malicious 
purpose. For example, an individual is hired as a penetration tester by a group, only to 
learn later that he is testing the security of a company to find vulnerabilities that will then 
be exploited to launch ransomware on the company. This recalls Leukfeldt et al. (2020) 
and Bijlenga and Kleemans’ (2018) argument that the neutrality of IT tasks creates a 
grey area that can be leveraged to successfully orchestrate criminal activities. If relevant 
moral restraints are still binding the individual, then the individual does not enter the drift 
state. Experts mentioned that often, once the line is crossed and the individuals realize 
that they have gotten involved in such activities, they end up continuing the said 
activities. Further research should investigate these processes, with research questions 
such as When did you realize that you were contributing to online economic crime? 
Were there any hints? Why did you continue? Unfortunately, the private chat log did not 
provide further information on drifting means, as the discussions did not mention how or 
why the individuals studied ended up spreading malicious applications.  
In sum, the factor lack of legal opportunities justifies why individuals might be 
interested in online economic crime (or why online economic crime opportunities may 
look appealing) while the lack of deterrents implies a feeling of impunity as individuals do 
not fear informal or formal sanctions when participating in these schemes even though, 
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traditionally, there are sanctions. The drifting means factor explains how one may end up 
in such activities, including encounters with other individuals involved, a drift state and a 
realization condition. These factors are also closely linked to various criminological 
theories, as illustrated above. Settings where the three contextual factors converge are 
settings where there might be a high proportion of individuals involved in online 
economic crime. Studying the effect of convergence in different spaces, as well as their 
interplay, could be of interest for further research. 
12.1.2. Money, Yet Little of it for the Masses  
Interviews with experts also provided insights on what they perceived as 
motivators behind online economic crime. That money was the primary perceived 
motivation was expected, given the definition of the crime. What was startling was the 
general agreement that the amounts gathered, for most individuals, were not substantial. 
A small group of individuals -the kingpins- seemed to make large amounts of money, 
while the rest did not. Such discourse resembled other findings that stress inequality in 
revenues from criminal activities, with most individuals being quite unsuccessful 
(Paquet-Clouston, Décary-Hétu and Morselli, 2018; Levitt and Venkatesh, 2001; 
Tremblay and Morselli, 2000). This finding also links to a recent research on cybercrime 
(Collier et al., 2020) that stressed the small amounts received by individuals involved in 
profit-drive cybercrime, such as those providing booting services. The private chat log 
analysis also illustrated that those involved in spreading the Geost botnet were 
motivated by the idea of economic independence yet did not make as much as they 
expected. One individual even mentioned: “I realized that I was led by the fact that 
others make good money” (Developer 1, January 2018). Given these results, further 
scientific studies could focus on estimating the proportion of individuals involved in 
online economic crime who make large amounts of money compared to those who do 
not.  
Experts also mentioned that feelings of pride, fame, excitement, and power over 
others were great motivators. These feelings were also reported as motivations by Katz 
(1988). However, this finding requires further assessment. Most likely, individuals behind 
online economic crime may have experienced these feelings, as expressed by some 
experts’ own experiences, but to what extent this is generalized is uncertain as 
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motivations are intrinsic to each individual. To truly assess personal motivations, those 
behind online economic crime need to be surveyed. 
Moreover, those spreading the Geost botnet were far from excited about their 
economic activities, given the adverse business environment they evolved in. 
Remember Developer 1 who kept on quitting the job, requiring motivational speeches 
from the Main Entrepreneur. This finding is, again, close to Collier et al. (2020), who 
interviewed individuals involved in online criminal activities and found that they were 
mainly lowly paid contractors who did the “invisible” work, which was or resembled 
legitimate work. Collier et al. (2020) even argued that focusing on the boring aspect of 
cybercrime (including online economic crime) and the meager revenue earned by most 
individuals could persuade those contemplating criminal activity to pursue legal 
opportunities instead.  
Given the findings of Collier et al. (2020), the private chat log analysis, and the 
tasks surrounding online economic crime, a great proportion of individuals involved in 
online economic crime do not experience these feelings: they are likely involved in the 
crime script for monetary purposes only. Potentially, those who are motivated by pride, 
fame, excitement, and power end up participating in online economic crime as a 
byproduct of these feelings; the money is a nice additional element, but it is not the main 
motivator. This raises the question: online economic crime is defined as profit-driven 
crime (Naylor, 2003), yet for a crime to fit this definition, must profit-driven be the main 
motivation, or can other motivations supersede it? As long as the monetary goal is 
central and wealth is redistributed, then, I believe, such crime should be considered as 
fitting the definition of online economic crime. However, further research could look into 
the extent to which such feelings supersede financial motivations as well as assess who 
specifically experiences these feelings. Those experiencing these feelings may also be 
involved in specific tasks behind the crime script, such as the secondary crime of 
cracking that often surrounds online economic crime. The feeling experienced may also 
depend on the type of online economic crime committed, as spreading malicious 
applications may be less exciting than targeting a company and launching a 
ransomware.  
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The findings of this thesis also yield interesting information on the organization of 
those behind online economic crime. The second discussion point hence explores this, 
along with the role of informal workers involved at the periphery. 
12.2. Organizing Online Economic Crime  
The general agreement in the literature is that criminal organizations are likely to 
be small and loosely organized (Leukfeldt et al., 2020; Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Lusthaus, 
2018; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 2017; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, 
b, c; Leukfeldt, 2014; Bouchard and Morselli 2014; 2007; Morselli, 2009; Morselli et al. 
2007; Reuter and Haaga, 1989; Reuter, 1983). Results from the interviews, however, 
illustrated various forms of organization behind online economic crime, ranging from 
structured forms (organized criminal groups or enterprise-like groups) to organic forms 
(including loose networks or communities) were perceived by experts. Each is discussed 
below and put in relation with other studies that reported similar structures.  
Structured forms included criminal groups that organize due to emergent 
contexts (Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti, 2011), such as large carder groups that form due 
to easy accessibility to information technologies, and the fall of the Soviet Union 
(Lusthaus and Varese, 2021). It also included depictions of traditional organized criminal 
groups exploiting opportunities in strategic contexts where there are criminal 
opportunities (Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti, 2011). The story of the group that switched 
from robbery to carding is a good example. Similarly, there have been several accounts 
in the literature of traditional organized crime groups seizing information technology 
economic crime opportunities or using these technologies to better conceal their 
activities (for reviews, see: Leukfeldt et al., 2020; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 
2017; Bulanova-Hristova et al., 2016)  
Structured forms also included enterprise-like organizations, where experts 
talked about criminal groups organized as enterprises or enterprises exploiting online 
economic crime opportunities. Lusthaus (2018) also argued that organizations involved 
in online profit-driven activities resembled firms with offices, floors and workers. In the 
same vein, in 2021, Böhme, Clayton and Collier published a theoretical paper that 
analyzed criminal entrepreneurs’ decision processes behind their “profit-driven 
cybercrime businesses”.  
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Organic structures were also mentioned during the interviews, including loose 
networks of entrepreneurs as well as communities. The former refers to entrepreneurs 
organizing to exploit an opportunity and then dismantling. This account is similar to 
findings in the traditional literature on criminal groups, which state that criminal 
entrepreneurs generally associate for a few economic transactions and split afterwards 
(Morselli, 2009; Morselli et al., 2007; Reuter and Haaga, 1989). It is also close to how 
offender convergence settings are conceptualized: loose and flexible networks of 
individuals who sometimes associate for criminal purposes (Dupont et al., 2017; Dupont 
et al., 2016; Holt and Smirnova 2014; Motoyama et al. 2013; Yip, Webber and Shadbolt, 
2013; Holt 2013; Décary-Hétu and Dupont 2012; Christin, 2012; Holt and Lampke 2010; 
and many more). 
Communities, on the other hand, refers to gatherings of like-minded individuals 
discussing various topics such as information security, hacking, and cybercrime in 
general and committing criminal activities together. In social science, the community 
concept is tied to the idea that those who form a community have a sense of solidarity, a 
shared identity, and follow a set of norms (Bradshaw, 2008). As an example, recall the 
youth gamer in one expert’s story that ended up in a community on an Internet Relay 
Chat (IRC), building and managing botnets and stealing credit cards with a group of like-
minded friends. The expert recalling this story referred to the group as a community. 
When studying cybercrime-related forums, a few scholars have also conceptualized 
online meeting places as communities (Holt and Dupont, 2019; Dupont, 2019; Afroz et 
al., 2013). 
All in all, these perceived structures represent different angles of a complex 
social phenomenon: the organization of individuals involved in online economic crime. 
Bouchard and Morselli (2014) discussed how being involved in criminal activities is a 
resource pooling process, with small groups embedded in larger networks. These 
various structures likely depict a version of the reality of such resource pooling 
processes.  
Which structure is reported also likely depends on the observer’s perspective. 
For example, group of entrepreneurs, like the individuals in the private chat log, may 
organize around an economic crime opportunity and hire a worker to help them in their 
endeavors. In such a situation, their organization could be interpreted as a criminal 
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organization, an enterprise hiring a worker, a loose network of entrepreneurs or a 
community, depending on the perspective taken by the observer. Such nuance is 
important: it illustrates the plurality of perspectives that can be taken and how 
conclusions sometimes depend more on the observer’s perspective than the structure of 
the organization itself.  
Apart from observers’ plural perspectives, the structure of criminal groups may 
also depend on the origin of the individuals involved, their context. This is important 
considering the local embeddedness of organizations involved in online economic crime 
(Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Lusthaus, 2018; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 2017; 
Leukfeldt, 2014). Lusthaus and Varese’s (2021) explanatory study also highlighted that 
there might be different economic and social dynamics that influence organizational 
structures. Bouchard and Morselli (2014) mentioned, as well, that group structures 
depend on the socio-legal environment in which they evolve.  
Experts interviewed in this thesis came from various geographic regions and 
investigated groups that were established all over the world. The different structures 
reported may be indicative of the plurality of structures that exist and the importance of 
studying contexts, as highlighted by other studies (Lusthaus and Varese, 2021; Leukfeldt 
et al., 2019; Lusthaus, 2018; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 2017; Leukfeldt, 2014). 
The three contextual factors identified above, a lack of legal opportunities, a lack of 
deterrents and drifting means, could be helpful in understanding why and how specific 
structures emerge in specific contexts.  
Finally, online economic crime was defined, in this thesis, as a series of actions 
that lead to online illegal wealth distribution. Market transactions happening in the 
cybercrime industry (Lusthaus, 2018; van Wegberg et al., 2018; Hutching and Holt, 
2015; Thomas et al., 2015; Moore et al., 2009) are part of the crime script, but do not 
define the organization behind online economic crime groups. Trading a cybercrime 
related product represents a secondary crime (as defined by Naylor, 2003) that can be 
part of an online economic crime script. This view is in line with previous research that 
illustrated that the various platforms on which this industry operates are offender 
convergence settings. Those involved in online economic crime can take advantage of 
them to develop their schemes: criminal expertise can be sought, co-offenders can be 
found, various criminally related products can be bought and sold, and even new skills 
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can be learned (Leukfeldt et al., 2020; Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Lusthaus, 2018; Leukfeldt, 
Lavorgna and Kleemans, 2017; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a ,b, c; Leukfeldt, 
2014).   
12.2.1. Introducing the Workforce at the Periphery  
To grasp the impact of a group outside of its specified boundaries, Tremblay, 
Bouchard and Petit (2009) brought forth the concept of economic influence. They argued 
that small groups can have large spheres of economic influence: their influences go 
beyond membership. An important finding of this thesis relates to the importance of 
individuals involved in online economic crime at the periphery of criminal groups. Indeed, 
throughout the interviews, the concept of indispensable workers surrounding online 
economic crime emerged to refer to those individuals involved in various tasks 
surrounding the scheme, such as transferring packages on behalf of a group, managing 
website servers, or laundering money. These workers are part of the sphere of economic 
influence of online economic crime groups. They expand the size and scope of these 
organizations beyond direct membership (Bouchard and Petit, 2009).  
The literature on the organization of criminal groups illustrated the importance of 
individuals surrounding criminal groups. Facilitators are identified as individuals from the 
legal world who offer services to criminal groups to help in the orchestration of various 
criminal schemes (for a review, see Morselli and Giguère, 2006). Enablers represent 
individuals, not necessarily from the legal world, who likewise provide services to 
criminal groups while money mules are those who help hide financial trails (Leukfeldt et 
al. 2020; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, b, c; Leukfeldt, 2014). These actors can 
be interpreted as indispensable workers or not, depending on their specific role in the 
criminal scheme.  
This is because what the indispensable workers concept highlights is not the  
facilitating or enabling feature of these individuals in the crime orchestration. Instead, 
those found surrounding the crime are interpreted as workers: individuals engaged in or 
available for work. The term worker, as opposed to facilitator or enabler, highlights the 
work dependency relationship of many of these individuals to the criminal group. These 
workers accept the task, which usually looks legal on the surface, for money purposes. 
For the criminal group, who is given the task does not really matter, as long as the 
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worker has the skills to achieve the task, be it transferring packages, laundering money, 
or translating a text. The workers are indispensable as a group, yet dispensable as 
individuals. They are positioned at the periphery of criminal organizations, and their 
mass form a sphere of economic influence that those orchestrating online economic 
crime can exploit. One strand of indispensable workers highlighted throughout the thesis 
that are key to online economic crime are informal workers from the IT sector.  
Informal Workers from the IT Sector 
To successfully orchestrate online economic crime, IT tasks must be achieved. 
This may explain why a significant proportion of indispensable workers seem to come 
from the IT sector. Indeed, alongside findings from the private chat log involving 
individuals developing websites, experts reported several accounts of IT professionals 
being recruited to contribute to various steps leading to online economic crime. 
Numerous studies also mentioned groups recruiting individuals from the IT sector to 
orchestrate their criminal schemes (Collier et al., 2020; Bijlenga and Kleemans, 2018; 
Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, b, c, d;).  
The informal status of these IT-related workers emerged from analyzing the 
private chat log: those involved in spreading the Geost botnet were conceptualized as 
informal workers34. The “informal” term grasps the neutrality of IT-related tasks and how 
the criminal character of a task can be concealed or denied, as mentioned by Leukfeldt 
et al. (2020) and Bijlenga and Kleemans (2018).  
Informal workers are workers involved in economic activities where the products 
or services are not illegal per se; it is the means by which they are produced and 
distributed that are illegal (Castel and Portes, 1989). In the traditional literature on 
informal markets, informal workers engage in informal economic activities due to 
autonomy, social ties, ease of entry, flexibility, and freedom. Their economic activities, 
although informal, are also often considered socially acceptable (Ojo, Nwankwo and 
Gbadamosi, 2013). Similarly, the protagonists of the private chat log were engaged in 
such work for the sake of economic independence. Based on the conversations 
analyzed, the economic activities they were engaged in, whether legal, informal, or 
 
34 The Main Entrepreneur was conceptualized as an entrepreneur because he coordinated the 
development of websites. However, he was also a worker as he was working for those involved in 
the Geost botnet, spreading malicious applications on their behalf.  
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criminal, were, moreover, not condemned by any of their business partners. The term 
informal thus also nuanced the status of these IT-related workers, who do not 
necessarily jump from legal to criminal, but may rather evolve in a grey area.  
12.3. The Double-Edged Sword: Hiring IT-Related Workers 
for Online Economic Crime  
When looking specifically at the possibility of outsourcing IT-related tasks 
associated with online economic crime, one can hardly ignore the current labor platforms 
that gather IT-related workers. This section starts by explaining how this thesis found 
that these platforms open a wide array of new hiring possibilities for online economic 
crime groups. Then, the third discussion point is undertaken: illustrating the benefits and, 
more importantly, the difficulties of hiring such a workforce through digital labor 
platforms.  
Experts interviewed mentioned that they were aware of individuals being 
recruited online, such as on freelancer platforms or job advertising websites. The private 
chat log analysis also pointed towards a digital labor platform where various services on 
internet marketing were traded. The Main Entrepreneur and two of his business partners 
participated in such a digital labor platform; using the platform to develop their economic 
activities allowed them to spread the Geost botnet. These findings point towards digital 
labor platforms representing informal spaces that can be exploited by criminal groups, 
and, more precisely, those behind online economic crime. In the literature, digital labor 
platforms are seen as unregulated spaces hosting a large workforce available at 
relatively low cost (Schmidt, 2017; Drahokoupil and Piasna, 2017; Drahokoupil and 
Fabo, 2016).  
That such informal spaces can be leveraged by individuals involved in crime is in 
accordance with previous research: there exists an intertwined relationship between 
informal and criminal economies (Sabet, 2015; Vande Walle, 2008; Hagedorn, 2007). 
Informal economies are known to represent attractive settings for criminal groups due to 
their unregulated state. Informal workers are also likely to accept economic opportunities 
in the criminal sphere when the potential returns are good (Ojo, Nwankwo and 
Gbadamosi, 2013), just as the Main Entrepreneur and two of his business partners did in 
the private chat log. That digital labor platforms host a pool of potential workers for 
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online economic crime organization opens new research avenues. For example, one 
could explore the extent to which those behind such crime take advantage of this 
opportunity and which platform is favored to do so.  
Such a finding may be concerning, given that, in the conventional world, digital 
labor platforms are reconfiguring the employer-employee relationship: hiring becomes 
efficient and flexible by minimizing outside employment regulations and evading 
company-like employment structures (Lehdonvirta, 2016). Criminal groups hiring through 
digital labor platforms could thus enjoy, as well, these benefits. Moreover, these 
platforms favor the division of jobs into microtasks (Schmidt, 2017; Drahokoupil and 
Piasna, 2017), which is advantageous for online economic crime groups: specific tasks 
can be given to workers without them being aware of the final product (Leukfeldt et al., 
2020; Bijlenga and Kleemans, 2018). Subdividing the tasks is an effective way to 
conceal the illicit feature of the final product. Does that mean that criminal groups behind 
online economic crime can hire a large workforce? Well, not necessarily, as explained 
below.   
The Challenges 
Although fostering hiring flexibility, digital labor platforms do incur additional 
opportunity costs, especially costs for hiring informal workers. For example, Lustig et al. 
(2020) highlighted transaction costs resulting from hiring freelancers, both in terms of 
providing adequate job descriptions and managing them afterwards. Lustig et al. (2020) 
discussed a setting where a large technology company hired freelancers to complete 
specific tasks; the relationships were thus likely to happen in a professional setting.  
The private chat log analysis provided information on how business relationships 
could take place in informal settings. Given the discussions analyzed, the transaction 
costs mentioned by Lustig (2020) seem to be exacerbated: the business partnerships 
are ephemeral and unreliable. Remember Website Master 1 mentioning to the Main 
Entrepreneur: “Well probably he was writing code in his head” when talking about the 
developer he hired to help with a task, illustrating the difficulties in monitoring work, and 
thus incurring monitoring costs. The same individual mentioned: “Same story, and the 
programmer keeps disappearing all the time”, illustrating the additional difficulties of 
keeping business relationships. Goldsmith and Brewer (2015) stressed that flexible 
online encounters lead to unstable relationships. They argued that this is further 
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exacerbated with pseudo anonymity, allowing individuals to better conceal their identity 
and face few consequences when engaging and disengaging in online relationships 
(Goldsmith and Brewer, 2015).  
The private chat log analysis also illustrated that there seemed to be high 
switching costs when a job is given to an individual. Throughout the conversations, the 
Main Entrepreneur was dependent on Developer 1 to continue developing the Android 
portals, while Developer 1 was unreliable and often stopped working. The Main 
Entrepreneur even mentioned once: “Please understand it is important. And it’s not an 
option to look for another programmer”. Rather than hiring someone else, the Main 
Entrepreneur made motivational speeches. All in all, these platforms may enable flexible 
hiring, but there may be additional costs that offset these benefits.  
Reuter (1983) stated that, because employees represent a threat for 
entrepreneurs, criminal enterprises need to be segmented, thus preventing the hiring of 
a large workforce. The private chat log analysis illustrated that such an assumption is 
still relevant for those behind online economic crime. Throughout the conversations, the 
Main Entrepreneur acted as a middleman between those behind Geost and Website 
Master 1. Whether the Main Entrepreneur discussed with the operators or another 
middleman was also unclear throughout the conversations. Those behind Geost thus still 
segmented their operations to conceal their identity from those at the periphery, incurring 
additional transaction costs due to the multiplicity of actors involved.  
Moreover, motivated offenders should still have incentives to conceal their 
identity and fragment the operations because, if workers given a licit task end up 
learning that it is for malicious purpose, they instantly represent a risk, as stated by 
Reuter (1983). However, such risk may depend on several factors, such as the 
geographic distance between the two parties or the extent to which the motivated 
offender can be blackmailed or exposed. Further research could investigate the various 
risks that online contracting relationships represent for motivated offenders. One 
interesting hypothesis that could also be investigated is: the further away in the chain 
from the motivated offenders who develop the scheme, the less likely people may be to 
conceal their identity.  
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On the other hand, to what extent can the maliciousness of IT-related tasks 
enabling online economic crime appear licit on the surface? Think of the story told by 
one expert of a translator who was given a task to translate a ransomware note targeting 
La Gendarmerie Nationale. A great proportion of the tasks are likely to leak the malicious 
purpose, so to what extent are informal workers likely to complete the tasks, 
disregarding their potential maliciousness? In other words, what proportion of informal 
workers available on digital labor platforms could drift? This leads to the fourth, and last 
discussion point of this thesis: presenting the workforce’s limited involvement in crime-
oriented platforms.  
12.4. Assessing the Informal Workers’ Dance  
This thesis leveraged the informal workforce uncovered through the private chat 
analysis and developed a specific strategy to investigate its potential ties to crime-
oriented spaces. To differentiate workers who talked on crime-oriented platforms, the 
concept of drifter was developed. Drifters are individuals from the informal workforce 
that end up discussing, at least once, in a crime-oriented space.  
By posting on crime-oriented platforms, drifters are assumed to have achieved a 
state of drift: they are released from moral restraints, as defined by Matza (1990). They 
are not assumed to have participated in online economic crime, however. By 
commenting even only once, they take action in the space, which is different from lurking 
or simply reading on these spaces. Commenting per se is not illegal; it is only, as I 
argued earlier, a step that illustrates that the individual has drifted. In the drifting state, 
criminal activities are possible, yet not inevitable.  
Of the entire workforce studied in 2017 and 2018 that respected the most liberal 
filtering approach, a total of 7.2% of individuals were identified as drifters and they did 
not form a specific subpopulation, as no behavioral indicators developed could 
differentiate them from non-drifters. This 7.2% represents a lower-bound and illustrates 
that the online informal workforce studied encompasses workers in a state of drift, who 
may be willing to participate in online economic crime.  
These findings are in-line with previous research: informal workers do end up 
seizing opportunities in criminal spheres, especially when there are higher prospects for 
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profit and the likelihood of getting caught is low (or criminal involvement can be denied) 
(Bijlenga and Kleemans, 2018; Ojo, Nwankwo and Gbadamosi, 2013; McElwee, Smith, 
and Somerville, 2011). 
Dipping a Toe 
Further investigation illustrated that drifters tend to favor informal spaces over 
crime-oriented ones. The drifters identified posted only a small number of comments in 
crime-oriented platforms (over 75% of drifters posted fewer than 10 comments according 
to the 2017-2018 drifter dataset). They also favored crime-oriented platforms hosted on 
the clearnet over those hosted on the Tor network, which has a reputation for fostering 
criminal activities (Faizan and Khan, 2019; Owen and Savage, 2015). This finding is in 
line with Sabet’s (2015) study illustrating that informal workers from traditional markets 
preferred to avoid crime ties when possible.  
The longitudinal analysis on drifters’ posting behavior corroborated these results. 
Over time, nearly 75% of drifters who engaged in these spaces for nine years favored 
the informal platform over crime-oriented ones. These findings showed that most 
drifters seem to dip a toe in crime-oriented spaces: their engagement is limited. 
Such minimal drift recalls Matza’s (1990) statement that drift is transient and rather rare 
for most individuals. Criminal career studies also report minimal involvement in criminal 
activities for most individuals (Piquero, 2004; Laub and Sampson, 2003).  
Moreover, inspired by Matza’s (1990) approach, this thesis did not conceptualize 
those posting in crime-oriented platforms as criminals who continuously break the law 
and are fully committed to crime. Instead, by considering drifters’ posting patterns, the 
theoretical approach and subsequent procedure illustrated that a small proportion of the 
informal workers studied drifted intermittently. Such a nuanced approach was helpful in 
understanding that informal workers do not favor crime-oriented spaces. This research 
path could be taken by other scholars to dig further into drifters’ decision process. 
Understanding the factors that influenced drifters to comment in and out of crime-
oriented spaces could be of interest to future studies.  
Those Who Drifted Permanently  
The longitudinal analysis also illustrated that nearly 25% of drifters, through time, 
ended up posting more in crime-oriented platforms, potentially due to better economic 
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opportunities (Ojo, Nwankwo and Gbadamosi, 2013). However, this finding does not 
indicate 1) whether these drifters ended up involved in criminal activities but only drifted, 
and 2) whether the informal space led them to crime-oriented ones, acting as a gateway. 
Additional investigation is needed to answer these questions, such as what proportion 
are conducting criminal activities and whether the informal space has a role in their shift. 
Potentially, these drifters (or their activities) have specific features that can be identified 
to understand their drift. 
These drifters are assumed to be in state of drift. Given the large digital labor 
platforms that remain available, only a small proportion needs to be willing to 
drift. This proportion represents those that may be targeted by organizations behind 
online economic crime.  
Lastly, given these results, and the lack of legal economic opportunity factor 
mentioned by experts, a line of inquiry that could be of interest to further studies is to 
evaluate whether investment in the technological sector decreases participation in crime-
oriented platforms. For example, experts mentioned that a growth of the cybersecurity 
industry in one specific region (known to be a hotbed for online economic crime) has led, 
recently, not only to a shortage of IT workers but also a shortage of individuals involved 
in online economic crime in that specific region.  
12.5. Study Limits Leading to Further Research 
Although this thesis provides valuable knowledge on various processes behind 
online economic crime, there remain several limits to the findings. These limits open new 
research avenues for future studies on the topic. Since several limits were mentioned 
throughout the chapters, this section focuses on a few important ones that are 
necessary to understand the limits of the work. 
In the first part of the thesis, perceived motivations were assessed via experts’ 
perspectives and my own analysis of textual data that contained discussions among 
individuals involved in online economic crime. A motivation is a reason someone acts a 
specific way; it is intrinsic to an individual. To overcome this limit, the term “perceived” 
motivation was used. To fully assess why individuals end up participating in online 
economic crime beyond financial gains, those who engage in such crime should be 
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interviewed. Further research should survey individuals specifically involved in online 
economic crime to understand their reality. Such research could evaluate whether the 
feelings mentioned by experts in this thesis represent motivations for those behind 
online economic crime or whether such feelings are rather a reflection of what experts 
believe would motivate them.  
Another limit of this thesis lies in the cultural origin of the private chat log dataset 
and the two datasets related to the informal workforce. Both the private chat log and the 
informal platform are formed of Russian-speaking individuals. The digital labor platform 
is available both in English and Russian, yet most discussions happen in the Russian 
language. The results of this thesis in terms of experience with online economic crime as 
well as the relationship between informality and criminality are thus based on Russian-
speaking populations. Note that “Russian-speaking” does not refer only to the Russian 
Federation; it encompasses a large population from various countries and different 
cultures, from Romania to Poland and Kazakhstan (examples are chosen randomly). 
Still, workers speaking other languages may be more or less inclined to participate in 
crime related activities. Surveying informal workers from other digital labor platforms and 
their potential ties to crime-oriented platforms could be the topic of future studies. 
Another limit relates to identifying drifters: the results of this thesis are highly 
dependent on Flare System’s visibility of crime-oriented platforms. Flare Systems 
monitors over a hundred platforms, yet it is not necessarily focused on Russian-speaking 
ones, which could explain the low number of drifters found. To expand the visibility of 
potential crime-oriented platforms on which informal workers can drift, partnerships with 
other organizations could be developed.  
Moreover, the name filtering approach, when identifying drifters, focuses on a 
perfect match approach, making the number of drifters identified a lower bound, and 
thus limiting the scope assessment. Although those who switch their usernames 
completely are not easily identifiable for researchers, individuals registering in different 
platforms with a slightly similar username, such as Marik9 and Marik10, could be 
identified. Recomputing the analysis to associate similar usernames could be done. This 
method would assume that similar usernames would belong to the same individual (such 
as Marik9 and Marik10). Although not without flaws, such a method would yield a higher 
lower bound. 
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Moreover, this thesis assesses the proportion of informal workers who drift and 
their relationship between informal and crime-oriented spaces through a quantitative 
approach. Subsequently, there was no qualitative analysis of what drifters do in crime-
oriented platforms. Potentially, the drifter population is a group of individuals using 
crime-oriented platforms for a specific purpose that was not grasped by the analysis 
computed in this thesis. Further research could attempt to understand what makes 
individuals drift and in what kind of activities these drifters are involved in. An additional 
line of inquiry could also be to look at drifters’ discussions on crime-oriented platforms to 
identify those who actively participate in online economic crime. Recomputing the Mann-
Whitney U tests using only a sub-sample of drifters who are knowingly involved in online 
economic crime may yield different results on their distinguishability. 
Finally, some studies investigated digital labor platforms and found that shady 
activities were hosted on them (Farooqi et al., 2017; Garg, Camp and Kanich, 2013; 
Motoyama et al., 2013). This endeavor was not completed in this thesis because of the 
length of work needed to do so. It would have required to study each comment to assess 
whether the topic discussed could be related to criminal activities. Investigating the 
platform, its categories and the various topics discussed illustrated that most of the 
discussions focused on legitimate inquiries about internet marketing. One subcategory 
hinted towards potential malicious economic activities: “doorways and cloaking”, which 
refer to manipulating users into clicking on links they do not wish to. Apart from that, the 
platform did not embody a criminal ethos nor promoted clear criminal activities like 
crime-oriented platforms did. Still, upcoming research could explore various digital labor 
platforms to better assess the content advertised on them.  
Despite these limits, this research uncovers various dynamics behind online 
economic crime, from contextual factors to perceived motivations to structures of 
organizations. It moreover assesses the role of informal workers in online economic 
crime and provides a first assessment of their likelihood to participate in crime-oriented 
platforms.  
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Chapter 13. Conclusion 
Online economic crime involves a series of actions leading to illegal wealth 
redistribution through online means. This thesis uncovers contexts, motivations, and 
organizations of individuals involved in online economic crime. While doing so, it 
assesses the role and availability of an informal workforce surrounding the crime 
organization and its likelihood to participate in such criminal schemes. This was possible 
thanks to a mixed methodology, from inductive thematic analyses to non-parametric 
tests and group-based trajectory modeling.  
The results are briefly summarized below. Then, further thoughts emerging 
from the results and the discussion are introduced. One idea suggests that specific 
geographic settings where the three identified contextual factors converge may foster 
large and structured organizations behind online economic crime. Another idea proposes 
that the uncovered informal workforce established at the periphery of online economic 
crime may explain the crime’s reach and sophistication, along with the availability of the 
cybercrime industry and the incentives to target victims abroad. The existence of the 
informal workforce also fosters a third idea, namely, that there is a need to think beyond 
motivated offenders when studying online economic crime. Lastly, further thoughts on 
how to prevent online economic crime participation, from an informal IT worker 
perspective, are presented. 
13.1. Thesis Results Summary 
The thesis started with the objective: to uncover the contexts and motivations 
that may drive individuals to participate in online economic crime. Through the analyses, 
a confluence of contextual factors that influence individuals to participate in online 
economic crime was developed. They include lack of legal economic opportunities, lack 
of deterrents, and drifting means. These factors relate to important theoretical work in 
criminology, such as Merton (1968; 1938), Stafford and Warr (1993) and Matza (1990). 
They are also similar to what has been identified in the literature to explain the size and 
scope of criminal organizations (Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti, 2011; Tremblay, Bouchard 
and Petit, 2009; Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter, 2009; Tremblay, Cusson and Morselli, 
1998). Financial gain and feelings, including pride, fame, excitement and power over 
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others, are also identified as motivators. Financial gain was no surprise as online 
economic crime is a profit-driven crime. Yet the narratives illustrated that only a small 
proportion of individuals are believed to end up making large amounts of money; 
inequality in criminal venture is a recurrent finding in the literature (Paquet-Clouston, 
Décary-Hétu and Morselli, 2018; Levitt and Venkatesh, 2001; Tremblay and Morselli, 
2000). Feelings, on the other hand, requires further investigation given that online 
economic crime seems to be surrounded by boring work (Collier et al., 2020). 
Experts’ narratives also illustrated the various forms of organizations behind 
online economic crime, including structured forms (criminal groups or enterprises) and 
organic ones (loose networks or communities). Each of these conceptualizations most 
likely depicts a version of the reality; they represent different angles of the complex 
social phenomena that online economic crime organization represents. To further 
understand their prevalence, studying the origin and growth of criminal organizations 
beyond online settings is needed (Leukfeldt, 2014) especially given that these 
organizations are known to be locally embedded (Lusthaus, 2018; Leukfeldt et al., 2019; 
Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 2017; Leukfeldt, 2014).  
Another important finding of this thesis relates to the importance of individuals 
involved in online economic crime at the periphery of criminal groups, the indispensable 
workers. The term “worker”, as opposed to “facilitator” or “enabler”, highlights the 
dependent relationship for work of many of these individuals to the criminal group. Within 
such a workforce, one that is unique to online economic crime, are informal workers 
involved in IT tasks, mentioned by experts and illustrated in the private chat log analysis. 
When looking specifically at the possibility of outsourcing IT-related tasks, one can 
hardly ignore the current labor platforms that gather IT-related workers, opening a wide 
array of new hiring possibilities for online economic crime groups.  
The presence of these platforms suggests, a priori, that the possibility of hiring 
workers online reconfigures the employer-employee relationship discussed in Reuter 
(1983), allowing online economic crime organizations to hire a large workforce. 
However, the thesis -and previous research- also illustrated that the benefits of hiring 
individuals online may be mitigated by transaction costs, including hiring costs (e.g., 
finding the worker with the right skills), switching costs (e.g., costs associated to 
switching worker afterwards), and monitoring costs (e.g., making sure the job is done). 
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Informal workers also seem to favor informal spaces; online economic crime 
organization may thus sometimes have difficulty finding workers given this feature. 
Although not without friction, those behind online economic crime do have a large 
economic sphere of influence they can leverage.  
The second part of the thesis focuses on understanding this workforce’s 
relationship between informal and criminal spaces, leveraging the drifter concept. 
Drifters are individuals from the informal workforce that end up discussing, at least once, 
in a crime-oriented space, illustrating that they have entered a state of drift, as defined 
by Matza (1990). The objective was specifically to assess drifters’ relationship between 
informal and crime-oriented spaces. Through various filtering techniques, drifters were 
estimated to form at least 7.2% of the workforce population, and no discriminatory 
variables differentiated drifters from non-drifters (using Mann-Whitney U tests).  
Results illustrated that, for the majority of drifters, involvement in crime-oriented 
space was limited. The group-based trajectory model also showed that nearly 75% of 
them commented most often on the informal platform compared to crime-oriented ones 
over time. These findings suggest, similarly to Sabet (2015), that informal workers may 
prefer to stay in informal realms when possible. Such minimal drift also recalls Matza’s 
(1990) statement that drift is transient and rather rare for most individuals. Nevertheless, 
about 25% of drifters ended up discussing only on crime-oriented platforms in the long-
run. These are the ones that those behind online economic crime may try to recruit for IT 
tasks surrounding the scheme.  
Given these findings, three further thoughts are outlined in the following sections. 
Hopefully, these thoughts can spark new research ideas surrounding online economic 
crime. 
13.2. Contextual Factors and Perceived Group Structures  
 Previous studies have illustrated that organizations involved in economic crime 
related to information technologies are locally embedded (Leukfeldt et al., 2020; 
Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Lusthaus, 2018; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 2017; 
Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, b, c; Leukfeldt, 2014). Leukfeldt (2014) also 
argued that there is a need to study the origins and growth of individuals involved in 
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such criminal activities. This thesis illustrated three contextual factors that may influence 
individuals to participate in online economic crime, regardless of their degree of 
involvement, as well as four perceived organizational structures. One hypothesis that 
comes out from these results is that in settings where the confluence of these factors 
is strong, organizations behind online economic crime may be large, in terms of 
active members, and more structured. Most research that concluded that the size and 
scope of criminal organizations were small assumed that Reuter’s (1983) driving forces 
of product illegality were efficient: (1) contracts were not enforceable by law and (2) 
there were risks of arrest. Yet, in settings where the confluence of factors is strong, the 
second force, risks of arrest, may not be as efficient, given the lack of deterrents. Such 
settings may thus foster larger and more structured organizations with pre-established 
roles. This would explain why a variety of organizational structures were found within 
experts’ discourse. However, organizations behind online economic crime are still 
unlikely to end up as large as multinational enterprises, since the forces of illegality may 
be strong beyond the geographic settings in which the individuals are established. Also, 
additional risks and difficulties are prevalent, given that the contracts are still not 
enforceable by law, as illustrated in the private chat log analysis.  
Hopefully, further research will focus on understanding how geographic settings 
explain the prevalence and differences in the structures discussed, thus providing 
insightful information on the organization of criminal groups. Settings where the risk of 
arrest is absent provide interesting grounds for research. For example, how do criminal 
organizations navigate the second driving force of contracts not being enforceable by 
law in online environments when one of the contracting parties is abroad? Do they favor 
contracting individuals within their sphere of influence? Accounts of violence and threats 
were mentioned by a few experts, but further research on the matter is needed. Lastly, in 
settings where organizations behind online economic crime can grow, the organizations 
have the potential to involve more informal workers at the periphery to develop 
sophisticated schemes, as explained below.  
13.3. Explaining Online Economic Crime Sophistication and 
Reach  
Online economic crime is characterized by a long reach in terms of number of 
victims (Tcherni et al., 2016) and sophistication as it requires several steps to be 
156 
successful, from enticing a user to click on malicious links to hacking a network, all the 
way up to money laundering (Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 
2017; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, b, c, d; Leukfeldt, 2014). Based on the 
findings of this thesis and insights from the literature, three key elements may explain 
online economic crime’s long reach in terms of number of victims and sophistication: 1) 
the possibility of leveraging an IT-related informal workforce, 2) an accessibility to 
offender convergence settings, and 3) the online means of the crime, which provides a 
diffusion capability and incentives to target individuals abroad. Each of these is 
discussed below.   
As argued throughout this thesis, those behind online economic crime can take 
advantage of online digital labor platforms, which are unregulated and host a large pool 
of informal workers at a very low cost (Schmidt, 2017; Drahokoupil and Piasna, 2017; 
Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016). If the task related to online economic crime is legal and its 
maliciousness can be concealed, then the pool of worker can easily be leveraged. 
However, if the task is clearly illegal, such as building an “evil twin” website, then those 
behind online economic crime will have to look for workers who are lenient towards 
criminality. This thesis investigated informal workers who ended up in criminal activities, 
likely given the adverse business environment they evolved in, and illustrated that in a 
large population of workers some will tend to drift. The sphere of economic influence of 
criminal groups who make use of these workers can expand significantly.  
Accessibility to such a workforce is one explanation. A second one is 
accessibility to offender convergence settings (and the related cybercrime industry), as 
discussed in several studies (Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and Kleemans, 
2017; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, b, c, d; Leukfeldt, 2014). Online meeting 
places can be used for market, social or learning purposes, as argued by Leukfeldt, 
Kleemans and Stol (2017d). These settings are a great tool for those behind online 
economic crime, allowing them to specialize and find the resources necessary for the 
orchestration of their scheme.  
The third explanation is that online economic crime happens in online 
environments, allowing those behind such crime to target individuals in other 
geographical spaces than the ones they are positioned in. This process is known as a 
diffusion process (Llinares and Johnson, 2018; Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016; Yar, 2005). Not 
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only is there such a possibility, but it may also lead to less risk of arrest. Indeed, when 
considering Reuter’s (1983) argument, where products are physically moved from one 
place to another, expanding geographical reach increases risk. However, in the case of 
online economic crime, targeting victims across geographical boundaries might be 
favored: it increases the level of safety of those behind such crime. As mentioned by 
experts, law enforcement agencies tend to investigate within their own jurisdictions and 
international collaborations are often slow. Thus, those behind online economic crime 
can target victims beyond the geographical borders they feel threatened by potential law 
enforcement intervention.  
Given these three elements, online economic crime’s long reach in terms of 
number of victims and sophistication may be explained. However, insights from this 
thesis also illustrated that hiring IT-related informal workers is not without costs. The 
literature also illustrates that several organizations behind online economic crime are 
locally embedded, and their growth depends on their social opportunity structures 
(Leukfeldt et al., 2020; Leukfeldt et al., 2019; Lusthaus, 2018; Leukfeldt, Lavorgna and 
Kleemans, 2017; Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol, 2017a, b, c; Leukfeldt, 2014).  
Potentially, only a small number of criminal groups can successfully 
leverage these three elements. They are the ones responsible for highly sophisticated 
online economic crime that targets victims on the global scale. This would also explain 
why experts reported that only a small number of individuals involved in online economic 
crime succeeded at making large sums of money. This finding is also recurrent in the 
criminal achievement literature (Levitt and Venkatesh, 2001; Paquet-Clouston, Décary-
Hétu and Morselli, 2018; Tremblay and Morselli, 2000). 
13.4. Beyond the Concept of Motivated Offenders 
The discovery of the informal workforce surrounding online economic crime and 
its dance between informal and crime-oriented spaces raises questions regarding the 
motivated offender approach currently dominating cybercrime research. Individuals 
involved in online economic crime or profit-driven cybercrime, regardless of their degree 
of involvement, are referred to as cybercriminals (Yip, Webber and Shadbolt, 2013; 
Yang et al., 2012; Wall, 1998) or “internet miscreants” (Caballero et al., 2011; Franklin et 
al., 2007). Yet there are many individuals established at the periphery of motivated 
158 
offenders organizations who are likely to contribute to the schemes, but they are not the 
masterminds behind the schemes. Just as the dichotomy “cyber/non-cyber” was found to 
be problematic when studying crime and technology (Powell, Stratton and Cameron, 
2018), the “good/bad” dichotomy may be covering important dynamics at play among 
actors involved in online economic crime and their degree of involvement in such crime. 
Developing concepts that grasp this nuance is required to start understanding the 
complex phenomenon that is online economic crime.  
Among the concepts that capture such nuances, Goldsmith and Brewer (2015) 
proposed digital drift to depict the ability of individuals to negotiate engagement 
boundaries in online criminal commitment. Digital drift grasps the flexibility, yet instability, 
of online criminal encounters. This concept can be useful when studying, for example, 
how and why informal workers end up knowingly contributing to online economic crime.  
This thesis offered additional concepts to grasp the degree to which individuals 
may be willing to participate in criminal activities: informal workers and drifters. 
Informal workers refer to individuals who engage in economic activities outside of the 
law, but not necessarily criminal activities. Drifters are individuals involved in crime-
oriented platforms, platforms that embody a criminal ethos (such as carding or blackhat 
SEO). This concept nuances that participating in crime-oriented platforms does not 
mean these individuals motivated offenders, but rather are “crimino-curious”. Further 
research could try to assess the shades of involvement, from motivated offenders to 
drifters, informal workers and even lurkers. This would illustrate the potential size and 
scope of online economic crime organizations beyond direct membership.  
Finally, previous studies have associated freelancer platforms with hotbeds for 
criminal online activities (Farooqi et al., 2017; Motoyama et al., 2013; Garg, Camp and 
Kanich, 2013). These studies, however, did not consider that most of the activities they 
considered “black hat” or “criminal” could fall into the informal realm, which is an 
important contribution of this thesis. Indeed, considering the informal realm as a space 
where individuals navigate between criminal, informal and legal, while favoring to 
stay out of the criminal arena, can enlighten researchers on the potential realities of 
these workers.  
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13.5. Further Thoughts on Prevention  
Lastly, this thesis illustrates the importance of indispensable workers and, more 
precisely, IT informal workers in the orchestration of online economic crime. The 
potential importance of digital labour platforms that gather these workers is also 
discussed. From these results, various strategies to deter informal IT workers from 
participating in online economic crime can be developed. These strategies are a first 
step towards moving beyond motivated offenders to prevent online economic crime. 
Given the rising interest in freelance work (Schmidt, 2017; Drahokoupil and 
Piasna, 2017; Drahokoupil and Fabo, 2016), and that freelancers usually provide their IT 
services through digital labour platforms, working with the administrators of these 
platforms to evaluate whether workers have been solicited to participate in online 
economic crime would be an interesting first step. This would quantify the extent to 
which these platforms are used for malicious purposes beyond the results of this thesis.  
Moreover, to prevent informal IT workers from contributing to online economic 
crime, they have to know how to detect whether the contracts they accept, and the 
subsequent product or service they provide, will be used for legitimate purposes. 
Developing programs and strategies that help informal IT workers develop skills to 
assess whether the work offered is for legitimate purposes or not would be useful. Also, 
informal IT workers not only have to know, but they also have to care. Thus, raising 
workers’ awareness on the harm created by online economic crime would also be 
valuable.  
Finally, these informal IT workers are the ones most visible, those at the end of 
the supply chain. They may be the ones punished or charged for their contributions in 
online economic crime, although they are not those who have orchestrated or thought of 
the scheme. Raising awareness on their vulnerable positions and the consequences 
they may face if they participate in online economic crime could prevent them from 
accepting dubious or shady work contracts.   
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Appendix A. Consent Form  
Consent Form for Research Participation 
 
Principal Investigator: Masarah-Cynthia Paquet-Clouston, PhD Student in 
Criminology, and part-time Security Researcher at GoSecure  
PhD Student Supervisor: Prof. Martin Bouchard  
Research Collaborators: (i) Sebastian Garcia: Assistant Professor at CTU University, 
PhD. Director of Stratosphere Laboratory; (ii) Marìa José Erquiaga, Licence 
Professionnelle, Researcher, Team Leader of the Aposemat project, part of the 
Stratosphere Laboratory; (iii) Anna Shirokova, Researcher at Avast Software (iv) 
Veronica Valeros: MSc. Technical Leader of Stratosphere Laborator 
 
Invitation and Study Purpose  
You are being invited to contribute, through an interview, to a research that aims at 
understanding the incentives behind criminal opportunities exploitations related to 
information technologies.  
Title: Beyond “Cyber”: Exploring the Incentives behind Criminal 
Opportunities Exploitations related to Information Technologies 
Thesis Summary: This study aims at understanding what are the personal 
and contextual factors that influence one’s decisions to exploit IT-related 
criminal opportunities, such as writing malware? To do so, we aim to (Goal 
1.) get the point of view of those behind the malicious activities and examine 
their decision-making processes when exploiting ITs-related criminal 
opportunities and (Goal 2.) understand the contextual factors that may 
influence one to exploit IT-related criminal opportunities. To answer the 
study’s objective, we dive into the technical structure of a botnet named 
Geost. The malicious scheme behind the Geost botnet is as follows: through 
hacked phone applications advertised on Russian websites, the operators own 
a network of infected phones. Based on this, we attempt at understanding the 
backgrounds and motivations of those involved in developing the malicious 
software with the use of data available online on public forums and a leaked 
and publicly available chat log of one of the main operators. Then, we move 
to comprehend the contextual factors (i.e. social, cultural, economic, 
political) that may influence individuals to develop such malicious software 
by discussing with cybersecurity experts from the same geographical region 
as the Geost operators and/or actively involved in stopping similar malicious 
schemes. 
Interview context: This interview is conducted for Masarah-Cynthia 
Paquet-Clouston’s PhD thesis, as well as for research about the Geost botnet, 
led by the Stratosphere Research group, based at the Czech Technical 
University, in collaboration with Avast (a Czech anti-virus company) and 
GoSecure (an American cybersecurity company with offices in Canada).   
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Interview Procedures  
Interviewer: Masarah-Cynthia Paquet-Clouston 
Observers:  Two of the collaborators, Sebastian Garcia and Maria José Erquiaga, 
may sit in the interview, if the research participant is comfortable with this.  
Interviewee: A cybersecurity expert from the same geographical region as the 
Geost operators and/or actively involved in stopping similar malicious schemes 
Objective: Understand the contextual factors (i.e., social, cultural, economic, 
political) that may influence one to exploit criminal opportunities related to 
information technologies  
Location: Online 
Time: between one hour to one hour and half  
Confidentiality 
All interviews are anonymous: any identifiable information, such as your name, 
professional occupation or company, will not be disclosed anywhere in the research. We 
will only keep the country from which you are operating as a cybersecurity expert. The 
interview will be recorded only with your acceptance. Once the interview’s transcription 
will be completed, all identifiable information will be removed, and if there is a recording, 
it will be destroyed.  
 
Potential Risks of the Study 
There are no foreseeable risks to you in participating in this study. If you think of any, 
please let me know. 
Potential benefits 
Your participation in the study will help us develop knowledge on contextual factors that 
may influence one to develop malicious software.  
 
Withdrawal  
You can withdraw from the study at any time during the interview and after the interview 
without giving any reasons. If you wish to withdraw after the interview, you can write to 
the email address to: […] and I will delete your interview transcript immediately and will 
not consider the interview in the study’s results.  
 
Study’s Results  
The study’s results will be presented at international conferences in cybersecurity, 
published in scientific articles and my final PhD thesis. If you wish to receive the study’s 
result personally, let me know (during or after the interview) and I will send them by 
email once completed.  
 
Data Stewardship 
The data will be kept by myself on a password protected external disk for five years 
following the publication of the research. All collaborators cited above will be able to 
access the disk strictly for the study. If the data is requested by an external party, it will be 




Contact Information  
If you have any questions, you can contact me, Masarah Paquet-Clouston, at the email 
address: […] or call me at […]. 
Contact for Complaints 
If you have any concerns about your rights, as a research participant and/or your 
experiences while participating in this study, you may contact Dr. Jeffrey Toward, 
Director, Office of Research Ethics […] or […].  
Thank you for your collaboration!  
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Appendix B. Crime-Oriented Platforms 
Forum Name Hosted Type N. Actors N. Comments 
Nulled to Clearnet Cracking and Leaks 415 3205 
Dark Money  Darknet Money Laundering 287 4872 
Best Hack Forum Clearnet Hacking 232 6311 
Exploit in  Clearnet Hacking 147 5845 
Black Hat World  Clearnet Black hat SEO 141 2319 
Club2crd Clearnet Carding 113 2407 
RaidForums Clearnet Cracking and Leaks 93 488 
Cracked Clearnet Cracking and Leaks 86 1212 
Cracking pro  Clearnet Cracking and Leaks 84 482 
Dread Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 83 1207 
Hidden answer Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 45 187 
Xss is  Darknet Hacking 43 538 
Prtship Clearnet Carding 42 383 
Cracking King Clearnet Cracking and Leaks 39 73 
Torum forum Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 36 202 
Trollodrome2 Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 34 90 
French deep web forum Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 30 138 
Rutor Darknet Cryptomarket 29 93 
Sinister  Clearnet Cracking and Leaks 28 738 
DNMAvengers Darknet Cryptomarket 26 280 
Dream forum Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 24 94 
The Hub Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 15 78 
SatForum Darknet Carding 12 1480 
International Carding Alliance Clearnet Carding 9 15 
Deutschland Clearnet Discussions, Sales, Questions 7 66 
Verified Carders Darknet Carding 7 32 
Envoy Forum Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 7 13 
Onion Land Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 7 44 
Wall Street forum Darknet Cryptomarket 5 27 
Dark Anti French System (DFAS) Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 5 104 
Criminality French Market Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 3 12 
Xaker26 Clearnet Hacking 2 46 
CardVilla Clearnet Carding 2 2 
Sinfulsite Clearnet Cracking and Leaks 1 2 
Hermes Darknet Discussions, Sales, Questions 1 1 
Main Helium Darknet Hacking 1 5 
CryptBB Darknet Hacking 1 5 
GreySec Clearnet Hacking 1 1 
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Appendix C. Additional Mann-Whitney U Tests 
 
Time Filter 1 (TF1): From 2015 to 2020  




Table 1  
Entire Platform Population TF1 and NF1  
 





 Mean Std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 34.76 171.77 4.0 28.87 149.23 4.0 15875519 0.0000 0.53 
N. days active 16.24 44.15 3.0 13.44 40.40 2.0 15666700 0.0000 0.54 
Diversification          
SDI 0.33 0.40 0.0 0.29 0.39 0.0 15996351 0.0000 0.53 
N. cat. 2.13 1.81 1.0 1.97 1.68 1.0 16007108 0.0000 0.53 
N. sub-cat 3.55 6.07 1.0 3.14 5.34 1.0 16029862 0.0000 0.53 
Business          
N. $ sign 1.50 12.87 0.0 1.02 10.54 0.0 16134200 0.0000 0.54 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.13 0.0 0.04 0.13 0.0 16153262 0.0000 0.52 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 3.00 17.75 0.0 2.94 21.36 0.0 16895351 0.3573 0.50 
Monetizing sites 7.50 80.50 0.0 5.65 37.24 0.0 16849367 0.2950 0.50 
Practical opt. 3.82 19.08 0.0 3.81 31.76 0.0 16959295 0.4905 0.50 
Comm. of prof. 6.52 50.43 0.0 3.89 40.65 0.0 16104023 0.0000 0.53 
Site building 4.75 26.53 0.0 4.62 45.83 0.0 16227874 0.0002 0.52 
Exch. and sale 1.61 8.10 0.0 1.45 9.62 0.0 16307064 0.0001 0.52 
Purch. traffic 0.93 10.68 0.0 0.66 9.76 0.0 16832449 0.1637 0.50 
Work web master 0.97 4.94 0.0 0.96 6.04 0.0 16778840 0.1291 0.50 
Not about work 5.66 59.09 0.0 4.89 71.32 0.0 16548104 0.0020 0.51 
Table 2  
Top 30% TF1 and NF1 
 





 Mean Std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 99.79 289.63 29.0 91.10 264.88 27.0 1559642 0.04 0.52 
N. days active 44.68 68.89 19.0 40.36 67.16 17.0 1526452 0.01 0.53 
Diversification          
SDI 0.52 0.35 0.6 0.51 0.36 0.6 1617283 0.34 0.51 
N. cat. 3.69 2.33 3.0 3.53 2.25 3.0 1577524 0.09 0.52 
N. sub-cat 7.70 9.23 5.0 7.19 8.47 4.0 1598917 0.20 0.51 
Business          
N. $ sign 4.29 22.23 0.0 3.22 19.25 0.0 1536479 0.01 0.53 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.08 0.0 0.04 0.08 0.0 1552542 0.02 0.53 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 8.64 30.23 0.0 9.29 38.61 0.0 1619719 0.34 0.50 
Monetizing sites 21.73 139.65 1.0 17.80 67.07 1.0 1629106 0.44 0.50 
Practical opt. 10.81 32.21 1.0 11.73 57.74 1.0 1595856 0.17 0.51 
Comm. of prof. 19.06 86.82 0.0 12.47 74.21 0.0 1515778 0.00 0.54 
Site building 13.28 45.15 1.0 14.52 83.63 1.0 1579436 0.08 0.52 
Exch. and sale 4.18 13.72 0.0 4.21 17.37 0.0 1587799 0.10 0.51 
Purch. traffic 2.54 18.54 0.0 1.92 17.90 0.0 1626877 0.39 0.50 
Work web master 2.45 8.36 0.0 2.72 10.86 0.0 1615643 0.28 0.51 
Not about work 17.11 102.36 0.0 16.43 130.75 0.0 1561045 0.02 0.52 
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Time Filter 1 (TF1) : From 2015 to 2020  







Entire Platform Population TF1 and NF2 
 





 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 30.74 163.49 4.0 29.18 150.1 4.0 13051649 0.0046 0.52 
N. days active 15.24 42.76 3.0 13.54 40.54 2.0 12921421 0.0007 0.53 
Diversification          
SDI 0.32 0.40 0.0 0.29 0.39 0.0 13023474 0.0011 0.52 
N. cat. 2.09 1.79 1.0 1.97 1.68 1.0 13093770 0.0032 0.52 
N. sub-cat 3.44 5.99 1.0 3.16 5.36 1.0 131827401 0.0136 0.52 
Business          
N. $ sign 1.44 13.82 0.0 1.03 10.51 0.0 13094995 0.0002 0.52 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.13 0.0 0.04 0.13 0.0 13102302 0.0003 0.52 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 2.59 13.49 0.0 2.96 21.48 0.0 13499189 0.1953 0.51 
Monetizing sites 7.55 88.34 0.0 5.68 37.25 0.0 13584526 0.3772 0.50 
Practical opt. 3.64 19.20 0.0 3.82 31.60 0.0 13516339 0.2482 0.50 
Comm. of prof. 5.08 35.97 0.0 4.01 41.66 0.0 13123717 0.0012 0.52 
Site building 4.49 26.69 0.0 4.64 45.60 0.0 13209078 0.0102 0.52 
Exch. and sale 1.67 8.69 0.0 1.45 9.58 0.0 13152484 0.0011 0.52 
Purch. traffic 0.70 7.16 0.0 0.67 9.95 0.0 13487232 0.0965 0.51 
Work web master 1.05 5.35 0.0 0.96 6.01 0.0 13430183 0.0727 0.51 
Not about work 3.96 48.54 0.0 5.00 71.60 0.0 13395992 0.0274 0.51 
Table 4 
Top 30% TF1 and NF2 
 





 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 89.67 280.21 29.00 91.87 265.96 27.0 1246473 0.13 0.52 
N. days active 42.70 67.85 18.00 40.56 67.27 17.0 1223830 0.04 0.53 
Diversification          
SDI 0.51 0.35 0.59 0.51 0.36 0.6 1285253 0.46 0.50 
N. cat. 3.65 2.35 3.00 3.53 2.25 3.0 1262927 0.24 0.51 
N. sub-cat 7.53 9.26 4.00 7.21 8.48 4.0 1283097 0.43 0.50 
Business          
N. $ sign 4.23 24.21 0.00 3.25 19.16 0.0 1216474 0.02 0.53 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.0 1219649 0.02 0.53 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 7.59 23.05 0.00 9.34 38.77 0.0 1273839 0.33 0.51 
Monetizing sites 22.40 155.21 1.00 17.83 66.98 1.0 1282424 0.42 0.50 
Practical opt. 10.55 32.87 1.00 11.73 57.37 1.0 1268434 0.28 0.51 
Comm. of prof. 15.10 62.44 0.00 12.82 75.93 0.0 1202405 0.01 0.53 
Site building 12.81 46.07 1.00 14.53 83.08 1.0 1263020 0.23 0.51 
Exch. and sale 4.43 14.92 0.00 4.20 17.25 0.0 1250178 0.12 0.52 
Purch. traffic 1.86 12.55 0.00 1.98 18.22 0.0 1288007 0.48 0.50 
Work web master 2.73 9.15 0.00 2.70 10.78 0.0 1286803 0.46 0.50 
Not about work 12.21 85.27 0.00 16.74 131.04 0.0 1249680 0.10 0.52 
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Time Filter 1 (TF1) : From 2015 to 2020  
Name Filter 3 (NF3): Minimum of five characters AND at least an uppercase OR a 






Entire Platform Population TF1 and NF3 
 





 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu  p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 30.02 119.77 5.0 29.23 152.01 4.0 9643767 0.0000 0.54 
N. days active 15.08 34.68 3.0 13.56 40.90 2.0 9512654 0.0000 0.55 
Diversification          
SDI 0.33 0.40 0.0 0.29 0.39 0.0 9957233 0.0002 0.53 
N. cat. 2.16 1.82 1.0 1.97 1.68 1.0 9908008 0.0000 0.53 
N. sub-cat 3.51 5.68 1.0 3.16 5.38 1.0 9990163 0.0005 0.53 
Business          
N. $ sign 1.10 4.71 0.0 1.05 10.90 0.0 10040786 0.0000 0.53 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.14 0.0 0.04 0.13 0.0 10058989 0.0000 0.53 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 2.36 13.01 0.0 2.96 21.41 0.0 10532269 0.3341 0.50 
Monetizing sites 6.27 29.05 0.0 5.75 42.00 0.0 10381182 0.1011 0.51 
Practical opt. 3.08 12.15 0.0 3.85 31.62 0.0 10479627 0.2412 0.51 
Comm. of prof. 6.85 54.34 0.0 3.94 40.73 0.0 9887739 0.0000 0.53 
Site building 3.83 17.13 0.0 4.66 45.60 0.0 10129655 0.0024 0.52 
Exch. and sale 1.40 5.68 0.0 1.46 9.66 0.0 10070740 0.0001 0.52 
Purch. traffic 0.65 6.04 0.0 0.68 9.95 0.0 10452972 0.0891 0.51 
Work web master 0.93 4.91 0.0 0.96 6.02 0.0 10549088 0.3583 0.50 
Not about work 4.67 47.23 0.0 4.95 71.39 0.0 10304260 0.0052 0.51 
Table 6 
Top 30% TF1 and NF3 
 





 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu  p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 80.28 193.15 30.5 92.31 269.92 27.0 1037039 0.08 0.52 
N. days active 38.75 50.85 20.0 40.78 68.02 17.0 1010601 0.01 0.54 
Diversification          
SDI 0.51 0.35 0.6 0.51 0.36 0.6 1075500 0.36 0.51 
N. cat. 3.65 2.29 3.0 3.53 2.25 3.0 1054491 0.17 0.52 
N. sub-cat 7.26 8.33 5.0 7.22 8.54 4.0 1078888 0.40 0.50 
Business          
N. $ sign 2.88 7.64 0.0 3.32 19.89 0.0 1041784 0.08 0.52 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.09 0.0 0.04 0.08 0.0 1050250 0.12 0.52 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 6.30 21.47 0.0 9.39 38.69 0.0 1077164 0.37 0.50 
Monetizing sites 16.84 47.42 1.0 18.16 75.96 1.0 1074137 0.34 0.51 
Practical opt. 8.11 19.58 0.0 11.84 57.48 1.0 1076778 0.37 0.51 
Comm. of prof. 18.86 90.87 1.0 12.66 74.35 0.0 987551 0.00 0.55 
Site building 9.81 27.99 1.0 14.66 83.19 1.0 1083730 0.45 0.50 
Exch. and sale 3.25 9.22 0.0 4.26 17.42 0.0 1070570 0.28 0.51 
Purch. traffic 1.64 10.14 0.0 1.99 18.25 0.0 1065357 0.18 0.51 
Work web master 2.25 8.09 0.0 2.72 10.81 0.0 1048752 0.08 0.52 
Not about work 13.22 79.34 0.0 16.65 130.85 0.0 1050045 0.09 0.52 
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Time Filter 2 (TF2): From 2016 to 2019  






Entire Platform Population TF2 and NF1 
 
  Drifters 




 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 39.65 195.37 4.0 28.72 148.13 4.0 12085308 0.0002 0.53 
N. days active 17.78 48.50 3.0 13.41 40.20 2.0 11917918 0.0000 0.54 
Diversification          
SDI 0.33 0.40 0.0 0.29 0.39 0.0 12136276 0.0001 0.53 
N. cat. 2.14 1.85 1.0 1.97 1.68 1.0 12127189 0.0001 0.53 
N. sub-cat 3.65 6.36 1.0 3.14 5.34 1.0 12173247 0.0003 0.53 
Business          
N. $ sign 1.71 14.74 0.0 1.02 10.46 0.0 12149912 0.0000 0.53 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.13 0.0 0.04 0.13 0.0 12191079 0.0000 0.53 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 3.21 19.41 0.0 2.93 21.22 0.0 12838389 0.4260 0.50 
Monetizing sites 8.85 92.91 0.0 
 
5.61 
36.95 0.0 12794157 0.3434 0.50 
Practical opt. 4.16 21.11 0.0 3.80 31.51 0.0 12812234 0.3780 0.50 
Comm. of prof. 7.31 54.56 0.0 3.89 40.56 0.0 12113545 0.0000 0.53 
Site building 5.24 29.10 0.0 4.60 45.47 0.0 12257289 0.0004 0.52 
Exch. and sale 1.69 8.78 0.0 
 
1.45 
9.57 0.0 12349774 0.0005 0.52 
Purch. traffic 1.14 12.33 0.0 0.65 9.67 0.0 12684530 0.0577 0.51 
Work web master 1.02 5.13 0.0 0.96 6.02 0.0 12698689 0.1165 0.51 
Not about work 7.03 68.05 0.0 4.83 70.70 0.0 12503083 0.0018 0.51 
Table 8 
Top 30% TF2 and NF1 
 





 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 115.09 329.46 33.00 90.39 262.65 27.0 1141394 0.00 0.54 
N. days active 49.56 75.52 21.00 40.17 66.76 17.0 1116426 0.00 0.55 
Diversification          
SDI 0.52 0.35 0.60 0.51 0.36 0.6 1213995 0.24 0.51 
N. cat. 3.75 2.37 3.00 3.53 2.25 3.0 1177444 0.05 0.53 
N. sub-cat 8.03 9.68 5.00 7.18 8.45 4.0 1197362 0.13 0.52 
Business          
N. $ sign 4.97 25.50 1.00 3.21 19.08 0.0 1124717 0.00 0.55 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.0 1149742 0.00 0.54 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 9.35 33.13 0.00 9.23 38.32 0.0 1216732 0.25 0.51 
Monetizing sites 26.00 161.32 1.00 17.63 66.48 1.0 1207479 0.18 0.51 
Practical opt. 11.93 35.69 1.00 11.65 57.22 1.0 1204423 0.16 0.51 
Comm. of prof. 21.47 93.95 0.00 12.46 73.97 0.0 1132597 0.00 0.54 
Site building 14.83 49.56 1.00 14.40 82.89 1.0 1180834 0.05 0.52 
Exch. and sale 4.38 14.93 0.00 4.20 17.24 0.0 1206242 0.15 0.51 
Purch. traffic 3.17 21.43 0.00 1.90 17.72 0.0 1220897 0.23 0.51 
Work web master 2.60 8.69 0.00 2.71 10.80 0.0 1239948 0.50 0.50 
Not about work 21.36 117.87 0.00 16.20 129.47 0.0 1157260 0.00 0.53 
188 
 
Time Filter 2 (TF2): From 2016 to 2019  





Entire Platform Population TF2 and NF2 
 
  Drifters 
N= 924 
 Non-Drifters 
N=  22,424 
Statistics 
 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 33.64 184.53 4.0 29.08 149.29 4.0 9987036 0.03 0.52 
N. days active 16.23 46.29 3.0 13.52 40.41 2.5 9861071 0.01 0.52 
Diversification          
SDI 0.32 0.40 0.0 0.29 0.39 0.0 9880754 0.00 0.52 
N. cat. 2.10 1.82 1.0 1.97 1.68 1.0 9927170 0.01 0.52 
N. sub-cat 3.49 6.18 1.0 3.16 5.36 1.0 10056632 0.05 0.51 
Business          
N. $ sign 1.63 15.80 0.0 1.03 10.45 0.0 9899181 0.00 0.52 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.13 0.0 0.04 0.13 0.0 9922078 0.00 0.52 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 2.65 13.88 0.0 2.95 21.38 0.0 10208775 0.15 0.51 
Monetizing sites 8.80 101.76 0.0 5.65 37.03 0.0 10359620 0.50 0.50 
Practical opt. 3.80 20.97 0.0 3.82 31.42 0.0 10227283 0.21 0.51 
Comm. of prof. 5.06 34.42 0.0 4.02 41.64 0.0 9914873 0.00 0.52 
Site building 4.90 29.07 0.0 4.62 45.33 0.0 9994147 0.01 0.52 
Exch. and sale 1.85 9.67 0.0 1.44 9.52 0.0 9928202 0.00 0.52 
Purch. traffic 0.84 8.24 0.0 0.67 9.88 0.0 10172462 0.04 0.51 
Work web master 1.11 5.54 0.0 0.96 5.99 0.0 10120283 0.03 0.51 
Not about work 4.62 55.54 0.0 4.96 71.12 0.0 10200365 0.08 0.51 
Table 10 
Top 30% TF2 and NF2 
 
  Drifters 
N= 290 
 Non-Drifters 
N=  6,634 
Statistics 
 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 100.70 319.63 32.50 91.35 264.24 27.0 901275.5 0.03 0.53 
N. days active 46.66 74.06 21.00 40.42 66.98 17.0 883153.0 0.01 0.54 
Diversification          
SDI 0.51 0.35 0.60 0.51 0.36 0.6 953309.5 0.40 0.50 
N. cat. 3.72 2.38 3.00 3.53 2.25 3.0 923191.0 0.12 0.52 
N. sub-cat 7.83 9.61 4.00 7.20 8.48 4.0 954144.0 0.41 0.50 
Business          
N. $ sign 4.91 27.95 1.00 3.23 19.03 0.0 874416.5 0.00 0.55 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.0 883824.0 0.01 0.54 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 7.93 23.93 0.00 9.30 38.55 0.0 961451.0 0.49 0.50 
Monetizing sites 26.89 180.52 1.00 17.71 66.51 1.0 946161.0 0.31 0.51 
Practical opt. 11.31 36.34 1.00 11.68 56.97 1.0 947644.0 0.32 0.51 
Comm. of prof. 15.32 60.22 0.00 12.85 75.81 0.0 889351.5 0.01 0.54 
Site building 14.36 50.64 1.00 14.43 82.50 1.0 927042.5 0.13 0.52 
Exch. and sale 5.04 16.75 0.00 4.18 17.14 0.0 921030.0 0.07 0.52 
Purch. traffic 2.30 14.58 0.00 1.96 18.08 0.0 947265.5 0.26 0.51 
Work web master 2.95 9.55 0.00 2.69 10.75 0.0 937842.0 0.18 0.51 
Not about work 14.60 98.53 0.00 16.56 130.03 0.0 921150.0 0.07 0.52 
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Time Filter 3 (TF2) : From 2017 and 2018  






Entire Platform Population TF3 and NF1 
 





 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 36.09 196.98 4.0 29.05 149.19 4.0 7396325 0.00 0.53 
N. days active 17.37 47.53 3.0 13.51 40.43 2.5 7317611 0.00 0.54 
Diversification          
SDI 0.33 0.40 0.0 0.29 0.39 0.0 7405017 0.00 0.53 
N. cat. 2.16 1.85 1.0 1.97 1.68 1.0 7409644 0.00 0.53 
N. sub-cat 3.63 6.41 1.0 3.16 5.36 1.0 7442372 0.00 0.53 
Business          
N. $ sign 1.90 18.41 0.0 1.03 10.39 0.0 7421517 0.00 0.53 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.13 0.0 0.04 0.13 0.0 7442708 0.00 0.53 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 2.92 16.13 0.0 2.94 21.27 0.0 7871826 0.47 0.50 
Monetizing sites 11.05 118.45 0.0 5.61 36.72 0.0 7832678 0.36 0.50 
Practical opt. 3.48 15.49 0.0 3.83 31.43 0.0 7879421 0.49 0.50 
Comm. of prof. 5.57 29.44 0.0 4.02 41.69 0.0 7371457 0.00 0.53 
Site building 3.98 19.01 0.0 4.65 45.36 0.0 7535437 0.01 0.52 
Exch. and sale 2.00 10.64 0.0 1.44 9.49 0.0 7526997 0.00 0.52 
Purch. traffic 1.39 14.40 0.0 0.65 9.65 0.0 7633722 0.00 0.52 
Work web master 1.21 5.93 0.0 0.96 5.98 0.0 7758455 0.13 0.51 
Not about work 4.48 50.46 0.0 4.96 71.10 0.0 7728462 0.06 0.51 
Table 12 
Top 30% TF3 and NF1 
 





 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 102.62 332.54 31.00 91.37 264.23 27.0 728492 0.07 0.53 
N. days active 47.66 73.76 21.00 40.44 67.06 17.0 707074 0.01 0.54 
Diversification          
SDI 0.52 0.35 0.63 0.51 0.36 0.6 756048 0.28 0.51 
N. cat. 3.74 2.37 3.00 3.53 2.25 3.0 736946 0.11 0.52 
N. sub-cat 7.84 9.78 5.00 7.20 8.48 4.0 758913 0.32 0.51 
Business          
N. $ sign 5.48 31.70 1.00 3.23 18.92 0.0 695031 0.00 0.55 
Prop. $ sign 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.0 697116 0.00 0.55 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 8.35 27.22 0.00 9.27 38.37 0.0 770912 0.47 0.50 
Monetizing sites 32.34 204.24 1.00 17.60 65.99 1.0 760147 0.32 0.51 
Practical opt. 9.77 25.77 1.00 11.73 57.02 1.0 754084 0.25 0.51 
Comm. of prof. 15.84 49.57 0.00 12.85 75.95 0.0 717639 0.02 0.54 
Site building 10.90 31.88 1.00 14.55 82.60 1.0 744830 0.16 0.52 
Exch. and sale 5.18 17.99 0.00 4.18 17.09 0.0 747174 0.15 0.52 
Purch. traffic 3.76 24.83 0.00 1.91 17.66 0.0 753183 0.17 0.51 
Work web master 3.15 9.95 0.00 2.69 10.72 0.0 751674 0.18 0.51 
Not about work 13.33 87.04 0.00 16.59 130.07 0.0 746690 0.14 0.52 
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Time Filter 3 (TF3): From 2017 and 2018  





Entire Platform Population TF3 and NF2 
 





 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu  p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 33.39 212.15 4.0 29.16 149.03 4.0 6112769 0.07 0.52 
N. days active 15.99 46.98 3.0 13.57 40.50 3.0 6048591 0.03 0.52 
Diversification          
SDI 0.33 0.41 0.0 0.29 0.39 0.0 5958426 0.00 0.53 
N. cat. 2.15 1.84 1.0 1.97 1.68 1.0 5991509 0.00 0.53 
N. sub-cat 3.54 6.37 1.0 3.16 5.37 1.0 6112788 0.05 0.52 
Business          
N. $ sign 1.87 19.92 0.0 1.03 10.39 0.0 6071896 0.01 0.52 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.13 0.0 0.04 0.13 0.0 6088850 0.01 0.52 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 2.52 12.78 0.0 2.95 21.30 0.0 6287850 0.30 0.50 
Monetizing sites 10.90 129.54 0.0 5.65 36.86 0.0 6253243 0.24 0.51 
Practical opt. 3.31 15.52 0.0 3.83 31.36 0.0 6323919 0.43 0.50 
Comm. of prof. 4.51 24.30 0.0 4.05 41.70 0.0 5965911 0.00 0.53 
Site building 3.48 16.60 0.0 4.66 45.27 0.0 6130521 0.05 0.52 
Exch. and sale 2.24 11.71 0.0 1.44 9.47 0.0 5989857 0.00 0.53 
Purch. traffic 1.14 10.42 0.0 0.66 9.81 0.0 6100427 0.00 0.52 
Work web master 1.34 6.47 0.0 0.95 5.96 0.0 6177571 0.05 0.51 
Not about work 3.96 54.07 0.0 4.97 70.93 0.0 6330213 0.42 0.50 
Table 14 
Top 30% TF3 and NF2 
 





 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu  p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 98.68 368.63 31.00 91.56 263.60 27.0 569759 0.15 0.52 
N. days active 45.41 75.44 20.00 40.56 67.07 17.0 552251 0.04 0.54 
Diversification          
SDI 0.52 0.35 0.64 0.51 0.36 0.6 580491 0.26 0.51 
N. cat. 3.79 2.38 3.00 3.53 2.25 3.0 562096 0.09 0.53 
N. sub-cat 7.81 9.97 5.00 7.21 8.49 4.0 595128 0.47 0.50 
Business          
N. $ sign 5.62 35.10 1.00 3.24 18.90 0.0 540025 0.01 0.55 
Prop. $ sign 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.0 536585 0.01 0.55 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 7.45 21.87 0.00 9.29 38.39 0.0 595110 0.47 0.50 
Monetizing sites 33.38 228.61 1.00 17.69 66.18 1.0 583177 0.29 0.51 
Practical opt. 9.67 26.46 1.00 11.72 56.83 1.0 587471 0.35 0.51 
Comm. of prof. 13.32 41.81 1.00 12.94 75.90 0.0 539074 0.01 0.55 
Site building 9.78 28.44 1.00 14.55 82.35 1.0 589704 0.38 0.51 
Exch. and sale 6.07 20.19 0.00 4.16 17.04 0.0 556765 0.04 0.53 
Purch. traffic 3.06 18.33 0.00 1.94 17.94 0.0 579546 0.17 0.51 
Work web master 3.65 11.08 0.00 2.68 10.69 0.0 562733 0.05 0.53 
Not about work 12.29 95.56 0.00 16.59 129.63 0.0 593886 0.44 0.50 
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Time Filter 3 (TF3): From 2017 and 2018  
Name Filter 3 (NF3): Minimum of five characters AND at least an uppercase OR a number 





Entire Platform TF3 and NF3 
 





 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu  p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 28.53 75.86 4.0 29.27 151.87 4.0 4404273 0.00 0.54 
N. days active 16.34 36.23 3.0 13.58 40.74 3.0 4356994 0.00 0.55 
Diversification          
SDI 0.33 0.40 0.0 0.29 0.39 0.0 4524930 0.01 0.53 
N. cat. 2.19 1.86 1.0 1.97 1.68 1.0 4479288 0.00 0.54 
N. sub-cat 3.54 5.77 1.0 3.16 5.39 1.0 4534297 0.01 0.53 
Business          
N. $ sign 1.13 4.93 0.0 1.05 10.79 0.0 4483080 0.00 0.54 
Prop. $ sign 0.04 0.13 0.0 0.04 0.13 0.0 4510193 0.00 0.53 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 2.62 16.15 0.0 2.95 21.22 0.0 4796942 0.39 0.50 
Monetizing sites 8.79 40.19 0.0 5.72 41.58 0.0 4718437 0.17 0.51 
Practical opt. 2.53 8.94 0.0 3.84 31.33 0.0 4656851 0.07 0.52 
Comm. of prof. 5.46 29.91 0.0 4.04 41.56 0.0 4401129 0.00 0.54 
Site building 2.73 9.38 0.0 4.66 45.19 0.0 4577963 0.01 0.53 
Exch. and sale 1.60 6.71 0.0 1.46 9.57 0.0 4550360 0.00 0.53 
Purch. traffic 0.56 2.25 0.0 0.68 9.91 0.0 4655954 0.01 0.52 
Work web master 1.26 6.37 0.0 0.96 5.97 0.0 4802565 0.39 0.50 
Not about work 2.97 19.70 0.0 4.98 71.17 0.0 4717719 0.08 0.51 
Table 16 
Top 30% TF3 and NF3 
 





 Mean std Median Mean std Median Mannwhitneyu  p-value 1-f 
Activity Rate          
N. posts 73.76 113.04 31.50 92.14 269.20 27.0 486970 0.13 0.53 
N. days active 41.24 51.68 21.00 40.67 67.61 17.0 467977 0.03 0.55 
Diversification          
SDI 0.51 0.35 0.60 0.51 0.36 0.6 512991 0.47 0.50 
N. cat. 3.71 2.31 3.00 3.54 2.25 3.0 492061 0.17 0.52 
N. sub-cat 7.18 8.39 5.00 7.23 8.53 4.0 511404 0.45 0.50 
Business          
N. $ sign 2.89 7.89 1.00 3.31 19.67 0.0 461471 0.01 0.55 
Prop. $ sign 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.0 459530 0.01 0.55 
Specific Topics           
Search Engine 6.95 26.37 0.00 9.29 38.28 0.0 503464 0.31 0.51 
Monetizing sites 23.54 64.40 2.00 17.97 75.06 1.0 478807 0.06 0.53 
Practical opt. 6.53 14.00 0.00 11.78 56.84 1.0 495430 0.20 0.52 
Comm. of prof. 14.28 48.62 1.00 12.92 75.71 0.0 467051 0.02 0.55 
Site building 6.59 14.79 1.00 14.60 82.29 1.0 513136 0.47 0.50 
Exch. and sale 3.53 10.78 0.00 4.23 17.24 0.0 514151 0.49 0.50 
Purch. traffic 1.18 3.48 0.00 1.99 18.14 0.0 505982 0.30 0.51 
Work web master 3.05 10.30 0.00 2.69 10.71 0.0 512595 0.46 0.50 
Not about work 8.10 32.21 0.00 16.67 130.21 0.0 501689 0.26 0.51 
